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ABSTRACT
Parties to large business combination transactions are
paradigmatically sophisticated, profit-maximizing entities. As such, they
structure their transactions to be efficient, that is, to maximize the joint
surplus of the transaction, as this creates the greatest opportunity for each
to profit from the transaction. One of the greatest difficulties such parties
face in maximizing the joint surplus of the transaction is the severe
asymmetric information problem between the seller and the buyer
regarding the business to be transferred (the target). The market has
developed two main tools to overcome this problem. First, before the
parties enter into a definitive agreement regarding a transaction, the seller
provides the buyer with tremendous amounts of non-public information
about the target business (due diligence). Second, in the definitive
agreement, the seller makes extensive representations and warranties about
the target, thus assuming liability if these factual statements about the
target turn out to be false.
In order to price transactions as accurately as possible, sophisticated
parties attempt to identify precisely the rights they acquire and the
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obligations they undertake in entering such transactions. By far, the
cheapest way to do this is to limit those rights and obligations to those
specified in the definitive written agreement, and so the intention of the
parties is that the agreement between them should determine such rights
and obligations completely. With respect to the rights and obligations
created by contractual promises, that goal is easily attained (to the extent
that any contract can ever be truly complete) by invoking the parol
evidence rule by means of a properly drafted integration clause.
With respect to rights and obligations arising from representations,
however, the development of the common law at the intersection of
contract and tort has made the situation more complicated. Although the
law has usually allowed parties to contract around actions for contractual
misrepresentation, the situation was different with respect to fraudulent
misrepresentations for a long time. Under the theory that fraud vitiates
everything, contractual provisions purporting to limit remedies for
fraudulent
misrepresentations,
including
even
extra-contractual
misrepresentations, were long held unenforceable on public policy grounds.
More recently, however, leading commercial jurisdictions like Delaware
and New York have allowed sophisticated parties to agree that the only
actionable representations will be those included in the definitive
agreement, including with respect to actions for fraudulent inducement.
This is accomplished by means of so-called “non-reliance clauses,” in
which a party promises or represents that it is not relying on any
representations by the counterparty except for those included in the
definitive agreement.
Even some sophisticated parties are surprised to discover, however,
that representations made not actionable at common law by non-reliance
clauses may be actionable under Rule 10b-5, the general antifraud
provision of the federal securities laws. At issue is Section 29(a) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which declares void any agreement
“binding any person to waive compliance with any provision” of the act or
rules promulgated thereunder. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has held that non-reliance clauses, at least between
sophisticated parties, survive under Section 29(a), but the First and Third
Circuits have held otherwise and have allowed Rule 10b-5 suits based on
extra-contractual representations to proceed.
After reviewing the common law background regarding non-reliance
clauses, this Article provides an economic analysis of the process by which
sophisticated parties to business combination transactions deal with the
severe information problem inherent in such transactions, that is, the fact
that the buyer comes to the transaction knowing relatively little about the
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target business, and certainly much less than the seller does. The process
of dealing with this problem typically begins with the parties entering into
a preliminary agreement, variously styled a confidentiality agreement or
non-disclosure agreement, the primary purpose of which is to prevent the
potential buyer from using confidential, non-public information about the
target for any purpose other than evaluating a potential acquisition of the
target. After such an agreement is signed, due diligence begins, and the
seller gives the buyer access to large amounts of non-public information
about the target business, including both written materials and information
delivered orally in meetings and discussions between the agents of the
parties.
Confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements virtually always include
provisions in which the seller disclaims any representation that the
information delivered in due diligence will be accurate or complete. This
Article argues that such disclaimers, which neophytes often find surprising,
are virtually necessary features of the situation. First, the written materials
delivered in due diligence typically aggregate several tens of thousands of
pages, and this information is usually drawn directly from the business
records of the company, which were prepared for other purposes in other
contexts.
Since a rational business invests in the accuracy and
completeness of its records only to the extent that the marginal benefit of
doing so exceeds the marginal cost, a firm’s business records will naturally
contain a certain non-zero percentage of misstatements and omissions. A
seller delivering such records in due diligence will thus know that they
include such misstatements and omissions. Reviewing the records to
identify and correct such misstatements and omissions, however, would be
extremely costly and involve significant delay. Moreover, the oral
discussions between agents of the seller and agents of the buyer often
involve relatively junior personnel who lack a comprehensive
understanding of the business and the potential transaction, and so there is a
very large probability that such agents will sometimes make statements
even in good faith that senior officers and transaction advisors would
recognize as being untrue or misleading. Again, preventing or correcting
such misstatements and omissions would be extremely costly and involve
significant delays. Hence, with respect to both written and oral statements
in due diligence, if the seller represented that all the information it
delivered to the buyer was true and complete, that representation itself
would almost inevitably be fraudulent. The seller would be virtually
certain that what it was saying was false. Moreover, sophisticated buyers
understand all this as well as the seller does. In disclaiming the accuracy
and completeness of the due diligence materials, therefore, the seller is
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merely saying what the seller and buyer already know is the case: that these
materials will contain misstatements and omissions that the seller, at some
senior level, would know to be misstatements or omissions.
Furthermore, sophisticated parties want to craft an efficient
agreement, that is, one that divides rights and obligations precisely and
allocates each right to the party that values it most highly and each
obligation to the party that can bear it most cheaply. With respect to
representations and warranties, this means that parties wish to include in
the agreement only the efficient set of representations and warranties—that
is, those that cost the seller less to make than they benefit the buyer to
receive. Including any other representations will reduce the joint surplus
and make both parties worse off.
But, identifying the efficient
representations and warranties requires comparing the cost of making the
representation, which is known only to the seller, with the benefit of
receiving the representation, which is known only to the buyer. That
means that neither party, acting alone, can determine the efficient set of
representations. Rather, the parties must act together, through bargaining,
to identify the efficient set of representations. In addition, the cost to the
seller and the benefit to the buyer of a given representation depends not
only on its content (i.e., what it says about the target business), but also on
the other provisions contained in the agreement of which it is a part, such
as the indemnification provisions and closing conditions. Hence, it is
impossible for parties to identify the efficient representations except by
bargaining over them in the context of a definitive agreement. Since both
parties understand this, neither party wants the information the seller
delivers to the buyer in due diligence to form part of their agreement.
Hence, as a counterpart to the seller disclaiming the accuracy and
completeness of the due diligence materials, the buyer promises in the
preliminary agreement that it will not rely on any statements by the seller
except for the representations in the definitive agreement (promissory nonreliance clauses). When it enters into that agreement, the buyer then
represents that it has fulfilled this promise and is relying only on the
representations in the definitive agreement (representational non-reliance
clauses).
In short, this Article argues that disclaimers, promissory non-reliance
clauses, and representational non-reliance clauses are parts of an integrated
system designed to produce an efficient set of representations and
warranties as part of an efficient overall agreement between sophisticated
parties. Since such parties come to the transaction wanting and expecting
such a system, the clauses merely make express the understanding that
participants in the market for corporate control already have. Even if such
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clauses were not included in the relevant agreements, the economic realities
of the situation make it such that no reasonable seller would understand
itself to making enforceable representations in due diligence, and no
reasonable buyer would rely on any such representations. Even if
enforceability were limited to fraudulent misrepresentations, the result
would be a severely inefficient process that would decrease the value to the
parties of the potential transaction.
Against this understanding of the economic realities of the dealmaking process, this Article then considers whether disclaimers and nonreliance clauses should be enforceable under Section 29(a). Arguing that
Section 29(a) should be understood as preventing parties from tampering
with the allocation of rights made by the federal securities laws, and relying
on the economic analysis in the Article to show that no representations or
warranties were ever made or received in due diligence and thus no rights
created, the Article concludes that disclaimers and non-reliance clauses do
not run afoul of Section 29(a). If the Supreme Court ever addresses the
circuit split related to the enforceability of non-reliance clauses, it should
adopt the view of the Second Circuit that such clauses are enforceable, at
least as between sophisticated parties involved in business combination
transactions.
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INTRODUCTION
In any significant business combination transaction, the seller (or
target) is a firm of substantial size. The acquirer is either another firm
operating in the same or a related line of business, usually of larger and
often of much larger size (a strategic buyer), or otherwise a private equity
fund (a financial buyer). The parties to such transactions are thus
paradigmatically rational, sophisticated, profit-maximizing parties.1 To
profit as much as possible from such transactions, such parties want to
structure their transactions to assign rights to the party who values them
most highly and obligations to the party that can bear them the most
cheaply. This maximizes the joint surplus the transaction creates, which
allows both parties to profit to the greatest extent possible. Central to this
endeavor is identifying and specifying the rights the parties acquire and the
1. The assumption is very much in favor of the neo-classical rationality assumption
and against any competing behavioralist assumptions. See infra note 26.
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obligations they undertake upon entering the transaction. By far, the
cheapest and most effective way of doing this is to limit those rights and
obligations to those specified in the definitive written agreement between
the parties.2 Unfortunately, the law makes this surprisingly difficult.3
Although the parol evidence rule,4 which the parties invoke by means
of an integration clause in the definitive agreement,5 makes it simple for the
parties to circumscribe the set of promises they make (and thus the
contractual obligations for performing such promises that they take on) to
those in the written agreement, the situation is not so simple with respect to
the representations the parties make.6 In part because of historical
2. See generally Glenn D. West & W. Benton Lewis, Jr., Contracting to Avoid ExtraContractual Liability—Can Your Contractual Deal Ever Really Be the “Entire” Deal?, 64
BUS. L. 999 (2009) (proposing a series of defensive strategies to limit client exposure to tort
liability arising from contractual obligations). Of course, whenever transaction costs are
positive—which is to say, always in the real world—no contract is ever literally complete.
The point in the text is that, because of their sophistication and experience, the costs that
sophisticated parties face in attempting to make contracts complete are unusually low, and
since the amounts involved in business combination transactions are usually very high, such
parties can and will write contracts that are, generally speaking, highly complete—about as
complete as contracts in the real world will get, even if these contracts are not literally
complete.
3. West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1018 (stating, “[T]he agreements governing
sophisticated corporate transactions . . . often include a series of defensive provisions
designed to ensure that the contract constitutes the exclusive source of contracting parties’
post-closing rights, obligations, and remedies.”).
4. See E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS §§ 7.2-7.3 (1990)
(discussing parol evidence rule and related doctrines). As Judge Posner explains, “Drafters
of contracts worry lest in the event of a dispute one of the parties ask the court to depart
from the terms of the written contract on the ground that it is not the parties’ entire
agreement.” Extra Equipamentos E Exportacao Ltde. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 723 (7th
Cir. 2008). Hence, “If such a claim enabled the party making it to obtain a jury trial on the
meaning of the contract, the contractual process would be riven with uncertainty. The law’s
response to this problem is the parol evidence rule, which . . . forbids the introduction of
evidence (whether oral or written) of what was said in the process of negotiating a contract
to vary the terms of the contract that resulted from the negotiation, provided that the contract
seems clear and complete.” Id.
5. See generally LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS (2017). As Judge Posner puts it, not content to
rely on the parol evidence rule, “To make assurance doubly sure, parties to a written
contract commonly include in it an ‘integration’ clause; for if they do not, the party resisting
the invocation of the parol evidence rule can ask the judge to consider extrinsic evidence
bearing on the question whether the parties really did intend the written contract to be the
complete and final articulation of their agreement.” Extra Equipamentos E Exportacao
Ltde., 541 F.3d at 723; see also West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1019 (discussing how
most contracting parties will include merger [i.e., integration] clauses in their agreements to
trigger the parol evidence rule).
6. See generally Representations, Warranties, Covenants, Rights, and Conditions,
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accidents in the development of the common law, a breach of
representation may support actions not only in contract, but also in tort, in
particular for fraudulent inducement.7 The problem thus becomes one of
limiting obligations arising in tort.8 The conventional solution in the
market for corporate controls lies in an array of related contractual
provisions, in both a preliminary agreement generally styled a
confidentiality or non-disclosure agreement and the definitive agreement.
The most important of these provisions is the so-called non-reliance clause,
versions of which can appear in different forms in both the confidentiality
agreement and the definitive agreement. In the former, the buyer promises
that it will not rely on representations by the seller except for those as may
eventually be contained in the definitive agreement; in the latter, the buyer
represents that, in entering the definitive agreement, it has not relied on
representations of the seller except for those actually contained in the
definitive agreement.9 Since reliance is an element of a fraudulent
Practical Law Practice Note 9-519-8869, WESTLAW (2019) (providing background
information on representations); FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at § 7.2.
7. See Section I.A.
8. As Judge Posner puts it, “fraud is a tort, and the parol evidence rule is not a doctrine
of tort law and so an integration clause does not bar a claim of fraud based on statements not
contained in the contract. Doctrine aside, all an integration clause does is limit the evidence
available to the parties should a dispute arise over the meaning of the contract. . . . [I]t has
nothing to do with whether the contract was induced, or its price jacked up, by fraud.”
Vigortone AG Products, Inc. v. PM AG Products, Inc., 316 F.3d 641, 644 (7th Cir. 2002).
9. For the most important articles on non-reliance clauses see generally Johnathan P.
Altman, Rule 10b-5 and Reasonable Reliance: Why Courts Should Abandon Focus on NonReliance Clauses, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 747 (2007); Allen Blair, A Matter of Trust: Should
No-Reliance Clauses Bar Claims for Fraudulent Inducement of Contract? 92 MARQ. L.
REV. 423 (2009); Elizabeth Cummings, Balancing the Buyer’s Right to Recover for
Precontractual Misstatements and the Seller’s Ability to Disclaim Express Warranties, 76
MINN. L. REV. 1189 (1992); Kevin Davis, Licensing Lies: Merger Clauses, the Parol
Evidence Rule and Precontractual Misrepresentations, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 485 (1999);
Jason R. Grove, Non-Reliance Clauses and SEC Rule 10b-5: Defining the Boundaries of
Corporate Transactions, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1119 (2006); Steven M. Haas,
Contracting Around Fraud Under Delaware Law, 10 DEL. L. REV. 49 (2008); Jeffrey M.
Lipshaw, Of Fine Lines, Blunt Instruments, and Half-Truths: Business Acquisitions
Agreements and the Right to Lie, 32 D.J.C.L. 431 (2007); David K. Lutz, The Law and
Economics of Securities Fraud, 79 CHI-KENT L. REV. 803 (2004); Kabir Masson, Paradox
of Presumptions: Seller Warranties and Reliance Waivers in Commercial Contracts, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 503 (2009); Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud
Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337 (2003); Margaret V. Sachs,
Freedom of Contract: The Trojan Horse of Rule 10b-5, 51 WASH. & LEE. L. REV. 879
(1994); George J. Siedel, The Double Liar Dilemma in Business Negotiations, 17 STAN. J.L.
BUS. & FIN. 1 (2011); Elaine A. Welle, Freedom of Contract and the Securities Laws:
Opting Out of Securities Regulation by Private Agreement, 6 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 519
(1999); Joseph Wylie, Using No-Reliance Clauses to Prevent Fraud-in-the-Inducement
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inducement claim,10 a non-reliance clause, if taken at face value,11 prevents
a party from proving fraudulent inducement with respect to any
representation not contained in the definitive agreement. Although courts
were for a long time hostile to non-reliance clauses and their underlying
purpose of limiting by contract claims sounding in fraud,12 the courts in the
leading commercial jurisdictions of Delaware and New York,13 which
especially value freedom of contract14 and are committed to having
Claims, 92 ILL. B.J. 536 (2004).
10. See, e.g., Prosser & Keaton on Torts, § 105 (explaining the elements of fraudulent
inducement); Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 525 (stating justifiable reliance is an element
of fraudulent inducement). This is also the law in Delaware and New York. See e.g., DCV
Holdings, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 889 A.2d 954, 958 (Del. 2005) (holding that reliance is an
element of fraudulent inducement under Delaware law); Ambac Assur. Corp. v
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 31 N.Y.3d 569, 579-80 (2018) (holding that, in New York,
the elements of common law fraud include justifiable reliance); Banque Arabe et
Internationale D’Investissement v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1995)
(stating that in New York, fraudulent misrepresentation requires that (a) the defendant make
a material, false representation, (b) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff thereby,
(c) the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representation, and (d) the plaintiff suffered
damages as a result of such reliance).
11. The text here is studiously ambiguous. The idea is that, if the buyer has kept its
promise in the confidentiality agreement (for non-reliance clauses in such agreements) or
has not breached its representation in the definitive agreement (for non-reliance clauses in
such agreements), then it has not relied on extra-contractual representations, and so could
not succeed in a claim for fraudulent inducement.
12. See Masson, supra note 9, at 504 (collecting cases indicating hostility towards nonreliance clauses).
13. The enforceability of non-reliance clauses in other jurisdictions varies. See West &
Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1023-28 (surveying case law across multiple jurisdictions). In
particular, non-reliance clauses are generally unenforceable in California and
Massachusetts. See e.g., Ron Greenspan Volkswagen, Inc. v. Ford Motor Land Dev. Corp.,
38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 783 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (holding non-reliance clause unenforceable in
California); Danzig v. Jack Grynberg & Assoc., 208 Cal. Rptr. 336 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984)
(same); Bates v. Southgate, 3 N.E.2d 551 (Mass. 1941) (holding non-reliance clause
unenforceable in Massachusetts). Texas makes the enforceability of non-reliance clauses
turn on the particular aspects of the language used and the circumstances of the case. See,
e.g., Forest Oil Corp. v. McAllen, 268 S.W.3d 51 (Tex. 2008) (holding that an agreement
that clearly and specifically negates reliance on representations made outside the agreement
would bar a claim for fraudulent inducement based on such representations).
14. As Chief Justice Strine has said, “[w]hen parties have ordered their affairs
voluntarily through a binding contract, Delaware law is strongly inclined to respect their
agreement, and will only interfere upon a strong showing that dishonoring the contract is
required to vindicate a public policy interest even stronger than freedom of contract.”
Libeau v. Fox, 880 A.2d 1049, 1056 (Del. Ch. 2005), aff’d in pertinent part, 892 A.2d 1068
(Del. 2006). Similarly, “the right to contract is one of the great, inalienable rights accorded
to every free citizen. If there is one thing more than another which public policy requires it
is that men of full age and competent understanding shall have the utmost liberty of
contracting.” State v. Tabasso Homes, 28 A.2d 248, 253 (Del. Gen. Sess. 1942). Again,
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efficient commercial laws,15 now give effect to non-reliance clauses, at
least in transactions between sophisticated parties, and allow such parties to
limit their obligations for breach of representations (whether in contract or
in tort) in exactly the same way they allow them to limit their obligations
for breaches of promises.16 Accordingly, sophisticated parties, who
regularly elect to have their contracts governed by Delaware or New York
law,17 now count on courts to honor their intentions in this regard.
Even sophisticated parties are sometimes surprised, then, when courts
allow securities fraud suits under Rule 10b-5 to proceed when suits for
common law fraud based on the same facts would be blocked by nonreliance clauses.18 The different treatment arises primarily because of
Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, which declares void
any agreement “binding any person to waive compliance with any
provision” of the federal securities laws.19 The First20 and Third Circuit
Courts of Appeals21 have held that Section 29(a) makes non-reliance
clauses ineffective, even between sophisticated parties involved in business
combination transactions.22 The Second Circuit has held the opposite,
however, and it has enforced non-reliance clauses to block suits under Rule
10b-5.23 Remarkably, a number of other Circuit Courts of Appeals have
enforced non-reliance clauses to block suits under Rule 10b-5 without

“Delaware upholds the freedom of contract and enforces a matter of fundamental public
policy the voluntary agreements of sophisticated parties.” Cornell Glasgow LLC v. La
Grange Prop., LLC, No. N11C–05–016 JRS CCLD, 2012 WL 2106945, at *8 (Del. Super.
Ct. June 6, 2012).
15. According to Chief Justice Strine, Delaware “prides itself on having commercial
laws that are efficient.” Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032,
1059-60 (Del. Ch. 2006).
16. See Sections I.B.1 and I.B.2.
17. See NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra
note 5, at § 15A.01 (discussing choice of law provisions in business combination
agreements and indicating prevalence of Delaware and New York law in such choices).
18. See, e.g., AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003) (allowing a
securities fraud suit under Rule 10b-5 to proceed despite the presence of non-reliance
clause); Rogen v. Illikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966) (non-reliance clause did not
bar Rule 10b-5 securities fraud suit).
19. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2018).
20. Rogen, 361 F.2d at 264.
21. AES Corp., 325 F.3d at 179.
22. Some scholars have agreed with this interpretation. See Altman, supra note 9, at
759 (“The Exchange Act requires parties to abstain from the sort of contracting embodied
by the use of [non-reliance clauses].”); Sachs, supra note 9, at 913 (agreeing with Altman’s
argument).
23. See, e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding that a nonreliance clause barred a securities fraud suit under Rule 10b-5).
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considering the effect of Section 29(a).24 This split among the federal
Circuit Courts of Appeals creates considerable uncertainty for parties
entering business combination transactions as to whether, contrary to the
plain meaning of agreements between the parties, extra-contractual
statements made by the seller are actionable.25
Part I of this Article provides background on some of the legal
doctrines that have evolved at the intersection of contract and tort law and
describes the treatment, under the common law of Delaware and New
York, of non-reliance clauses. It then takes up the treatment of such
clauses under the federal securities laws, especially Section 29(a), and
describes the split in the federal circuits regarding the effectiveness of nonreliance clauses under that section. Part II contains the major contribution
of this Article, which is a much more detailed economic analysis of the
process whereby sophisticated parties exchange information in due
diligence and determine which representations and warranties they will
make in connection with a business combination transaction. In particular,
Part II will show that non-reliance clauses are only one of a set of related
contractual provisions that sophisticated parties use to structure the
bargaining process in business combination transactions. That larger
process includes other contractual provisions (primarily disclaimers) and
conventions regarding due diligence that, in the aggregate, produce
incentives for the parties to bargain to an efficient set of representations
and warranties in the definitive agreement as part of an overall process of
crafting a value-maximizing transaction. In light of the conclusions of Part
II, Part III returns to the key issue of what effect Section 29(a) should have
on such clauses and concludes that such clauses should be effective, at least
in the context of complex business combination transactions between
sophisticated parties. Finally, I offer some concluding remarks.

24. See, e.g., Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (holding that a nonreliance clause barred a securities fraud suit under Rule 10b-5); Jackvony v. Riht Financial
Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989) (non-reliance clause barred security suit); One-to-One
Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (non-reliance clause barred
security suit).
25. There may be an extremely simple and elegant solution, however, that parties could
adopt to avoid this uncertainty: parties could add to their choice of law and venue clauses a
provision that any claims arising under the federal securities laws will be adjudicated by the
federal courts sitting in New York, which, of course, falls within the Second Circuit and so
would apply Harsco Corp., under which non-reliance clauses in contracts between
sophisticated parties are effective. West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1031 n.212.
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COMMON LAW BACKGROUND AND NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS

As noted above, the parties to large business combination transactions
are paradigmatically sophisticated, rational,26 profit-maximizing entities.27
They are large corporations or private equity funds typically managed by
extremely knowledgeable and experienced individuals chosen for their
proven business and financial acumen, advised by expert legal counsel and
26. Here, I set aside the idea that such parties are significantly affected by the biases or
heuristics studied in behavioral economics. My reasons include not only profound
skepticism about behavioral economics in general, see, e.g., Mario J. Rizzo and Douglas
Glen Whitman, The Knowledge Problem of New Paternalism, 2009 BYU L. Rev. 905
(2009) (arguing that the various biases and heuristics identified in behavioral economics
affect different persons to different degrees in different circumstances and so tend to offset
each other); Charles R. Plott and Kathryn Zeiler, The Willingness to Pay/Willingness to
Accept Gap, the “Endowment Effect,” and Subject Misconception and Experimental
Procedures for Eliciting Valuation, 95 AMER. ECON. REV. 530 (2005) (presenting empirical
evidence that, when comprehensive protocols to exclude subject misconceptions are used,
the endowment effect disappears); Lutz, supra note 9 (assessing the assumption of
rationality from the behavioralist perspective); Gregory Mitchell, Why Law and Economics’
Perfect Rationality Should Not Be Traded for Behavioral Economics’ Equal Incompetence,
91 GEO. J. L. 67 (2002) (criticizing the behavioralist perspective on rationality); Jeffrey J.
Rachlinski, The Uncertain Psychological Case for Paternalism, 97 NW. U. L. REV. 1165
(2003) (criticizing the cognitive psychological approach to the law and behavioral
economics), but also an even more profound skepticism of behavioral economics as applied
to sophisticated commercial parties. The agents who act for such parties are an elite group
of individuals selected for the purpose, and they act in teams, with redundant checking and
rechecking of their decisions. Authors who suggest that, because individuals are subject to
heuristics and biases, organizations that are staffed by individuals are subject to such
heuristics and biases too, e.g., Robert Prentice, Contract-Based Defenses in Securities Fraud
Litigation: A Behavioral Analysis, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 337 (2003), may as well say that, if
each of ten soldiers in a firing squad has a ten-percent chance of missing the condemned
man, the squad as a whole has a ten-percent of chance of missing the condemned man. I
agree with David K. Lutz, who argues, in the specific context of non-reliance clauses in
business combination transactions, that Prentice’s assumptions are very unrealistic. See
Lutz, supra note 9, at 842 (asking rhetorically why, if AES’s managers can operate
profitably a large international business, they could not comprehend the significance of a
non-reliance clause that they had agreed to); see also Blair, supra note 9, at 466-67
(considering behavioral economic considerations in the context of non-reliance clauses and
concluding that it is difficult to imagine sophisticated commercial parties suffering from
biases that would lead them to agree to non-reliance clauses contrary to their interests); id. at
463 n.185 (stating that “[t]here is little research to suggest that firms suffer from cognitive
biases. To the contrary, it is likely that firms tend to correct for cognitive biases due to
market pressures, even if individuals in the firm suffer from them.”).
27. I mean here not that all such parties literally always seek only to maximize value for
themselves (such an absolute generalization would obviously be false), but merely that such
parties do this so often that legal rules, which address what usually or normally happens,
should be framed on the assumption that the parties are acting in the way indicated.
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investment bankers, and highly motivated to maximize profits within the
law. Such parties will almost always structure their transactions efficiently,
that is, by dividing rights and obligations minutely and then allocating
rights to the party that values them most highly and obligations to the party
that can bear them most cheaply. This maximizes the joint surplus from
the exchange and maximizes each party’s opportunity to profit from the
transaction. Such parties understand that, if the joint surplus arising from
the allocation of rights and obligations in the contract is increased, then the
price term, which divides this joint surplus between them, can be adjusted
in a manner that makes both parties better off. Assuming other branches of
the law prohibit business combinations that generate significant negative
externalities (as, for instance, the antitrust laws prohibit combinations that
substantially increase market power),28 business combination transactions
increase social welfare by increasing the welfare of the parties to the
transaction more than they decrease the welfare of others. Hence, society
has an interest in seeing that such transactions are structured efficiently.
Since the acquirer is a rational profit-maximizer, its interest in
acquiring the target is limited to the value it can capture by owning the
target.29 This is true if the acquirer is a strategic buyer, who usually hopes
to combine the target’s business with its own existing business, capturing
value from synergies as well as from the target’s own cash flows, and it is
true if the acquirer is a financial buyer, who hopes to improve the business
of the target and then resell the company in the midterm at a substantial
profit. For this reason, the price that the acquirer will pay in the transaction
is highly dependent on what it comes to believe about the future cash flows
of the target, their riskiness, and, in the case of a strategic buyer, the
potential synergies between the target and its own existing business.
The process leading to a business combination transaction may begin
in any number of ways, ranging from the acquirer approaching a target that
previously had no intention to sell itself,30 to a seller engaging an
investment banker to approach potential buyers,31 to an activist shareholder

28. See generally Philip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law § 910 et
seq. (2018).
29. But see Robert T. Miller, Inefficient Results in the Market for Corporate Control:
Highest Bidders, Highest-Value Users, and Socially-Optimal Owners, 39 J. CORP. L. 71
(2013) (arguing that, in certain cases, an acquirer will pay more for a target than the present
value of its future cash flows in order to prevent damage to its pre-existing business that
would result if a competitor acquired the target).
30. See, e.g., Lyondell Chemical Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235 (Del. 2009).
31. See, e.g., In re Netsmart Tech., Inc. Shareholders Litig., 924 A.2d 171 (Del. Ch.
2007).
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goading a reluctant board into a sales process.32 But, however the process
begins, there is a significant constant: one of the greatest difficulties that
parties to business combination transactions face concerns the buyer’s lack
of information about the seller.33 This problem has two aspects. On the
one hand, it is a problem for both parties, as the buyer will not make an
offer to purchase the company without a sufficient understanding of its
business, and how much the buyer will offer will depend on how much it
thinks the company is worth, which in turn depends on the information
about the company the buyer possesses. Hence, both parties have
incentives to create an efficient process whereby the buyer can acquire
information from the seller about its business. To the extent that this
information is positive (that is, supports a higher valuation of the seller’s
business), both sides have incentives for the seller to disclose the
information to the buyer. On the other hand, the information problem is
especially a problem for the buyer, for the seller will always have a better
understanding of the business than will the buyer, and this asymmetry
exposes the buyer to opportunistic behavior by the seller.34 In particular,
the seller has incentives to conceal negative information about the business,
which the buyer has an incentive to ferret out. While obviously important,
this aspect of the situation should not be exaggerated, for sellers also have
partly countervailing incentives to disclose even negative information
about the business. Sophisticated and experienced buyers will usually
discover the information in any event (they tend to know where the pitfalls
lie) and being straightforward about negative aspects of the business allows
the seller to put its own construction on such information, to manage the
buyer’s expectations, and to build credibility by being forthcoming
contrary to its own immediate interest. In general, therefore, the interests
of the parties are closely, but not perfectly, aligned in favor of the seller
disclosing information about the business to the seller.35 The market has
32. See, e.g., In re PLX Tech. Inc. Shareholders Litig., C.A. No. 9880-VCL (Del. Ch.
Oct. 16, 2018).
33. The text assumes a transaction in which the consideration is cash and thus in which
one party is clearly the buyer, the other the seller. In transactions in which the consideration
is stock or other securities of the buyer, in effect both parties are buyers and both parties are
sellers. See generally NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND
DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at § 1.07. In such cases, the information problems—and the
solutions thereto—are reciprocal, but this does not affect the analysis in this Article, and so
without loss of generality I shall assume one party is the buyer and the other the seller.
34. Blair, supra note 9, at 432 (discussing asymmetric information problem and stating,
“[b]uyers know little about the characteristics and qualities of sellers and their promised
performances, including sellers’ propensities to act opportunistically.”).
35. There are odd occasional exceptions. For instance, in In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders
Litig., the seller, IBP, the nation’s leading producer of beef, was auctioning itself, and the
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evolved tools and customs to deal with this information problem. The most
important of these is the due diligence process.36 That is, before the parties
enter into a definitive agreement regarding the transaction, the seller
provides the buyer with tremendous amounts of non-public information
about the target. This typically involves the seller making available to the
buyer (and its advisors and experts) tens of thousands of pages of
information about the target in electronic data rooms, and further
supplementing this information with in-person presentations, meetings, and
on-site inspections of the properties and assets of the target business.37
Such disclosure to the buyer of non-public information about the
target makes the seller vulnerable to various types of opportunistic
behavior by the buyer, such as misappropriating the seller’s trade secrets or
other competitively sensitive information. To limit the possibility of such
behavior, the seller typically makes such information available to the buyer
only after the parties enter into a preliminary legal agreement, often styled
a confidentiality agreement or non-disclosure agreement.38 The key
provisions in this agreement usually include promises by the buyer not to
further disclose the non-public information that it receives from the seller,
and not to use such information for any purpose other than evaluating the
potential transaction with the seller.39 Indeed, the buyer usually has its own
bidders were Tyson, the nation’s leading producer of chicken, and Smithfield Foods, the
nation’s leading producer of pork. 789 A.2d 14, 21 (Del. Ch. 2001). While Tyson was
uninvolved in the beef business, IBP was also the nation’s second largest producer of pork.
Id. In providing the parties due diligence materials, IBP held back from both parties some
competitively sensitive information, because, although it was willing to let Tyson see the
information, it was not willing to let Smithfield do so. Id. at 33. To comply with its Revlon
duties, IBP informed Tyson that it would make the information available to Tyson if Tyson
so desired, but if it did so, it would also have to make the same information available to
Smithfield. Id.
36. See NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra
note 5, at §§ 8.01-8.04 (explaining the purpose of due diligence, including the lawyer’s
role); CRAIG E. CHAPMAN, CONDUCTING DUE DILIGENCE (2004) (outlining the steps of the
due diligence process); see also Blair, supra note 8, at 434 (discussing preliminary
negotiations and the due diligence process).
37. See Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 439 (discussing due diligence in the underlying
transaction in Abry Partners).
38. See generally IGOR KIRMAN, M&A AND PRIVATE EQUITY CONFIDENTIALITY
AGREEMENTS LINE BY LINE (2008); see also NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES,
SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at § 1.04[1][a] (2017) (discussing confidentiality
agreements and their role in the deal process).
39. See Martin Marietta Materials Inc. v. Vulcan Materials Co., 68 A.3d 1208 (Del.
2012) (holding that a company that received information under a confidentiality agreement
for the exclusive purpose of negotiating a transaction with the party providing the
information breached the agreement when it used the information to launch a hostile tender
offer). There are minor exceptions. For example, if the parties are significant competitors,
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incentives to want the seller’s confidential information to remain
confidential: if the transaction goes through, the seller becomes a
subsidiary of the buyer, and so any disclosure that hurts the seller will
ultimately hurt the buyer.40
Information about the target business is valuable to the buyer,
however, only to the extent that it is reliable. The reliability of the
information that the buyer receives from the seller in due diligence can be
enhanced in many ways, including by the buyer’s independent efforts to
verify it and the reputation costs that the seller may incur if the information
proves false.41 The most effective way for the seller to enhance the
reliability of the information it conveys to the buyer, however, is to assume
legal liability for inaccuracies or omissions in such information. As
explained more fully below however, originally the seller’s liability for
such inaccuracies or omissions supported actions in tort, not contract. This
historical accident in the development of the common law introduced a
great deal of complexity. The key contractual tool for dealing with this

sharing certain kinds of pricing and cost information could violate the antitrust laws.
Similarly, if the target is worried that a competitor is not serious about acquiring the target,
but merely wants to gain a competitive advantage over the target by learning confidential
information about it, the target may be reluctant to share such information. See In re IBP,
Inc., 789 A.2d at 33 (discussing how a target corporation wanted to keep competitively
sensitive information from a potential acquirer that was also a competitor).
40. For simplicity, the text presupposes that the consideration paid by the acquirer to
the seller (or its shareholders) is cash. In such a transaction, the seller has no continuing
interest in the business after the completion of the deal. If the consideration paid by the
acquirer is its own stock, however, then the seller (or its shareholders) will hold such stock
in what, after the completion of the transaction, is the combined company. In such cases,
the seller will care about the condition of the combined business (and so the condition of its
own business after closing) because this affects the value of the securities it receives in the
merger. See generally Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk
through Mac Clauses in Business Combination, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2007 (2008).
41. More accurately, the reputation costs for the individual employees and agents of the
sellers tend to afford the buyer some basis for thinking the information disclosed is reliable.
The seller itself, if the transaction closes, will cease to be an independent entity, and so in
the sales process, it faces a last period problem. The same may be true for employees who
will effectively retire as a result of the transaction, or otherwise become so personally
wealthy that they can disregard any reputational interests. This is one reason that
professional legal and financial advisors add value: by being consummate repeat players
with comparatively little at stake in any one transaction, their behavior is much more
sensitive to reputational concerns than that of their principles. See generally JOHN C.
COFFEE, GATEKEEPERS: THE ROLE OF THE PROFESSIONS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
(2006). See also Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1061
(Del. Ch. 2006) (“[j]udicial decisions are not the only way that commercial norms of fair
play are instilled,” and “the nature of [the] market is still such that reputational factors are
likely to be important.”).
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complexity is the non-reliance clause: a promise by the buyer that it is
relying only on the representations and warranties42 in the definitive
agreement, and thus not on the vast amount of information made available
to it in due diligence.43 The next section of this Part of the Article explains
the relevant common law doctrines, the contractual provisions sophisticated
parties use to contract around some of these in business combination
transactions, and the judicial response such attempts have met in the
leading commercial law jurisdictions of Delaware and New York.
A. The Intersection of Contract and Tort
In order to know whether a contract is worth making, the contracting
parties need to ascertain and quantify the value of the rights they will
acquire and the obligations they will incur under the contract. For
sophisticated parties entering business combination transactions, those
incentives are especially strong. The reason is that, given the very large
amounts of money involved in such transactions, the transaction costs of
making the contract complete (that is, specifying the rights and obligations
of the parties in great detail) tend to be quite small by comparison and
therefore worth incurring. In addition, these costs tend to be smaller for
sophisticated parties than for others because the parties’ sophistication and
experience give them advantages in writing complete contracts.
Agreements memorializing business combination transactions, therefore,
tend to include elaborate divisions and allocations of rights and obligations.
While no contract is ever literally complete, business combination
agreements between sophisticated parties are among the most complete
contracts encountered in the real world.
By far the cheapest way to make certain what the parties’ rights and
obligations are is to specify them explicitly in the written agreement. For
this to work, however, the written agreement must contain the entire
allocation of rights and obligations between the parties in the sense that
whatever express agreements there really are between the parties, these

42. NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note
5, at §§ 11.01-11.04; JAMES C. FREUND, ANATOMY OF A MERGER §§ 7.01-7.4 (1975).
Representations and warranties are heavily negotiated. See id. at 229 (stating that, although
there are “no known statistics on the subject,” the author would “bet [his] briefcase that
lawyers spend more time negotiating ‘Representations and Warranties of the Seller’ than
any other single article in the typical acquisition agreement.”).
43. See NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra
note 5, at § 1.06 (discussing the relationship between due diligence and representations and
warranties).
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express agreements are included in the written agreement.44 If this is not
the case, then any attempt to determine what the parties’ rights and
obligations actually are quickly devolves into difficult, expensive, and
uncertain factual inquiries about who said what to whom in what context
during the process of negotiating the contract. In the case of a business
combination transaction, given the very large number of individuals
involved for both parties — businesspeople, legal counsel, accountants,
financial advisors, and other experts — and the typically long and complex
negotiations leading to such transactions,45 this inquiry is especially
difficult, expensive, and uncertain. Procedurally, this factual uncertainty
means that any lawsuit based on alleged extra-contractual promises or
representations will likely be impossible to dismiss on the pleadings, will
proceed to discovery and summary judgment, and perhaps even to trial to
resolve disputed factual matters.46 These procedural realities can lead
unscrupulous plaintiffs to engage in opportunistic behavior, for even weak
cases will have considerable settlement value for defendants.47
For these entirely familiar reasons, the common law has long
responded to this problem with the parol evidence rule, which provides that
44. The text refers to completeness of the agreement in the sense used by the parol
evidence rule that there are no express agreements between the parties related to the
transaction not memorialized in the agreement. As noted in the text, although business
combination agreements are unusually complete, they are not (and cannot be) literally
complete in the sense that contract theory uses the expression “complete”.
45. See e.g., NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS,
supra note 5, at § 1.04[a][1] (discussing the transaction process); see also Davis, supra note
9, at 488-89 (discussing complex negotiations leading to business combination transactions).
46. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1058 (Del. Ch.
2006); see also Blair, supra note 9, at 465-66 (stating, that “[a] plaintiff alleging fraud
stands a very good chance of surviving any pretrial efforts that a defendant might make to
cut short the litigation,” and “[s]ellers faced with fraud claims . . . are likely to be forced to
incur legal fees through a trial.”); Lutz, supra note 9, at 842 (discussing effects of not
enforcing non-reliance clauses on litigation); Masson, supra note 9, at 513 (arguing that
non-reliance clauses mitigate the potential hold-up problem arising from the expense and
difficulty of dismissing opportunistic, non-meritorious suits based on allegedly fraudulent
extra-contractual misrepresentations); West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 999 (stating, that
“fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims have proven to be tough . . . easy to allege,
hard to dismiss.”).
47. As Judge Posner has said in a related context, without some way to limit such suits,
“sellers would have no protection against plausible liars and gullible jurors.” Carr v. CIGNA
Securities, Inc., 95 F.3d 544, 547 (7th Cir. 1996); see also Robert F. Quaintance, Jr.,
Division of Opinion in the Colonies — “Non-Reliance Clauses,” 7.4 M & A LAW 17, 18
(stating that if non-reliance clauses are not effective to block fraud suits based on extracontractual representations, although “seller will likely still win” the suit, “seller may be
forced to go through discovery which . . . can create significant incentive for seller to pay
something and settle.”).
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if a written agreement appears complete, courts will not consider extrinsic
evidence (whether via other documents or oral testimony) about promises
allegedly made during negotiations but not included in the written
agreement.48 From the point of view of sophisticated parties wanting to
ensure that their written agreement is treated as the entire agreement
between them, the only problem with the parol evidence rule is making
sure that it will be applied. That problem is easily solved by including in
the written agreement an integration clause: a provision expressly stating
that the written agreement is the entire agreement between the parties and
supersedes any other agreements, written or oral, that may have existed.49
Unsurprisingly, therefore, business combination agreements between
sophisticated parties virtually always include integration clauses.50
Nevertheless, the parol evidence rule and the integration clauses that
invoke it have nearly universally been held not to affect which
representations a party may have made for purposes of a fraudulent
inducement claim.51 Many commentators understand the reluctance of
48. See FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at §§ 7.2-7.3 (discussing parol
evidence rule and related doctrines); see also Extra Equipamentos E Exportacao Ltde. v.
Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 723 (7th Cir. 2008) (Posner, J) (explaining the parol evidence
rule).
49. See e.g., West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1019 (stating that “most contracting
parties include merger [i.e., integration] clauses in their agreements to trigger the parol
evidence rule”).
50. Id.
51. See Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that although
non-reliance clause can block fraud in the inducement claims, for a contract to bar such a
claim it “must contain language that . . . can be said to add up to a clear anti-reliance clause
by which the plaintiff has contractually promised that it did not rely upon statements outside
the contract’s four corners in deciding to sign the contract” and “a standard integration
clause alone, which does not contain explicit anti-reliance representations and which is not
accompanied by other contractual provisions demonstrating with clarity that the plaintiff
had agreed that it was not relying on facts outside the contract, will not suffice to bar fraud
claims.”); see also Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1058
(Del. Ch. 2006) (stating that Delaware courts have not treated as non-reliance clauses
“merger or integration clauses that do not clearly state that the parties disclaim reliance upon
extracontractual statements”). See, e.g., Altman, supra note 9, at 747 n.2 (stating that “an
integration clause that specifically references representations and warranties would likely
have an effect similar to that of a non-reliance clause, while a more customary reference
only to ‘agreements and understandings’ probably would not”); Blair, supra note 9, at 436438 (distinguishing simple merger clauses from non-reliance clauses and noting that merger
clauses affect only claims arising in contract, not tort claims such as fraudulent inducement);
Cummings, supra note 9, at 72-73 (stating that while some courts have allowed integration
clauses to block suits sounding in tort based on extracontractual representations, other courts
have concluded that an integration clause does not affect suits, such as fraudulent
inducement, that sound in tort); Davis, supra note 9, at 489-490 (stating that courts
commonly distinguish between integration clauses, which limit actions sounding in contract,
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courts to read integration clauses as limiting which representations a party
has made as being part of a general hostility by courts towards allowing the
parties to limit contractually their liability in tort. While this is no doubt
largely correct, there is in fact a good deal more going on. For one thing,
integration clauses are clauses in contracts, and the parol evidence rule is a
rule of contract law. Hence, from a formalistic, doctrinal point of view,
neither an integration clause nor the parol evidence rule can operate to
block a claim sounding in tort, which fraudulent inducement undoubtedly
does.52 Moreover, this formalistic distinction can be grounded in more than
the arguably artificial categories of the common law, for fraudulent
inducement (and, for that matter, the claim of contractual
misrepresentation) is based not on the defendant’s promises, but on his
representations.
Representations, of course, are not promises but
declarative statements about present or past facts in being.53 Why,
however, should this difference matter? One possible answer is that,
although it makes perfect sense for the parties to agree later about which
and non-reliance clauses, which seek to limit actions sounding in tort ); Haas, supra note 9,
at 72-73 (discussing the rule in Kronenberg that, to block fraud suits based on
extracontractual representations, the contractual language must clearly and unambiguously
state that a party is not relying on such representations); Lutz, supra note 9, at 804 n.4
(noting the difference between “an integration clause, providing that all of the parties’
earlier dealings and written agreements are integrated into the final agreement” and “a nonreliance clause, providing that the parties may not rely on any representations not contained
in the final written agreement,” and stating that although “[t]he effect of both clauses is
substantially similar,” nevertheless “[s]ome courts . . . have noted that an integration clause
is less explicit in reference to reliance, and therefore may have less evidentiary value than a
non-reliance clause to prove the lack of reliance.”); Siedel, supra note 9, at 8 (stating that
“[o]ften a clear distinction is not made between broad merger and integration clauses (which
state that the writing represents the entire contract) and specific anti-reliance language”);
West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1018 (stating that “it is important to distinguish between
an explicit disclaimer-of-reliance provision and a standard merger or integration clause”).
52. See Extra Equipamentos E Exportacao Ltde., 541 F.3d at 723 (explaining that,
under the parol evidence rule, “evidence of what was said in the negotiations that led up to
the signing of the [contract] would not be admissible - in a suit for breach of contract,” but
because “[t]he parol evidence rule is a rule of contract law, and a contract integration clause
is a privately negotiated supplement to the rule,” it follows that “neither the rule nor the
clause prevents a disappointed party to the contract from basing a tort suit on proof that in
the course of negotiations the other party made fraudulent misrepresentations.”); see also
Davis, supra note 9, at 490 (discussing how some courts have “held that the parol evidence
rule is merely a rule of contract law that only bars actions that ‘sound in contract’, but
cannot bar claims that sound in tort.”).
53. See, e.g., FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at §§ 7.2-7.3. As we will see
below, a warranty is a promise that a representation is true, and so if a warranty is breached,
the breached-upon party has a remedy in contract — expectation damages to put him in the
position he would have enjoyed had the warranted statement of fact been true. See infra
notes 62-67 and accompanying text.
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promises they are making to each other, it is not quite the same with which
representations they have made.
That is, if during preliminary
negotiations, one party makes a promise to another, nothing prevents the
parties from later agreeing to void this promise. The promisee can agree to
relinquish whatever rights he acquired from the promisor under the
promise. It is within the parties’ power to unmake promises just as it is
within their power to make them. But whether or not a party made a
representation is a matter of past fact; technically speaking, if such a thing
happened, the parties can no more agree that it did not happen than they
can agree that the Civil War did not happen.54 Hence, reading it literally,
an integration clause that merely states that the writing containing it
contains the entire agreement between the parties does not extinguish
previously made representations the way it can extinguish previously made
promises.
The way around this difficulty is for the party to whom
representations may have been made to agree not to rely on any
representations except those contained in the definitive agreement. While
the parties cannot change the past facts about which representations were
made, they can change their present behavior and not rely on certain
representations other than those specified. This extra step about reliance,
of course, is precisely the one taken in a non-reliance clause as
distinguished from a mere integration clause.55
So, if the law allows parties, by means of the parol evidence rule and
integration clauses, to limit the promises they undertake to those included
in their written agreement, should the law not also allow parties by means
of non-reliance clauses to limit the representations they are making to those
54. Indeed, eminent theologians like Aquinas and Augustine have taught that even God
cannot change the past. See, e.g., Thomas Aquinas, De Aeternitate Mundi, in OPERA OMNIA
SANCTI THOMAE AQUINATIS, AQUINAS INSTITUTE (forthcoming), available in a prior version
in ON THE ETERNITY OF THE WORLD, INTERNET MEDIEVAL SOURCEBOOK (Robert T. Miller
trans., Fordham Univ. 1997), at https://sourcebooks.fordham.edu/basis/aquinas-eternity.asp
[https://perma.cc/7QTL-X7CE] (stating, “God cannot make [contradictory] things come to
be, for the assumption that such a thing exists immediately refutes itself. Nevertheless, if
we allow that God can make such things come to be, the position is not heretical, though I
believe it is false, just as the proposition that the past did not occur is false,” about which
Augustine says that “anyone who says ‘if God is omnipotent, let him make what has
happened not to have happened,’ does not realize that he is saying, ‘If God is omnipotent,
let him make true things false insofar as they are true.’”). If God cannot change the past, so
much less, therefore, may contracting parties do so, even sophisticated ones.
55. See Extra Equipamentos E Exportacao Ltde., 541 F.3d at 724 (explaining that since
a “suit for fraud can be a device for trying to get around the limitations [of] the parol
evidence rule and contract integration clauses,” “[n]o-reliance clauses serve a legitimate
purpose in closing a loophole in contract law.”).
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included in their written agreement?56 As explained more fully in Section
B of this Part of the Article, in leading commercial jurisdictions such as
Delaware and New York that sensible result is possible today, at least for
sophisticated parties. For a long time, however, this was not the case, and
the reason takes us back to the vagaries of the history of the common law.
As noted above, although actions based on a breach of promise always
sounded in contract, actions based on the falsity of a representation
originally sounded in tort. In particular, they were actions for deceit.57
This matter of legal categorization had many important effects. One was
that reliance (or reasonable reliance) by the plaintiff on the allegedly false
representation was an element of the cause of action, for someone who
does not rely on a false representation can hardly be said to have been
deceived by it. This is quite different from the usual understanding in
contract law. Even if, at the time the contract is made, one party does not
believe the other will perform, the breached upon party still has a good
claim for breach of contract when the breach occurs. A second effect
concerned the measure of damages. That is, although the standard measure
of damages in contract is expectation damages,58 in tort the measure is
compensatory damages.59 In addition, in appropriate cases, tort claims can
56. The parol evidence rule would presumably block an action for breach of warranty
based on an extra-contractual statement, for such would in fact be an extra-contractual
promise. Blair, supra note 9, at 434.
57. See West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1009-10, who explain that “courts have not
always recognized the distinction between tort-based misrepresentation claims and
contracts-based warranty claims,” the distinction between which is discussed below.
Indeed, “because the modern law of contract only later evolved as an independent legal
doctrine, courts did not even recognize breach of express warranty as a separate, contractbased action until 1778 and instead viewed these claims as grounded in deceit or fraud.
Accordingly, early courts did not treat representations and warranties that were specifically
set forth in a written agreement as part of a contract, but simply as statements of the ‘factual
predicate’ to the contract that were only actionable as misrepresentations under tort law, not
as actions to enforce promises made under contract law. Even after courts began enforcing
express warranties as contractual promises, many courts have continued to recognize a
separate tort claim for breaches of those express warranties to the extent that such claims
also satisfy the culpability, materiality, and reliance requirements of a misrepresentation
claim brought in tort.” Id.; see also Masson, supra note 9, at 508 (stating “[w]arranty law
grew out of tort actions for deceit, but eventually was recognized as a distinct part of
contract law.”).
58. “Delaware courts historically have endorsed the concept of the ‘efficient breach’ of
contract — a theory of contract law which urges expectation damages as a remedy in order
to encourage a promisor’s breach where resulting profits to the promisor exceed the loss to
the promisee.” Cornell Glasgow LLC v. La Grange Properties LLC, No. N11C-05-016,
2012 WL 2106945, at *8 (Del. Super. Ct. Jun. 6, 2012).
59. See, e.g., Harman v. Masonelian Int’l, Inc., 442 A.2d 487, 499 (Del. 1982) (stating,
“[t]he damages available for deceit and fraudulent misrepresentation are generally limited to
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support awards of punitive damages,60 which are generally not available for
contract claims, even when the breach of contract has been knowing and
intentional. A third effect arose from the idea that if one party to a contract
deceived another with respect to a fact at the time the contract was made,
the deceived party’s consent to the contract was not effectively given.61
This is a large part of the meaning of the common law maxim that fraud
vitiates everything.62 On this theory, as a result of the misrepresentation,
there never was an enforceable contract between the parties to begin with,
those which are the direct and proximate result of the false representation and which
represent the ‘loss-of-the-bargain’ or actual ‘out-of-pocket’ loss”). That is, the Delaware
Supreme Court has also allowed the award in tort cases of what amount to expectation
damages. Thus, “Delaware law recognizes two measures of damages both in cases of fraud
or deceit,” namely (a) “the benefit of the bargain rule,” under which “the plaintiff recovers
the difference between the actual and the represented values of the object of the
transaction,” and the aim of which “is to the put the plaintiff in the same financial position
that he would have been in if the defendant’s representations had been true,” and (b) “the
other rule” which “gives the plaintiff the difference between what he paid and the actual
value of the item,” which is “the out of pocket measure, and is designed to restore the
plaintiff to his financial position before the transaction occurred.”). Stephenson v. Capano
Dev., Inc., 482 A.2d 1069, 1076 (Del. 1983). Naturally, “[i]f the fraud is gross, oppressive,
or aggravated, or where it involves breach of trust or confidence, the plaintiff may recover
punitive damages.” Id. at 1076-77.
60. Id.; see also Blair, supra note 9, at 471 (discussing importance of punitive damages
in actions for fraud).
61. The idea goes back to Aristotle, who thought ignorance of important facts made an
agent’s action less than voluntary. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, 3.1.1110-1111
(W.D. Ross, trans. 1999).
62. See Pearson & Son Ltd. v. Dublin Corp., [1907] A.C. 351 (HL), 362 (appeal taken
from Ir.) (stating that “fraud vitiates every contract and every clause in it”); Bridger v.
Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 428 (1894) (stating that “a party who has perpetrated a fraud
upon his neighbor may [not] . . . contract with him in the very instrument by means of which
it was perpetrated, for immunity against its consequences, close his mouth from
complaining of it and bind him never to seek redress. Public policy and morality are both
ignored if such an agreement can be given effect in a court of justice. The maxim that fraud
vitiates every transaction would no longer be the rule but the exception.”); United States v.
Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 64 (1871) (stating “[t]here is no question of the general doctrine
that fraud vitiates the most solemn contracts, documents, and even judgments.”); see also
Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317, 323-33 (Fuld, J., dissenting) (arguing that the
traditional view that fraud vitiates everything should make non-reliance clause
unenforcable); Blair, supra note 9, at 426 (discussing the traditional view that fraud vitiates
everything); West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1021-22 (explaining that, historically,
judicial “decisions addressing the ability of contracting parties to disclaim liability for
‘fraudulent’ misrepresentations . . . were decidedly more negative,” and “influenced by the
widely accepted legal maxim that ‘fraud vitiates everything it touches,’ courts often have
rebuffed the efforts of contracting parties to avoid litigation over who said what to whom
during pre-contract negotiations, holding that tort-based liability for fraudulent (including
reckless) misrepresentations, unlike tort-based liability for negligent or innocent
representations, could not be contractually disclaimed.”).
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and so the appropriate remedy is therefore rescission (or, when rescission is
not practicable, rescissionary damages).
The development of the common law at this intersection of contract
and tort has varied considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Generally
speaking, however, this development has resulted in essentially three
possible causes of action that can be based on a false representation. First,
at one extreme, there is an action that rests squarely within contract law:
the action for breach of an express warranty. Here, the representation,
which is a statement of past or present fact, is taken to be coupled with a
promise that the statement is true (i.e., a warranty).63 It is this promise that
places breach of warranty firmly within the law of contracts. To prevail in
such an action, the plaintiff party must prove, besides the existence of a
contract and its own performance (or willingness to perform) thereunder,
(a) that its contractual counterparty made a statement of fact, (b) that the
counterparty promised that the statement was true, and (c) that the
statement was false, which of course implies that the promise was
breached. 64 There is no requirement that the party show it relied on the
promise or the related statement of fact.65 If the party can prove that the
counterparty warranted the factual statement in question and the statement
was false, then it is entitled, as in contract claims generally, to expectation
damages for the breach. As Judge Learned Hand put it, “A warranty is an
assurance by one party to a contract of the existence of a fact,” and “it
amounts to a promise to indemnify the promisee for any loss if the fact
warranted proves untrue.”66 A claim for breach of an express warranty is
63. As West and Lewis explain, “although some modern commentators disagree about
whether there is a difference between ‘representations’ and ‘warranties,’ there is a very clear
distinction between actions premised upon misrepresentations and actions premised upon
breaches of express warranties.” West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1008. “A claim based
upon a breach of an express warranty . . . is premised upon one party’s specific contractual
promise that a stipulated fact or set of facts is correct. If the warranty set forth in the written
agreement is incorrect, it would be irrelevant that the warranting party honestly believed that
the disputed statement was true, that the recipient of the warranty did not rely upon the
incorrect statement, or that the warranty was not a material basis upon which the
complaining party entered into the contract.” Id. at 1008-09.
64. Metropolitan Coal Co. v. Howard, 155 F.2d 780, 784 (2d Cir. 1946); see, e.g.,
Rogath v. Siebenmann, 129 F.3d 261 (2d Cir. 1997) (holding that in a suit for breach of
express warranty, the plaintiff need prove only that the defendant made a statement and the
statement was false); CBS Inc. v. Ziff-Davis Publishing Co., 75 N.Y.2d 496 (N.Y. 1990);
Ainger v. Michigan Gen. Corp., 476 F.Supp. 1209 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d 632 F.2d 1025 (2d
Cir. 1980).
65. See CBS Inc., 75 N.Y.2d at 1001 (holding that “[t]he right to be indemnified in
damages for [the warranty’s] breach does not depend on proof that the buyer thereafter
believed the assurances of fact made in the warranty would be fulfilled”).
66. Metropolitan Coal Co., 155 F.2d at 784.
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thus a straightforward claim for breach of contract.67 The only difference,
which turns out to be a legally immaterial difference, is that the promise
breached did not concern what the counterparty would do or not do, but
whether a certain factual assertion was true. Since this action sounds in
contract, and since it is based on a statement made by the counterparty,
there can be no question but that such actions may be based only on
representations made by the counterparty in the contract. If the underlying
representation is not in the contract, then the promise that it is true cannot
be in the contract either. Hence, the parol evidence rule will block an
action for breach of express warranty based on representations not included
in an integrated contract.
Second, at the opposite extreme, there is the action for fraudulent
inducement, which rests squarely within tort law. Here, the plaintiff must
prove that (a) the defendant falsely represented or omitted facts that the
defendant had a duty to disclose; (b) the defendant knew or believed that
the representation was false or made the representation with a reckless
indifference to the truth (scienter); (c) the defendant intended to induce the
plaintiff to act or refrain from acting; (d) the plaintiff acted in justifiable
reliance on the representation; and (e) the plaintiff was injured by its
reliance.68 Such an action supports compensatory and, in an appropriate
case, punitive damages. Some of the other differences from the contract
claim are also clear. Though an element of any intentional tort, scienter is
not an element of a breach of contract claim. Neither, as noted above, is
reliance by the plaintiff or deception by the defendant. Naturally, the parol
67. See CBS Inc., 75 N.Y.2d at 1001 (stating “[t]he express warranty is as much a part
of the contract as any other term.”).
68. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 525 (AM. LAW. INST. 1977); see also Abry
Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1068 (Del. Ch. 2006) (listing
the elements of fraudulent inducement); DCV Holdings, Inc. v. Conagra, Inc., 889 A.2d
954, 958 (Del. 2005) (elements of common-law fraud); Barks v. Herzberg, 206 A.2d 507,
508 (Del. 1965) (elements of common-law fraud). The law is essentially the same in New
York. See, e.g., Young v. Keith, 112 A.D.2d at 626 (stating “[a] claim for fraud must allege
a representation of a material existing fact, falsity, scienter, deception, and injury”); see also
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Services, Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 19 (2d Cir. 1996)
(stating “[t]o prove fraud under New York law, a plaintiff must show that (1) the defendant
made a material false representation, (2) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff
thereby, (3) the plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representation, and (4) the plaintiff
suffered damage as a result of such reliance.”); Banque Arabe et Internationale
D’Investissement v. Maryland Nat’l Bank, 57 F.3d 146, 153 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that in
New York, fraudulent misrepresentation requires that (a) the defendant make a material,
false representation, (b) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff thereby, (c) the
plaintiff reasonably relied upon the representation, and (d) the plaintiff suffered damages as
a result of such reliance.); see also West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 9, at 1013 (discussing
elements of common-law fraud).
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evidence rule, being a rule of contract law, does not apply to claims of
fraudulent inducement, even when the parol evidence rule is expressly
triggered by an integration clause. As indicated above, this is the crucial
point, for it leads to the invention and use of non-reliance clauses.
Finally, between the two extremes lies a third cause of action that is
governed neither entirely by contract principles nor entirely by tort
principles, although it is conventionally regarded as a contract claim: the
action for contractual misrepresentation. To prove this cause of action, the
plaintiff has to prove that (a) the defendant made a statement of fact, (b)
that was false, (c) and material, and (d) on which the plaintiff actually and
reasonably relied.69 If the plaintiff succeeds, he is entitled to rescind the
contract or, if rescission is impracticable, to collect rescissionary
damages.70 Clearly, contractual misrepresentation has some contract-like
elements and some tort-like ones. Like actions in contract, it does not
require a showing of scienter, but like actions in tort, it does require a
showing of reliance.71 The remedy it supports is not typical for either
contract (expectation damages) or tort (compensatory damages) but a
curious mixture of both tort and contract. It is contract-like in that it
assumes that a party who consents to a transaction while mistaken about
material facts does not consent effectively, and it is tort-like in requiring
that the mistake arise from the action by the other party (the
misrepresentation), albeit even an innocent one.72 Finally, in another tort69. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, §§ 162-164 (AM. LAW. INST. 1981);
FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at §§ 4.12-4.13; see, e.g., In re IBP,
Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 72 (Del. Ch. 2001) (listing elements of contractual
misrepresenatation under New York law); Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch.
2004) (listing the elements of contractual misrepresentation).
70. Id.; see also West & Lewis Jr., supra note 2, at 1016-17 (stating that “[w]hile
rescission is the only remedy available for a pre-contractual misrepresentation under
contract law, a plaintiff may seek compensatory damages for the same misrepresentation
under tort law.”).
71. Masson, supra note 9, at 508. Masson speaks of “warranty law,” but in context it is
clear he means contractual misrepresentation, which he describes as “an area of contract law
that retains some vestiges of tort law, such as reliance.” Id.
72. That is, if we really took seriously, for contract law purposes, Aristotle’s idea that a
man who acts in ignorance does not act voluntarily, then, regardless of the source of the
mistake, the party entering the contract less than voluntarily would be entitled to rescind.
This is, of course, not the law. A unilateral mistake of fact without fault on the other side
does not support an action to rescind the contract. See generally FARNSWORTH ON
CONTRACTS, supra note 4, at §9.4 (stating that “courts have been reluctant to allow a party
to avoid a contract for a mistake that was not shared by the other party”). To be clear, I am
in no way criticizing these traditional contract doctrines; I am merely pointing out that the
action for contractual representation, by including something like the notion that the mistake
by one party must be caused by the (fault of the) other party has certain tort-like qualities.
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like aspect, at least in some jurisdictions, actions for contractual
misrepresentation, even though typically sounding in contract, may be
based on a party’s extra-contractual statements, even when the contract is
fully integrated.
Although actions based on breach of an express warranty must be
based on representations made in the agreement, actions for fraudulent
inducement and contractual misrepresentation may be based both on
statements made in the agreement and on extra-contractual statements. The
problem for sophisticated parties attempting to determine and quantify the
value of their obligations, therefore, becomes how to limit actions for
contractual misrepresentation or fraudulent inducement to claims based on
representations made in the agreement. It may seem that the problem
admits of a simple solution: a clause in the agreement analogous to the
integration clause, but providing that the only representations and
warranties made are the ones contained in the agreement, and such
representations and warranties supersede any others that may have been
made previously. Such a clause, however, would likely be ineffective for
several reasons. In addition to all the reasons courts have found for not
honoring non-reliance clauses (of which, more below), there is the reason
suggested above that representations are different from promises, which
parties can agree to make and unmake as they please, because once a
representation is made, the parties cannot by agreement change the past, as
it were, and cause the representation not to have been made.73 Thus,
regardless of any purported agreement about which representations were
made, there seems to be nothing to stop a party from proving that all the
elements of a claim for contractual misrepresentation or fraudulent
inducement, and so a clause analogous to an integration clause purporting
to undo representations previously made is — or at least may seem to be —
literally nonsense.
If the parties cannot agree that representations made were not made,
what can they do to block actions based on contractual or fraudulent
misrepresentations? As suggested above, the answer lies in the fact that
both causes of action include as an element reliance on the alleged
misrepresentation by the party to whom it was made. Unlike whether a
certain event (one party’s making a representation) in fact occurred in the
past, whether or not a party relies in the present, as it enters into a contract,
on a representation made to it by the counterparty in the past, is within the
party’s power. Hence, the party to whom a representation was made can
agree that it is not relying on any representations by the counterparty other
73. See supra notes 52-54 and accompanying text.
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than those included in the written agreement, and this is the non-reliance
clause that is at the center of this Article.74 I now turn to the law’s
treatment of such clauses.
B. The Treatment of Non-Reliance Clauses at Common Law
Before considering the treatment of non-reliance clauses in particular
jurisdictions, it is important to consider the different ways they may be
thought to function. Now, grammatically, a non-reliance clause is a
statement that the party is not relying on certain representations that may
have been made by the counterparty. How this statement should be
understood legally, however, is not straightforward. Indeed, depending on
the context and the intentions of the parties, such a statement can be
interpreted in at least five different ways, each of which would fulfill, at
least to some extent, the intended general purpose of the clause of
forestalling suits on the basis of extra-contractual representations. I
consider the five possible interpretations in turn.
On the first interpretation, which I shall call the weak-evidentiary
interpretation, the statement by the party that it is not relying on certain
representations could be merely evidence, though not conclusive evidence,
that the party giving the non-reliance clause did not rely on the relevant
representations. If this interpretation is right, then the party giving the nonreliance clause would still be entitled to prove, by other evidence, that it did
in fact rely on the relevant representations. As we shall see, this is this how
courts that are said to disregard non-reliance clauses usually understand
them.75 It is very difficult to see how this interpretation, which is the
weakest of the four suggested here, is not correct as far as it goes — that is,
correct in a way that does exclude some of the stronger interpretations from
being true as well.
On the second interpretation, the non-reliance clause could be treated
as conclusive evidence that the party giving it did not rely on the relevant
representations, and this would mean that the party would not have the
opportunity to introduce other evidence to show that it really did so rely. If
this strong-evidentiary interpretation is understood as implying that, as a
factual matter, a party giving a non-reliance clause never or virtually never
actually relies on the representations it says it did not rely upon, then this
view seems very problematic. People — even sophisticated commercial
74. See Masson, supra note 9, at 513 (stating, “reliance waivers developed out of tort
law” and “were initially designed to provide protection against tort suits of fraud or
misrepresentation in the formation of a contract.”).
75. See, e.g., AES Corp. v. The Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2003).
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parties — often say one thing and do another. It is hard to see, therefore,
how we could give a written statement by a party that it is not relying on
certain representations such conclusive effect without bringing in some
other normative considerations (e.g., that the party to whom the writing is
directed relies on it). This suggests a third way to understand a nonreliance clause.
On this third interpretation, the non-reliance clause has the exact same
effect as the second interpretation (that is, it completely prevents the party
giving the clause from proving reliance), but on this interpretation we view
the clause not as evidence, whether conclusive or otherwise, of what the
party giving it did but as an equitable estoppel76 on certain future conduct
by the party.77 In other words, on this estoppel interpretation, it would, in
the circumstances, be unfair to allow a party that gave a non-reliance clause
to benefit itself and harm its contractual counterparty by attempting to
prove the opposite of what the party affirmed in the non-reliance clause.
As Justice Swayne put it in Dickerson v. Colgrove, a person, “who by his
language or conduct leads another to do what he would not otherwise have
done, shall not subject such person to loss or injury by disappointing the
expectations upon which he acted.”78 Presumably, the theory would be
that, by stating it was not relying on extra-contractual representations, the
party giving the non-reliance clause had led the counterparty to believe it
would not sue counterparty on the basis of those representations, thus
lulling the counterparty into not correcting any misstatements or omissions
in those representations prior to the parties entering the transaction. Hence,

76. See generally 2 JOHN NORTON POMEROY, A TREATISE ON EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§
801-821 (4th ed. 1941); T. Leigh Anenson, The Triumph of Equity: Equitable Estoppel in
Modern Litigation, 27 REV. LITIG. 377 (2008).
77. See Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 428 (1894). In this case, the contract
between the parties contained a clause in which the seller disclaimed all relevant
representations. Id. When the buyer later sued claiming that various extra-contractual
representations by the seller were fraudulent, the seller defended claiming that the
disclaimer was an equitable estoppel. This is nonsense, since the clause, which was a
disclaimer by the seller, was not a representation of any kind at all by the buyer on which
the seller could conceivably rely. Id. Not surprisingly, the court made quick work of this
theory, stating that the seller “may, indeed, have relied upon [the disclaimer’s] force and
efficacy to protect him from the consequences of his own fraud, but he certainly could not
have relied upon the truth of any statement in it. A mere device of the guilty party to a
contract intended to shield himself from the results of his own fraud, practiced upon the
other party, cannot well be elevated to the dignity and importance of an equitable estoppel.”
Id.
78. Dickerson v. Colgrove, 100 U.S. 578, 580 (1879); see also A TREATISE ON EQUITY
JURISPRUDENCE, supra note 76, at 1645 (stating, “[t]he conduct must be relied upon, and be
an inducement for the other party to act”).
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the party giving the non-reliance clause must be equitably estopped from
later bringing a cause of action on the basis of the counterparty’s extracontractual representations. Note that this interpretation is entirely
consistent with the idea that the party actually did rely on the
counterparty’s representation, for regardless of whether it actually relied, in
giving the non-reliance clause it causes the counterparty to change its
position to its detriment, and so the estoppel will lie.
On each of these first three interpretations, nothing requires that the
non-reliance clause be part of a legally enforceable agreement.79 On the
fourth interpretation, however, a non-reliance cause in a preliminary
agreement can be understood (indeed, almost certainly has to be
understood) as a promise about which representations the party will rely
upon in entering into the definitive agreement. On this promissory
interpretation, even if the party giving the non-reliance clause could prove
it relied on extra-contractual representations of the counterparty and that
these were false or fraudulent, in so proving it would prove that it had
breached a contractual promise. Hence, if the party is entitled to damages
for the falseness or fraudulence of the counterparty’s extra-contractual
representations, then the counterparty would, at least prima facie, be
entitled to expectation damages to return it to the position it would have
enjoyed had the party giving the non-reliance clause performed on its
promise not to rely on extra-contractual representations. It seems we
would have equal and offsetting damage awards, which is equivalent to
making the extra-contractual representations not actionable. Note that, on
the promissory interpretation, in contradistinction from the estoppel
interpretation, since the counterparty’s rights sound in contract and not in
equity, it is irrelevant whether the counterparty relied on the non-reliance
clause.
On a fifth and final interpretation, the non-reliance clause is a
contractual representation and warranty made by the party in the definitive
agreement. Analytically, nothing prevents the party giving the non-reliance
clause from attempting to prove that it relied on extra-contractual
representations by the counterparty, but, if it succeeds, it would thereby
prove its own representation to the counterparty was false.80 Assuming, as
79. Cf. Extra Equipamentos E Exportacao Ltde. v. Case Corp., 541 F.3d 719, 726 (7th
Cir. 2008) (stating that, in a suit for fraudulent inducement, “the significance of the [nonreliance clause], which does not depend on its enforceability in contract law, is that its
language and the circumstances of its negotiation render [the plaintiff’s] reliance on [the
defendant’s] supposed oral misrepresentations unreasonable as a matter of law.”).
80. Compare with Chief Justice Strine’s double-liar argument in Abry Partners V, L.P.
v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1058 (Del. Ch. 2006).
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seems inevitable, that a party knows on which representations it was
relying when entering the definitive agreement, in proving that its nonreliance representation to the counterparty was false, the party would be
simultaneously proving that its non-reliance representation was also
knowingly false. Thus, it would seem that, if the party proves that, the
non-reliance clause notwithstanding, it relied on extra-contractual
representations of the counterparty and thereby suffered harm, then the
damages that the party collects from the counterparty in such a lawsuit
would be harm to the counterparty arising from the party’s
misrepresentation to the counterparty about which representations of the
counterparty it was relying upon in entering into the definitive agreement.
In other words, as under the promissory interpretation, under this
representational interpretation, the counterparty could recover equal and
offsetting damages from the party based on the breach of the party’s
representation to it in the non-reliance clause.81
As we will see below, courts have not generally distinguished between
these five possible interpretations. This is somewhat surprising, as some of
the interpretations require that the clause appear in a particular kind of
document, and naturally, in any particular case, the court will encounter a
non-reliance clause only in the context of a particular document. Thus, the
promissory interpretation is possible, and virtually required, if the nonreliance clause appears in a preliminary agreement. The representational
interpretation is possible, and virtually required, if the clause appears in the
81. Another question altogether is how non-reliance questions relate to misleading
representations actually made or omissions from representations when the speaking party
had a duty to speak. See generally Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 446 (discussing how Abry
Partners, discussed below, and similar cases “went astray” by focusing on false
representations rather than misleading representations or wrongful omissions). I would have
thought that non-reliance clauses by their clear terms provide no benefit to the speaker who
makes a representation that is true but misleading. See Junius Construction Corp. v. Cohen,
257 N.Y. 393 (1931) (holding that if the recipient of a representation may rely on it for its
truth, he may also rely on its not being misleading). Additionally, questions of pure
omissions when the party has an obligation to speak are handled not by non-reliance clauses
but by the related but fundamentally different contractual provisions in so-called “big boy”
letters.
See Edwin D. Eshmoli, Big Boy Letters: Trading on Inside Information, 94
CORNELL L. REV. 133, 153 (2008) (discussing provisions in big boy letters); Grove, supra
note 9, at 1124 (2006) (stating that “a [non-reliance clause] is irrelevant to omissions”);
JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN, SIMPSON, THATCHER & BARTLETT LLP, BIG BOY LETTERS AND
NON-RELIANCE PROVISIONS 1-2 (2012) (discussing the differences between non-reliance
clauses and big boy letters); WACHTELL, LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, DISTRESSED MERGERS AND
ACQUISITIONS 218 (2018) (indicating that acknowledgement by a sophisticated party that it
is not relying on the insider-seller for information makes it more difficult to sustain a
contention of justifiable reliance by that party). See generally Arnold S. Jacobs, What is a
Misleading Statement or Omission under Rule 10b-5?, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 243 (1973).
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definitive agreement. The weak and strong evidentiary interpretations, as
well as the estoppel interpretation, are possible regardless of the document
in which the non-reliance clause appears, including documents that are not
legally enforceable agreements. With these distinctions in mind, we turn to
the treatment of non-reliance clauses in the leading commercial
jurisdictions of Delaware and New York.
1.

Delaware Law82

The Delaware Supreme Court and the Delaware Court of Chancery
have had multiple occasions to consider agreements between parties to
business combination transactions in which the seller disclaims, and the
buyer promises not to rely on, any representations and warranties except
for those in the definitive agreement between the parties, including with
respect to representations by the seller allegedly made fraudulently.83 For
at least the past twenty years, the Delaware courts have consistently held
that such agreements are enforceable against the parties in accordance with
their terms.84 The most important of these decisions are Abry Partners V,
82. See Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1046-1047
(Del. Ch. 2006) (noting that under Delaware law, the choice of law by contracting parties
will govern not only the interpretation of their contract but also tort claims of fraudulent
inducement to that contract). This is true generally. See West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at
1004 n.24 (stating that a properly drafted choice of law clause can control the choice of law
for tort claims arising from a transaction and citing cases).
83. See Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1064 (holding that a non-reliance clause
would block fraud claims based on alleged extracontractual misrepresentations); RAA
Management LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107, 119 (Del. 2012) (affirming
the lower court’s dismissal based on an “unambiguous” non-disclosure agreement absolving
the seller from intentional fraud); see also Prairie Capital III, L.P. v. Double E Holding
Corp., 132 A.2d 35, 50 (Del. Ch. 2015) (stating that “Delaware law enforces clauses that
identify the specific information on which a party has relied and which foreclose reliance on
other information”); In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 73 (Del. Ch. 2001)
(holding that a non-reliance clause in a confidentiality agreement would block a fraudulent
inducement action on the basis of extracontractual representations); Great Lakes Chemical
Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 A.2d 544, 556 (Del. Ch. 2001) (holding that under certain
circumstances Delaware law “permits explicit contract disclaimers” to bar fraud claims).
Despite the clarity of Delaware law on this point, the issue is often relitigated. See e.g.,
Chyronhego Corp. v. Cliff Wight & CFX Holdings, Inc., No. 2017-0548-SG, 2018 WL
3642132, at *11 (Del. Ch. July 31, 2018) (holding that fraud claims based on alleged extracontractual representations must be dismissed because of an anti-reliance provision in the
definitive agreement).
84. For example, in Great Lakes Corp. v. Pharmacia Corp., 788 A.2d 544, 552 (Del.
Ch. 2001), the Delaware Court of Chancery held that a confidentiality agreement between
sophisticated parties in which the seller disclaimed any representation as to the accuracy or
completeness of information available to the seller would bar claims by the seller even for

2019] RULE 10B-5 AND BUSINESS COMBINATION TRANSACTIONS

565

L.P. v. F.W. Acquisitions, LLC,85 a decision from the Court of Chancery by
then Vice Chancellor and now Chief Justice Strine that contains the most
elaborate analysis, and RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings,
Inc.,86 a decision from the Supreme Court by Justice Holland that adopted
the reasoning of Abry Partners. I discuss them in turn.
a. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F.W. Acquisitions, LLC87
In Abry Partners, the underlying transactions involved the sale of a
portfolio company by one private equity fund to another.88 In the
agreement between the parties, the seller made various representations to
the buyer, including about the financial statements of the company being
transferred.89 The agreement also contained provisions under which the
seller indemnified the buyer for breaches of the representations contained
in the agreement.90 Moreover, such indemnification was the sole and
exclusive remedy for breaches of representations, and the agreement
capped the seller’s liability at a relatively modest amount ($20 million in an
approximately $500 million transaction).91 After the transactions were
closed, the buyer sued the seller, alleging that both contractual and extracontractual representations about the financial condition of the company
were fraudulent — that is, the plaintiff alleged not only that the
representations were false but also that the seller knew they were false
when the seller made them.92 The buyer claimed damages in excess of
$100 million,93 an amount well above the $20 million cap on the seller’s
liability under the contractual indemnification provision.
fraud. Then Vice Chancellor, now Chief Justice, Strine reached an identical conclusion in
In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14 (Del. Ch. 2001). See generally Haas,
supra note 9.
85. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006).
86. 45 A.3d 107, 116-119 (Del. 2012).
87. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006). For insightful discussions
of Abry Partners and related cases in Delaware, see Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 446
(analyzing Abry Partners and arguing that non-reliance clauses should be effective to block
suits based on extra-contractual representations that either conflict with contractual
representations or are wholly additional to contractual representations but not to block suits
based on the allegedly misleading-by-omission nature of contractual representations). See
generally Blair, supra note 9; Haas, supra note 9; West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2.
88. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1035.
89. Id. at 1036.
90. Id. at 1041.
91. Id. at 1036.
92. Id. at 1051.
93. Id. at 1047.
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It is important to understand precisely why the plaintiff framed its
claims in the manner that it did. With respect to the representations in the
agreement that the plaintiff claimed were false, the plaintiff could certainly
have sued for breach of express warranty — that is, for breach of contract.
Such a suit would have been much easier to win, primarily because it
would not have required the plaintiff to prove scienter; the plaintiff would
have needed to prove only that the representation, which was indisputably
made, was false. A suit for breach of express warranty, however, would
have availed the plaintiff little, for even if the suit succeeded, the plaintiff
would have been bound by the provisions in the contract that limited its
remedies for breach of contract to the relatively modest sum of $20 million.
Thus, the point of casting claims based on representations in the agreement
as fraud claims (and taking on the additional significant burden of proving
scienter) was in this case to avoid contractually agreed-upon limitations on
damages for claims sounding in contract.94 Although a plaintiff may not
sue for both breach of contract and fraud with respect to the same alleged
misrepresentation contained in the contact (as least when the damages
would be duplicative),95 the plaintiff has the option to choose which cause
of action to bring.96 Hence, not only did the agreement between the parties
94. See Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1053-55; Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 433-43.
95. “The party asserting fraud must plead damages separate and apart from the alleged
damages for breach of contract. The fraud damages must be more than a ‘rehash’ of the
contract damages.” AFH Holding Advisory LLC v. Emmaus Life Sciences, Inc., No.
N12C-09-045 MMJ CCLD, 2013 WL 2149993, at *13 (Del. Sup. Ct. April 18, 2013).
96. See Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1048 (stating, “a party aggrieved by fraud
typically can seek to avoid a contract under the rubric of either contract of tort law.”); id. at
1054 (noting that, “[u]nder American law, buyers claiming to be victims of [fraudulent]
representations have traditionally been able to seek to avoid a contract (or, in the alternative,
recover damages) in either contract or tort.”). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS, § 471 com. A. But although the plaintiff may proceed on either theory, a party
cannot recover on both theories for the same damages. See generally McKenna v. Terminex
International Co., No. 04C-02-022RBY, 2006 WL 1229674 (Del. Sup. Ct. March 13, 2006).
Given the greater difficulty of proving fraud, this means that, unless they are seeking
damages peculiar to the fraud claim (e.g., if compensatory damages exceed expectation
damages or if the party is seeking punitive damages, which are not generally available for
breach of contract claims), parties typically elect to sue on the contract claim. This leads to
situations in which litigants who have what are essentially breach-of-contract claims attempt
to bootstrap fraud claims by alleging, in effect, that the breach was intentional, or the party
never intended to keep the breached promise. Such claims are routinely dismissed. See e.g.,
Khushaim v. Tullow Inc., No. N15C–11–212–PRW, 2016 WL 3594752, at *6 (Del. Sup. Ct.
2006) (stating, “fraud damages are a copy-and-paste recitation of [the] contract damages,
replacing only the word ‘breaches’ with the word ‘fraud.’”); see also Midland Red Oak
Realty, Inc. v. Friedman, Billings & Ramsey & Co. Inc., No. Civ.A.04C05091CLS, 2005
WL 445710, at *3 (Del. Super. 2005) (stating, “where an action is based entirely on a breach
of the terms of a contract between the parties, and not on a violation of an independent duty
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not prevent the plaintiff from suing for fraud based on representations made
by the seller in the agreement, but, the court added, any contractual
provision purporting to prevent suits for fraudulent inducement based on
such representations would be void as contrary to the public policy of
Delaware.97
With respect to its claims based on the representations not in the
agreement, however, the plaintiff knew that, by its plain terms, the nonreliance clause to which it had agreed appeared to block such claims.
Indeed, there was little doubt that the clause would block claims sounding
in contract (that is, claims of contractual misrepresentation)98 based on such
extra-contractual representations. Thus, in alleging fraudulent inducement
with respect to such representations, the plaintiff was hoping that, although
the court would likely hold that a non-reliance clause blocks contract
claims based on extra-contractual representations, it might reach a different
result concerning fraud claims based on such representations. In other
words, it might hold that the public policy of Delaware voided a nonreliance clause as to fraud claims based on extra-contractual representations
imposed by law, a plaintiff must sue in contract and not in tort,” and “a breach of contract
claim could not be bootstrapped into a fraud claim merely by adding the words ‘fraudulently
induced’ or alleging that the contracting parties never intended to perform”).
97. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1035 (stating, “[t]he public policy against fraud
is a strong and venerable one that is largely founded on the societal consensus that lying is
wrong.”). This is the virtually universal common law rule. See e.g., RESTATEMENT (FIRST)
OF CONTRACTS § 573 (AM. L. INST. 1932) (stating, “[a] provision in a bargain that fraud in
its formation shall not be asserted is illegal.”).
98. The court does not go into the point, but claims for breaches of express warranty,
which involve a breach of promise rather than of representation, would be blocked by the
integration clause even more clearly than claims for contractual misrepresentation since the
express warranty is a promise, and there is no doubt that which promises a party is making
is governed by the integration clause. Thus, Williston says, “There is probably no more
frequent application of the parol evidence rule than in cases in which one party asserts the
existence of an oral warranty when there is a written contract, usually of sale or to sell
goods,” but “if the writing contains a merger clause or a disclaimer stating that there is no
warranty or none except what is contained in the writing,” then under the Uniform
Commercial Code as under prior law “a parol warranty is ineffectual because it is
contradictory and not merely in addition to the writing.” SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 33.33 (4th ed. 1990). To be clear, Williston is speaking
about contract claims based on warranties, which are promises; the result with respect to
claims of contractual misrepresentation or fraud, both of which are based on representations,
will often be different. See also West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 2021 (stating, “[c]ourts
in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries generally enforced clauses that
disclaimed the existence of representations for which the seller refused to provide an
express warranty where the complaining party premised its extra-contractual claim upon
innocent, inadvertent, or negligent statements,” as opposed to consciously false statements,
and citing cases).

568

U. OF PENNSYLVANIA JOURNAL OF BUSINESS LAW

[Vol. 21:3

on the venerable common-law grounds as that fraud vitiates everything99 or
no one should be permitted to profit from his own wrongdoing.100 Put yet
another way, the plaintiff hoped that, just as Delaware does not allow
parties to contract around liability for fraud with respect to representations
in the agreement, perhaps it would also not allow parties to contract around
liability for fraud with respect to representations not in the agreement.
While acknowledging the complexity of an area of law involving the
intersection of contract and tort101 and noting that courts have expressed
many different views about the enforceability of a party’s contractual
promise to rely only on representations contained in the contract,102 the
court in Abry Partners held for the defendant. Regarding non-reliance
clauses specifically, the court stated that Delaware law has consistently
held “that sophisticated parties to negotiated commercial contracts may not
reasonably rely on information that they contractually agreed did not form
part of the basis for their decision to contract.”103 “A party cannot
promise,” the court held, “that it will not rely on promises and
representations outside of the agreement and then shirk its own bargain in
favor of a ‘but we did rely on those other representations’ fraudulent
inducement claim.”104
99. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
100. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 511 (1889).
101. See Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1048 (stating that, “[t]he relationship
between contract and tort law regarding the avoidance of contracts on grounds of
misrepresentation is an exceedingly complex and unwieldy one”); id. at 1054 (“American
jurisprudence has never been able to achieve” “a clear division” “between the role of
contract and tort law in addressing the consequences of false representations inducing the
making and closing of contracts.”).
102. Id. at 1056 (“There are several perspectives in American law regarding the extent to
which a contract can define those representations of fact upon which the parties’ decision to
contract was based.”).
103. Id. at 1057 (quoting H-M Wexford LLC v. Encorp Inc., 832 A.2d 129 (Del. Ch.
2003)).
104. Id. at 1057. Although Abry Partners is the best known and most elaborately
reasoned Chancery case on this issue, the Abry Partners court was not breaking new ground
in Delaware law. See Kronenberg v. Katz, 872 A.2d 568, 593 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that
although a non-reliance clause can block fraud in the inducement claims, for a contract to
bar such a claim it “must contain language that . . . can be said to add up to a clear antireliance clause by which the plaintiff has contractually promised that it did not rely upon
statements outside the contract’s four corners in deciding to sign the contract” and “a
standard integration clause alone, which does not contain explicit anti-reliance
representations and which is not accompanied by other contractual provisions demonstrating
with clarity that the plaintiff had agreed that it was not relying on facts outside the contract,
will not suffice to bar fraud claims.”); H-M Wexford, LLC, 832 A.2d at 142-143 (dismissing
fraud claims based on representations in a private placement memorandum when the fullyintegrated purchase agreement excluded representations made in the memorandum and
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Note that then-Vice Chancellor Strine here assumes, without further
analysis, that the non-reliance clause at issue should be understood as a
contractual promise in accordance with the fifth interpretation of nonreliance clauses given above. This made sense in Abry Partners because
the clause was contained in an agreement entered into prior to the definitive
agreement. It was part of a contract, but, since it related to the future, it
could not be a representation; hence, it must have been a promise.
Nevertheless, the then-Vice Chancellor does not treat the clause as a
promise with complete consistency, for, if the non-reliance clause is a
contractual promise, the plaintiff could conceivably prevail by arguing that
it had breached its own promise. Perhaps it would have to suffer the legal
consequences of that breach, but there is nothing impossible in the plaintiff
admitting its breach and then arguing for its fraudulent inducement claims.
The court does not even consider such a possibility. Rather, it tends to treat
the non-reliance clause along the lines suggested in the third interpretation
given above: it works an estoppel against the party giving it, preventing the
party from pleading reliance.
The court also considered the argument that, by dismissing the
plaintiff’s fraud claim based on representations on which it had promised
not to rely, it was encouraging or rewarding fraud. The court found this
argument unpersuasive on the theory that, even if the seller lied to the
buyer in some extra-contractual representations, the buyer lied to the seller
when it said in the contract that it was not relying on any extra-contractual
representations of the seller. “To fail to enforce non-reliance clauses,” the
court wrote,
is not to promote a public policy against lying. Rather, it is to
excuse a lie made by one contracting party in writing — the lie
that it was relying only on contractual representations and that no
other representations had been made — to enable it to prove that
another party lied orally or in a writing outside the contract’s four
corners.105
Hence, for a plaintiff in such a case to succeed, “it proves itself not only a
stating, “[t]he Court of Chancery has consistently held that sophisticated parties to
negotiated commercial contracts may not reasonably rely on information that they
contractually agreed did not form a part of the basis of the decision to contract”); In re IBP,
Inc., Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 72-74 (Del. Ch. 2001) (holding that buyer under a
merger agreement could not reasonably rely upon extra-contractual representations made by
the seller in due diligence when the confidentiality agreement between the parties provided
that the buyer would not rely on representations of the seller except those included in the
definitive written agreement).
105. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1058.
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liar but a liar in the most inexcusable of commercial circumstances—in a
freely negotiated written contract.”106 In other words, both allowing such
claims and dismissing them may be thought to encourage lying, either by
one party or the other, but allowing them encourages a worse sort of lying.
On the plaintiff’s view, the case involves, as the court put it, a “Double
Liar” problem, and the plaintiff is by far the worse of the two liars.107
Hence, assuming there is a public policy against fraud, that policy is
served, not disserved, by dismissing such claims.
This is a very attractive argument, and I think it is ultimately
substantially correct, but note the subtle shift that it involves in how we
understand non-reliance clauses. Earlier the court treated the non-reliance
clause as a promise by the seller (the fifth interpretation above), but now,
by saying the seller lied in giving the non-reliance clause, he is treating it as
a representation (the fourth interpretation above), for only statements of
fact are true or false (and so possibly lies). Promises, which can be kept or
broken, are neither true nor false.108 Now this shift may or may not matter
106. Id. Here, Vice Chancellor Strine quotes Judge, now Justice, Alito: “[if] a
contracting party may accept additional compensation for a risk that it has no intention of
actually hearing,” such “prevarication may amount to a fraud all its own.” MBIA Ins. Co. v.
Royal Indemnity Co., 426 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2005). Justice Alito thus seems to be the
originator, or at least the inspiration, for the Double Liar argument. See West & Lewis, Jr.,
supra note 2, at 1023 (discussing the Double Liar argument and the MBIA case).
107. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1058. See generally Siedel, supra note 9.
108. People sometimes speak of “lying promises,” on the theory that every promise
includes an implicit representation by the promisor about the promisor’s state of mind, to
wit, that at the time he makes the promise, he intends to keep it (even if this intention may
later change). See generally IAN AYRES & GREGORY KLASS, INSINCERE PROMISES: THE LAW
OF MISREPRESENTED INTENTION (2005) (discussing legal, philosophical and economic
aspects of lying promises); see Cornell Glasgow LLC v. La Grange Properties, LLC, No.
N11C–05–016 JRS CCLD, 2012 WL 2106945, at *8 (Del. Sup. Ct. June 6, 2012) (“[E]ven
if the defendants never intended to perform, their alleged scheme to breach the Development
Agreement simply cannot give rise to an actionable claim for fraud or negligent
misrepresentation”); see also Tristate Courier and Carriage, Inc. v. Berryman, No. C.A.
20574-NC, 2004 WL 835886 (Del. Ch. 2004) (holding that, although plaintiff proved that
defendant had breached a contract between the parties, such a claim cannot survive as a
fraud claim merely because the plaintiff alleges that the defendant never intended to
perform). There are fascinating and complex legal doctrines about whether a lying promise
can support a fraud claim or only a claim for breach of contact. In Delaware, the answer is
the latter. There is a subtle exception, however. If the defendant makes an extra-contractual
promise (so that an action for breach of contract on the basis of the defendant’s nonperformance of the promise would generally be blocked by a full integration clause and the
parol evidence rule), and the promise is a lying promise (that is, the defendant made the
promise with no intention of performing), then the plaintiff may generally sue for fraudulent
inducement on the basis of the implicit representation that the defendant intended to perform
the extra-contractual promise. See Iotex Comm. Inc. v. Defrieds, No. 15817.1998, WL
914265, at *6 (Del. Ch. 1998) (explaining “a false promise can support a claim for fraud
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to the argument. That is, if, as in Abry Partners, the non-reliance clause is
a promise in an earlier agreement about which representations the party
making the promise will rely upon in entering into a later agreement, then
only where that promise was ‘collateral or extraneous’ to the terms” of the contract.”). In
New York, the rule is the same. The early case of Sabo v. Delman, 143 N.E.2d 906 (NY
1957) seems to hold that even a contractual promise, if the promisor makes it with no
intention of keeping it, may be actionable as fraud on the theory that it implies a fraudulent
representation about the present intention of the promisor, but later cases make it clear that
the New York rule is the same as the Delaware rule. In International Cabletel, Inc. v. Le
Group Videontron Ltce., 978 F.Supp. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (Sotomayor, J.), Justice, then
Judge, Sotomayor explains that, although it is well settled under New York that (a) a contact
action cannot be converted into one for fraud merely by alleging that the contracting party
did not intend to meet its contractual obligations, and (b) if a promise was made with a
preconceived and undisclosed intention of not performing it, then it constitutes a
misrepresentation of a material existing fact sufficient to support a fraud claim, id.,
nevertheless, (c) “any apparent tension . . . has been reconciled through a rule, widely
adopted by the state and federal courts, pursuant to which a false promise can support a
claim of fraud only where that promise was ‘collateral or extraneous’ to the terms of an
enforceable agreement in place between the parties.” Id. at 486-487; see also D.S. America
(East), Inc. v. Chromagrafx Imaging Systems, Inc., 873 F. Supp. 786, 795-796 (E.D.N.Y.
1995) (stating, “[w]hen the fraud claim is premised upon an alleged breach of contractual
duties and the supporting allegations do not concern representations which are collateral or
extraneous to the terms of the parties’ agreement, a course of action sounding in fraud does
not lie,” and “[a]lthough a promise made with a preconceived and undisclosed intention of
not performing it can give rise to a fraudulent inducement claim, the promise must be
collateral or extraneous to the terms of the agreement, not merely a promise to perform
under the express terms of the contract, even if made with no intention to abide by the stated
intention.”); McKernin v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc., 176 A.D.2d 233, 234 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1991) (holding, “[i]t is well settled that where . . . a claim to recover damages for
fraud is premised upon an alleged breach of contractual duties and the supporting
allegations do not concern representations which are collateral or extraneous to the terms of
the parties’ agreement, a cause of action sounding in fraud does not lie.”); Spellman v.
Columbia Manicure Mfg. Co., 111 A.D.2d 320 (N.Y. App. Div. 1985) (reconciling Sabo
with later cases holding that a promise in a contract made with no intention to perform does
not support a fraud claim). According to Justice Sotomayor, the reason for this so-called
Collateral Promise Rule is that allowing fraud claims for false promises made in the
agreement “would be to undermine the predictability that is essential to contracting, the
predictability which permits sophisticated entities to enter into transactions understanding
both their responsibilities and the potential scope of their liabilities.” Id. at 489; see also
Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Recovery Credit Services, Inc., 98 F.3d 13, 20 (2d Cir. 1996)
(“To maintain a claim of fraud . . . a plaintiff must either: (1) demonstrate a legal duty
separate from the duty to perform the contract, . . . or (2) demonstrate a fraudulent
misrepresentation collateral or extraneous to the contract . . . or (3) seek special damages
that are caused by the misrepresentation and unrecoverable as contract damages.”); West &
Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1013-14 (discussing liability for lying promises under the laws of
various states). Under Rule 10b-5, lying promises are actionable. The Wharf (Holdings)
Limited v. United International Holdings, Inc., 532 U.S. 588, 596 (2001). I am not aware of
any important cases on non-reliance clauses involving the labyrinth of interesting sideissues raised by lying-promises.
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the shift matters: if the party later relies on extra-contractual promises by
the counterparty, it will breach its earlier promise, but it will not have told a
lie, much less have committed a fraud. Even intentionally breaching a
contract is very different from committing a fraud, and courts, including
Delaware courts, are assiduous in stopping plaintiffs with breach of
contract claims from transforming those claims into fraud claims by
arguing that the breach was intentional and that an intentional breach is
tantamount to fraud.109 That argument consistently fails. Ironically, Chief
Justice Strine here himself seems to slip into the fallacy of equating an
intentional breach of contract with a fraud. Eliminate this false step,
however, and the Double Liar argument breaks down: the party breaching
the promise in the non-reliance clause may intentionally breach a contract,
but the counterparty that made knowingly false extra-contractual
representations committed a fraud. There is only one liar.110
Or, at least that is true if the one and only non-reliance clause at issue
is a promise in a preliminary agreement not to rely on extra-contractual
promises. Often enough, as we shall see, there are multiple non-reliance
clauses involved in a single transaction. For example, besides the promise
by the buyer in the preliminary agreement not to rely on extra-contractual
representations in entering into the definitive agreement, there is often a
representation by the buyer in the definitive agreement that, in entering
that agreement, it is not relying on any such representations. That latter
kind of non-reliance clause—one squarely within the fifth or
representational interpretation—solidly supports Chief Justice Strine’s

109. See, e.g., Midland Red Oak Realty, Inc. v. Friedman, Billings & Ramsey & Co.
Inc., Civ.A.04C05091CLS, 2005 WL 445710, at *3 (Del. Sup. Ct. 2005) (stating “where an
action is based entirely on a breach of the terms of a contract between the parties, and not on
a violation of an independent duty imposed by law, a plaintiff must sue in contract and not
in tort,” and “a breach of contract claim could not be bootstrapped into a fraud claim merely
by adding the words ‘fraudulently induced’ or alleging that the contracting parties never
intended to perform”).
110. There may be an exception if, in making in the preliminary agreement, the party
promising not to rely on extra-contractual promises made the promise without the intention
of keeping it—that is, the promise was a so-called “lying promise.” All promises come,
some courts say, with an implicit representation that the party making the promise intends to
keep it, and so lying promises are implicit misrepresentations. See supra note 107 above
and sources cited therein. Although many courts, including Delaware courts, say that such
lying promises are not actionable as frauds and the disappointed promisee is limited to suing
for breach of contract, see generally Cornell Glasgow LLC v. La Grange Properties, LLC,
No. N11C–05–016 JRS CCLD, 2012 WL 2106945 (Del. Super. Ct. June 6, 2010); Tristate
Courier and Carriage, Inc. v. Berryman, No. C.A. 20574-NC, 2004 WL 835886 (Del. Ch.
2004), for purposes of the Double Liar argument, the party giving the non-reliance clause
would certainly still be a liar.

2019] RULE 10B-5 AND BUSINESS COMBINATION TRANSACTIONS

573

Double Liar argument.
All this is not to say, however, that Abry Partners should have turned
out other than it did if the only non-reliance clause at issue was the
promissory one in a preliminary agreement. As explained above,111 even if
the counterparty is liable for fraud, the party is liable for breach of contract,
and the damages should offset. Unless, that is, since we have only one liar
and not two, the public policy against fraud prevents the counterparty from
collecting on the contract. That would seem to make a very great deal turn
on the apparently technical point of whether, besides a non-reliance clause
in the form of a promise in the preliminary agreement, the parties also
included another non-reliance clause in the form of a representation in the
definitive agreement. The lesson, therefore, would seem to be that the best
practice is to include both forms of non-reliance clauses, the promissory
form in the preliminary agreement and the representational form in the
definitive agreement. In one sense, the former is obviously more
important, since it structures the entire due diligence process and makes it
clear from the beginning that the parties are agreeing that the buyer will not
rely on any representations made by the seller in due diligence that the
seller does not repeat in the definitive agreement. The latter, however, is
what we need to correctly ground the Double Liar argument, which is the
most powerful answer to the argument that enforcing non-reliance clauses
somehow licenses fraud. In other words, the promissory non-reliance
clause in the preliminary agreement does the heavy-lifting in structuring an
efficient deal-making process (on which see Part II below), but the
representational non-reliance clause in the definitive agreement does the
heavy-lifting in the policy area, ensuring that the non-reliance clauses—
both of them—are given legal effect.
However all of this may be, the court in Abry Partners makes another
important point about claims of fraud based on extra-contractual
representations by the seller—to wit, the judicial error rate in adjudicating
such claims will be abnormally high. “Courts are not perfect in
distinguishing meritorious from non-meritorious claims of fraud,” the court
wrote, and so permitting “fraud claims based on statements that buyers
promised they did not rely upon subjects sellers to a greater possibility of
wrongful liability.”112 Especially because those statements are often
111. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
112. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F & W Acquisition LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1058 (Del. Ch.
2006); Cf. Blair, supra note 9, at 470 (stating, “[s]ellers faced with fraud claims . . . face the
unpredictability of the legal system. Specifically, sellers run the risk that courts will not be
able to distinguish accurately between representations that were fraudulent and
representations that were merely inaccurate or puffery”); Davis, supra note 9, at 502-503
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allegedly oral rather than in a writing, “there is often an evidentiary issue
about whether the supposedly false statement was uttered.”113
This is an important point. Consider two fraud claims, one based on
representations in the contract and one based on representations outside the
contract. For the claim based on the representation in the contract, there is
no doubt that the seller made the statement, that it is material (why else
include it in the contract?), and that the buyer relied on it. The possible
sources of judicial error concern only whether the statement is indeed false
and whether the seller made the statement with the requisite scienter (that
is, knowing it was false and intending to induce the buyer to rely on it to
his detriment). Assume that the judicial error rate (both for false positives
and false negatives) is 10%. Ignoring transaction costs, that makes the
expected value to the plaintiff of a non-meritorious suit equal to 10% of the
damages that would be due if the suit were meritorious. For the claim
based on a representation outside the contract, the possible sources of
judicial error are much more numerous; they include whether the seller
really made the statement, whether it was material, whether the buyer relied
on it, and whether the seller had the requisite scienter. But because of the
difficult evidentiary problems associated with extra-contractual statements,
especially oral ones, assume (conservatively, in my view) that the judicial
error is only half again the rate in cases where the representations are in the
contract—that is, 15% (both for false positives and false negatives).
Ignoring transaction costs, that makes the expected value to the plaintiff
with a non-meritorious suit equal to 15% of the damages that would be due
if the suit were meritorious.114 As usual, plaintiffs with weak cases prefer
rules of law that are difficult to apply and result in high rates of judicial
error, for this increases the value of their claims.115 The perverse incentive
(explaining that sellers may want non-reliance clauses in their agreements because “they
might fear that courts are unable to determine accurately whether parties have behaved
negligently or fraudulently”); West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 999 (discussing that “fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims have proven tough to define, easy to allege, hard to
dismiss, and highly susceptible to the erroneous conclusions of judges and juries”).
113. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1058.
114. Of course, the same assumptions imply that plaintiffs with meritorious suits have a
lower chance of winning their cases when the judicial error is higher (assuming the same
error rate obtains for false positives and false negatives). Ignoring transaction costs,
allowing the cases with the higher error rate to go forward does not affect the overall
distribution of wealth between plaintiffs and defendants, but it does shift wealth from
plaintiffs with meritorious suits to plaintiffs with non-meritorious ones. Hence, if we
consider not just individual cases but the incentive effects of one legal rule as compared to
another, the argument against allowing cases with high rates of judicial error becomes
stronger.
115. See Robert T. Miller, RMBS Push-Back Litigations and the Efficient Allocation of
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effects of such rules are evident.116
Finally, as noted above, although the court in Abry Partners held that
Delaware law permits sophisticated commercial parties to “allocate the risk
of factual error freely as to any error where the speaking party did not
consciously convey an untruth,”117 nevertheless it also held that Delaware
law does not permit a party to exculpate itself for fraud. That is, although
the parties may agree as to which representations are being made, with
respect to the representations that they agree are made, the party making
the representations will be subject to liability for fraud regardless of any
contractual provision to the contrary. To the extent that an agreement
“purports to limit the seller’s exposure for its own conscious participation
in the communication of lies to the buyer, it is invalid under the public
policy of this State.”118
Some commentators have criticized this aspect of the decision,
arguing that all the efficiency rationales that support the position that
sophisticated parties may agree as to which representations are being made
also support the position that such parties may agree on the legal
consequences of fraud in the making of such representations.119 Indeed,
even Chief Justice Strine was somewhat uneasy about this aspect of the

Endogenous Risk Over Time, 34 REV. OF BANKING AND FIN. L. 255, 300 (2015) (stating,
“with the passage of time, determining disputed issues becomes much more difficult (that is,
more costly) because documents are lost, memories fade, and witnesses become
unavailable. This means that the error rate in such cases will rise, and the costs of
investigating and disputing issues will rise as well”).
116. As West and Lewis note, unscrupulous parties can also make a claim based on
allegedly fraudulent extra-contractual misrepresentations to use as a bargaining chip in what
is really a purely contractual dispute. See West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 999 (stating,
“[t]he mere threat of a fraud or negligent misrepresentation claim can be used as a
bargaining chip by a contracting party attempting to avoid a contractual deal that it made”);
see also Blair, supra note 9, at 468-469 (stating that allegations of fraud based on extracontractual representations “impose significant costs on a seller and thus give a buyer
leverage that it can use after contract formation to renegotiate the terms of the deal in its
favor”).
117. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1035.
118. Id. at 1035. The Abry Partners court also stated, however, that a party could, by
agreement with the counterparty, exculpate itself for negligent, grossly negligent, or even
reckless misstatements or omissions. Id. at 1063-1064. The prohibition arising from public
policy reaches only intentional or conscious misstatements or omissions.
119. See Blair, supra note 9, at 425 n.5 (describing Abry Partners’s distinction between
fraudulent representations in the contract and extra-contractual fraudulent representations as
“suspect”); Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 434 (citing criticisms of Abry Partners on this score);
Siedel, supra note 9, at 16 (questioning the moral basis for treating fraudulent
representations differently depending on whether they are made within or without the four
corners of the contract).
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decision.120 He says in a footnote that there is a “residual double liar
problem” in cases where a buyer promises not to sue for fraud on the basis
of misrepresentations in the contract but later does so.121 In that case, even
though both parties are liars, the law favors the buyer and allows him to sue
for fraud even though if he promised not to do so—the opposite of the
result in the usual Double Liar problem related to extra-contractual
representations and non-reliance.122
It is important to see precisely what is at issue here. Both with suits
based on fraudulent misrepresentations in the contract purportedly
120. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1064 n.85.
121. Id. After confessing its uneasiness with the distinction, Chief Justice Strine
provides three reasons to support it. First, he says that a typical non-reliance clause is much
more specific than an exclusive remedies provision that does not expressly mention
limitations on suits for fraud even if the provision is correctly interpreted to include such
limitations—a rationale that applied on the facts in Abry Partners but would clearly not
apply if the contract had expressly mentioned limitations on remedies in fraud suits.
Second, Chief Justice Strine says that “it is . . . not unrealistic to assume that the contracting
parties knew that there were public policy limitations that would come into play” that could
limit the seller’s ability to exculpate itself for fraud. Siedel suggests that this argument is
circular: contractual limitations on fraud suits should be unenforceable because courts often
hold such limitations to be unenforceable. Siedel, supra note 9, at 16. Third, if courts
decline to enforce non-reliance clauses, they would subject sellers to a great deal of
uncertainty and opportunism by buyers as the parties argue over which extra-contractual
representations were made, but there are no equivalent deleterious effects arising from
declining to enforce contractual limitations on fraud—an argument that seems correct as far
as it goes. In my view, however, the Chief Justice underestimates the importance of his
second argument: rightly or wrongly, many transactional lawyers think that contracts
exculpating a party for fraud will be unenforceable. See NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at § 15.02[4] (stating that
transactional lawyers may agree to provisions carving out fraud from exclusive remedies
provisions because “they may believe, erroneously, that the parties cannot agree among
themselves so as to exclude any fraud claims.”). That this view is erroneous, however, is
not quite true; the law varies by jurisdiction, but the rule announced in Abry Partners is not
at all unusual. See West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1021-1028 (surveying the case law
across states).
122. Actually, there is likely not a Double Liar Problem, for although the seller allegedly
made a fraudulent representation, the buyer merely promised not to sue for fraud or
promised to accept certain limitations on suits for fraud and now is breaching that promise.
We have one lie and one breach of promise, which are quite different things. The analogy
would be to a case in which the only non-reliance clause was a promissory one (i.e., there
was no representational non-reliance clause). The only way to get to two liars in the case
imagined is to assume that the promise not to sue for fraud was a lying promise, a promise
made with no intention of its being kept. Chief Justice Strine alludes to this issue when he
says the buyer’s “decision to later renege on [the relevant contractual] promise suggests that
it was untruthful in making the promise in the first instance.” Abry Partners V, L.P., 891
A.2d at 1064 n.85. In reality, though, breaching a contractual promise does not make it
probable that the promise was a lying promise, though this is always possible.
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circumscribed by other contractual provisions and with suits based on
extra-contractual representations purportedly blocked by non-reliance
clauses, there is a contractual provision that affects a suit for fraudulent
misrepresentation, but there the similarity ends. In the usual situation
involving non-reliance clauses, we have an allegedly fraudulent
representation outside the contract together with a contractual provision in
which the buyer promises or represents that it is not relying on the relevant
representation. The strict analogy to this would be a case in which we had
an allegedly fraudulent misrepresentation in the contract together with a
contractual provision in which the buyer promises or represents that it is
not relying on the representations in the contract (or, perhaps, promises not
to sue for fraud). This situation, to my knowledge, has not appeared in the
case law, and it is not hard to see why it does not occur in practice. For one
thing, the representation would (at least usually) also be a warranty, and so
the buyer could sue for breach of an express warranty regardless of whether
it relied on the particular representation. Since breach of an express
warranty is so much easier to prove than fraud, the buyer would normally
not even want to sue for fraud. For another thing, if the gist of the
agreement between the parties is that the representations in the contract are
not actionable in any way, even in fraud, then why bother negotiating page
after page of representations and write them into the agreement? If the
representations are not actionable, then rational parties would never incur
the costs of putting them in the contract in the first place.
Indeed, when parties negotiate representations and put them into the
contract, they do so because they are meant to have some legal effect.
There is no strict analogy to the usual case involving non-reliance clauses
where the agreement between the parties is precisely that that these extracontractual representations shall have no legal effect at all. The contractual
provisions relevant to fraudulent misrepresentations in the contract are not
clauses that, if effective, would wholly block suits for fraudulent
misrepresentation based on contractual representations. Rather, the
contractual provisions relevant to fraudulent misrepresentations in the
contract are, as was the case in Abry Partners (and every other case of
which I am aware), 123 limitations on remedies for breaches of
representations (e.g., caps on damages). With fraudulent representations in
the contract, the question is not whether the defrauding party shall be liable
for its fraud; the question is whether the contract may limit the damages for

123. See West & Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1021-28 (providing a broad survey of cases
in which provisions relevant to fraudulent misrepresentations in the contract are caps on
damages).
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fraud.124
Once this is clear, I think there are good grounds for distinguishing
between cases involving fraud suits based on extra-contractual
representations blocked by non-reliance clauses and cases involving
contractual limitations on remedies for fraud based on representations in
the contract. The difference is this: if we take non-reliance clauses
seriously—that is, if we take non-reliance clauses to mean that the buyer
has really not relied on extra-contractual representations, which is the
conclusion argued for in Part II below—then there never was any fraud in
the cases involving non-reliance clauses.125 That is, if the arguments in Part
II are correct, the usual scenario is not one in which a seller intentionally
makes false representations to the buyer before the contract is signed, the
buyer relies on them, and then, at the last minute, the seller bamboozles the
buyer into agreeing that he is relying only on representations in the contact.
That situation does indeed look like one in which the seller is attempting to
exculpate itself by contract for its own fraud.126 As shown in Part II,
124. Someone may say that a contractual provision making representations in the
contract not actionable is merely the limiting case of contracts that restrict remedies for
breaches of representations. This is technically true, but in context the point is captious. If
the parties incur significant transaction costs of negotiating representations and writing them
into the contract, then these costs will generally be less than the discounted value of any
damages the buyer may collect, which means that any cap on damages will be a nontrivial
amount.
125. To be clear, the argument in the text depends on the conclusion of Part II below that
non-reliance clauses merely make express what sophisticated, value-maximizing parties
involved in business combination transactions have already agreed to—that the buyer is in
fact not relying on any representations of the seller except for those included in the
definitive agreement between the parties.
126. Such cases, I suggest, would virtually invariably involve a non-sophisticated party
as the victim, and in such cases the non-reliance clause would likely not be enforced. See
e.g., Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 344 (2d Cir. 1996) (distinguishing Rogen on the
facts and concluding that, unlike in Rogen, there was nothing in Harsco “that indicates that
[the plaintiff] was duped” into waiving its rights”); Keller v. A.O. Smith Harvestore
Products, Inc., 819 P.2d 69 (Colo. 1991) (allowing negligent misrepresentation suit based on
extracontractual representation to proceed despite the presence of a full integration clause in
a case where the plaintiffs were individuals engaged in farming); see also Abry Partners V,
L.P., 891 A.2d at 1035 (holding that “Delaware law permits sophisticated commercial
parties to craft contracts that insulate a seller from a rescission claim for a contractual false
statement of fact that was not intentionally made.”); id. at 1061 (distinguishing older cases
that did not enforce contractual limitations on fraud claims as “involv[ing] the protection of
a relatively unsophisticated party or a party lacking bargaining clout who signs a contract
with a boilerplate merger clause” from the transaction in Abry Partners where the court
would “respect the ability of sophisticated businesses . . . to make their own judgments
about the risk they should bear and the due diligence they undertake, recognizing that such
parties are able to price factors such as limits on liability”); MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Royal
Indemnity Co., 426 F.3d 204, 218 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Delaware law and stating that
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however, in a typical business combination transaction, even before the
seller begins delivery of due diligence information to the buyer, the seller
and buyer agree that the seller is not making any representations as to the
accuracy or completeness of the information delivered (because both
parties know that that information will contain misstatements and
omissions),127 and, moreover, the parties understand that it would reduce
the joint surplus of the transaction and make them both worse off if
anything the seller says to the buyer other than the negotiated
representations in the definitive agreement were treated as a representation
upon which the buyer might rely. In the typical case in which non-reliance
clauses are used in business combination transactions, therefore, even if a
buyer intentionally lies to a seller in due diligence, the context makes this
lie non-fraudulent because both the buyer and the seller understand
perfectly well that the buyer will not rely on it. Hence, in typical cases
involving non-reliance clauses, there is no fraud (even if, occasionally,
there are some deliberate lies), but in typical cases involving contractual
limits on remedies for fraud, there is always fraud, for if there were no
fraud, the question of limitations on remedies for fraud would not arise.
There is, therefore, all the difference in the world between the two cases:
one never involves fraud, and the other always involves fraud.
And that is quite sufficient to explain the different treatment the two
kinds of cases receive at law. From a moral point of view, while enforcing
‘when sophisticated parties have inserted clear antireliance language” into an agreement,
Delaware courts “will enforce it to bar a subsequent fraud claim.”); H-M Wexford LLC v.
Encorp Inc., 832 A.2d 129, 142 n.18 (Del. Ch. 2003) (stating that the Delaware Court of
Chancery has “consistently [held] that sophisticated parties to negotiated commercial
contracts may not reasonably rely on information that they contractually agreed did not form
a part of the basis for their decision to contract”); In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 789
A.2d 14, 72 (Del. Ch. 2001) (before holding that a non-reliance clause would be enforced,
noting that “it is important to place [the court’s] . . . analysis in some context. The
negotiations between IBP and Tyson did not take place between a world-wise, globe-trotting
capitalist with an army of advisors on one side, and Jethro Bodine, on the other. Instead,
two equally sophisticated parties dealt with each other at arms’ length with the aid of
expensive and highly skilled advisors.”).
127. But see Quaintance, supra note 47, at 21-22, who thinks it cuts in favor of not
enforcing the non-reliance clause in RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings,
Inc., 45 A.3d 107 (Del. 2012) that the clause was contained in a preliminary agreement, not
the definitive one. Quaintance does not explain why this should be so, and I cannot imagine
a reason for this view. Surely warning someone ahead of time not to rely on information yet
to be produced generates a more sympathetic case for enforcement that allowing the buyer
to think he can rely on the information he is receiving until it comes time to negotiate the
definitive agreement, at which point the issue of a non-reliance clause is sprung for the first
time.
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non-reliance clauses in the usual case does not involve allowing a person to
exculpate himself for his own fraud, enforcing limitations on damages for
fraud obviously does. In the former case, the court does not help a
fraudster; in the latter, it does. If the legal system wants to uphold
standards of honest dealing in commercial transactions, it should enforce
non-reliance clauses, not refuse to enforce them.128 Likewise, if the legal
system wants to uphold standards of honest dealing in commercial
transactions, it should not enforce contractual limitations on fraud suits.
What about economics? It may seem that, if sophisticated parties
have agreed to limit remedies for fraud, then this must be efficient, and so
courts should enforce the such provisions in accordance with their terms. I
think there are two answers to this. First, even if enforcing such provisions
is efficient as between the contracting parties, such enforcement may
involve negative external effects that make enforcing the provisions
inefficient. That is, a legal system that helps fraudsters in this way may
reasonably be perceived as valuing commercial honesty less than society
generally does, and this will tarnish the reputation of that legal system, with
negative effects for many parties beyond the contracting parties in the
particular case. In other words, if Delaware allowed parties to exculpate
themselves for fraud or even to limit the liability to which they may be
exposed for fraud, this would harm the reputation of Delaware law and the
Delaware courts,129 which would hurt not only the State of Delaware but
also all those sophisticated commercial parties who value Delaware as the
venue of choice for settling business disputes. If we take account of these
external effects, it is no longer clear that enforcing contractual limitations
on remedies for fraud is efficient. Hence, even on purely economic
grounds, there may well be good reasons for Delaware to hold
unenforceable any contractual provisions purporting to limit remedies for
fraud.
Second, Chief Justice Strine comes to the heart of the matter when he
says in Abry Partners that the “public policy against fraud is a strong and
venerable one that is largely founded on the societal consensus that lying is
wrong.”130 That is, even if it is efficient, including when we take account
128. Again, always assuming we are considering business combination transactions (or
similar transactions) between sophisticated parties. See infra Part II.
129. See Bank of the United States v. Owens, 27 U.S. 527, 528 (1829) (stating “no court
of justice can in its nature be made the handmaid of iniquity. Courts are instituted to carry
into effect the laws of a country, how can they then become auxiliary to the consummation
of violations of law?”); see also Siedel, supra note 9, at 9 (stating that “the principal reason”
for “the policy behind the rule that courts do not enforce illegal contracts” is “protection of
the reputation of the judiciary”).
130. Abry Partners V, L.P., 891 A.2d at 1035.
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of external effects, to allow parties to agree by contract what should happen
if one party defrauds the other, efficiency is not the only value at stake in a
legal system.
Indeed, efficiency is an ersatz normative concept
intentionally devised by economists,131 the intelligent application of which
depends on the fulfillment of various conditions,132 and when what is
efficient and what is moral diverge, only an efficiency fanatic refuses to see
that there are powerful reasons (though not necessarily conclusive ones in
all cases) for the law to do what is moral rather than what is efficient. In
most commercial settings, the preconditions of using the concept of
efficiency in a normative way are usually easily fulfilled because most of
the preferences of everyone affected can usually be very plausibly
quantified in dollars. Society’s preference for promoting honest dealing,
however, is not plausibly quantified in dollars, and so this may be an
unusual instance in the realm of business law where the concept of
efficiency is not readily applicable.
b. RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc.133
In RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., the target
company was conducting a sales process in which potential bidders,
including RAA, a private equity firm, were given access to confidential
information about the target pursuant to a non-disclosure agreement.134 As
is typical in such cases,135 the agreement provided that the target was
making no “representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the
accuracy or completeness” of the materials made available to RAA and that
the target “will not have any liability to” RAA “or any other person
resulting from” RAA’s evaluation of the materials.136 In addition, the
agreement also contained a provision stating, “Only those representations
or warranties that are made to the purchaser in the Sale Agreement when,
131. The original papers are NICHOLAS KALDOR, Welfare Propositions of Economics and
Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J 549 (1939); JOHN HICKS, The Foundations
of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939); and TIBOR SCITOVSKY, A Note on Welfare
Propositions in Economics, 9 REV. ECON. STUD. 77 (1941); see also DAVID D. FRIEDMAN,
PRICE THEORY 434-454 (1990) (providing a modern treatment of the value of efficiency).
132. The most important of these conditions is that the parties involved can reasonably
and realistically quantify, in dollars, their preferences regarding the possible outcomes. See
id. In many commercial contexts, this condition is easily satisfied; in many other kinds of
contexts, it is not, and in some contexts even suggesting that it could be fulfilled would be
plainly absurd.
133. RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107 (Del. 2012).
134. Id. at 109-110.
135. See supra notes 6-11 and accompanying text.
136. RAA Management, LLC, 45 A.3d at 110.
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as and if it is executed, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as
may be specified [in] such a Sale Agreement, shall have any legal
effect.”137
Before considering the facts that gave rise to the dispute, notice that
none of those provisions are, on their face, a non-reliance clause—that is,
none expressly says that RAA will not rely on extra-contractual
representations.
The last quoted provision, stating, “[o]nly those
representations or warranties that are made to the purchaser” in the
definitive agreement “shall have any legal effect,” may reasonably be
thought to amount to a non-reliance clause. After all, why else would
representations outside the definitive agreement have no legal effect, unless
it was because RAA was not relying on them? The Delaware Supreme
Court obviously took this clause (or the other clauses mentioned above, or
all of them in conjunction) as amounting to a standard non-reliance clause,
which is certainly a reasonable view.
The other provisions in the preliminary agreement—the ones stating
that the seller was making no “representation or warranty, express or
implied, as to the accuracy or completeness” of the materials made
available to RAA and that the seller “will not have any liability to” RAA
based on RAA’s evaluation of the materials— are provisions we have not
encountered before in our review of the case law. These are disclaimers,
not non-reliance clauses, and although applying them in accordance with
their terms may have the same effect as an enforcing a standard nonreliance clause, it is obvious that disclaimers and non-reliance clauses are
different things. The disclaimer says, in effect, that the seller is making no
representations when speaking to the buyer in due diligence; a standard
non-reliance clause says that, although the seller makes all manner of
representations to the buyer in due diligence, the buyer is not relying on
those representations. In fact, confidentiality agreements typically include
both disclaimers and non-reliance clauses, although, as I said already and
we shall see further below, the Delaware Supreme Court in RAA does not
seem to make much of a distinction between the two kinds of clauses.
Now, I noted above that one reason courts may historically have been
reluctant to allow parties to contractually limit their liability arising from
representations in contradistinction from promises was that while parties
can by agreement unmake promises as easily as they make them, they
cannot by agreement change the past fact about whether a representation
was made or not. Here, however, we have a disclaimer in a preliminary
agreement, made before the seller delivers any information to the buyer or
137. Id.
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otherwise speaks to the buyer. Does it make sense, generally speaking, for
one person to deliver information to another without thereby endorsing it or
otherwise taking responsibility for its accuracy or completeness? Clearly,
it does. I can present you with a copy of a madman’s diary138 without
raising any inference that I agree with the views expressed therein, and this
is especially the case if, before I give you the book, I expressly say that I do
not necessarily agree with anything asserted therein.139 Whether this makes
sense, or should be respected by the law, in the particular context of the
delivery of information in due diligence by the seller to the buyer in
connection with a business combination transaction is another matter.
However, since the Delaware Supreme Court does not distinguish the
disclaimers in the agreements in RAA v. Savage Sports from a standard
non-reliance clause, I shall leave this topic for now and return to it in Part
II, where we consider how disclaimers and non-reliance clauses work
together to structure an efficient deal-making process.140
To return to RAA, however, the case arose because RAA contended
that the target had represented to it that the company had no material
liabilities not recorded on its financial statements, but that in the course of
reviewing the materials made available to it in due diligence, RAA
discovered that there were several such liabilities, a fact that, according to
RAA, caused it to abandon any interest in acquiring the target.141 RAA
sued, claiming that, when the target represented to it that the company had
no unrecorded material liabilities, it knew that this statement was false and
the company made the false statement for the purposing of inducing RAA
to at least consider purchasing the company.142 According to RAA, the
target was thus liable to it in fraud for the costs RAA incurred in its due
diligence investigation, an amount that aggregated over $1.2 million.143
Thus, at issue in the case were (a) whether the provisions in the nondisclosure
agreement
quoted
above
applied
to
fraudulent
misrepresentations (and not just innocent or negligent ones),144 and (b) if
138. See generally NIKOLAI GOGOL, The Diary of a Madman, in THE DIARY OF A
MADMAN, THE GOVERNMENT INSPECTOR, AND SELECTED STORIES (Ronald Wilks trans.
2006) (providing a fictional example of a diary written by a madman).
139. Gottlob Frege, Begriffsschrift § 2, in FROM FREGE TO GÖDEL: A SOURCE BOOK IN
MATHEMATICAL LOGIC, (1879-1931) (Jean van Heijenoort, 1967) (discussing the logical
distinction between asserting a proposition and merely calling someone’s attention to it or
proposing it for consideration).
140. See infra Part II.
141. RAA Management, LLC, 45 A.3d at 111.
142. Id.
143. Id.
144. Id. at 112-13.
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so, whether disclaimers of liability for fraudulent misrepresentations and
non-reliance clauses related thereto were unenforceable as being contrary
to public policy.145
Justice Holland, writing for the Delaware Supreme Court, quickly
concluded that the agreement unambiguously referred to all forms of
misrepresentations and therefore applied to fraudulent misrepresentations
as well as innocent and negligent ones.146 Turning to the more difficult
question of whether disclaimers apply to even fraudulent
misrepresentations, Justice Holland reviewed the reasoning in Abry
Partners and adopted it wholesale.147 In particular, Justice Holland quoted
then-Vice Chancellor Strine’s analysis of the Double Liar problem and
adopted it as the position of the Delaware Supreme Court. He concluded,
“In accordance with the ratio decidendi of Abry Partners, RAA’s claim
must be barred by the non-reliance and waiver provisions” in the nondisclosure agreement.148
Like the Chancery Court in Abry Partners, the Delaware Supreme
Court also went on to consider policy rationales relevant to the question of
disclaiming liability for fraud. Quoting from the decision of the Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit in Warner Theatres Associates, Ltd. v.
Metro Life Insurance Co., the court observed that disclaimers of liability
and non-reliance clauses serve not only to shield a party from liability but
also to “avoid lawsuits, or at least lawsuits that cannot be quickly
dismissed.”149 That is, if non-reliance clauses are legally effective, any
claim by the buyer based on allegedly fraudulent statements or omissions
made in due diligence will be immediately dismissible under Rule 12b-6 on
the basis of the non-reliance clause. If such clauses are not effective, then
such claims will, in general, not only survive a motion to dismiss but will
not even be resolvable by summary judgment.150 That is, such claims will
145. The agreement included a choice-of-law clause providing that New York law would
govern disputes related to the agreement. The Delaware Supreme assumed without deciding
that New York applied, but it expressly noted that “the outcome would be the same under
Delaware law.” Id. at 112.
146. Id. at 112.
147. Id. at 116-17.
148. Id. at 117.
149. Id. at 118 (quoting Warner Theatres Associates, Ltd. v. Metro Life Insurance Co.,
149 F.3d 134, 137 (2d Cir. 1998)).
150. See Lutz, supra note 9, at 842 (describing how plaintiffs may avoid summary
judgement or a motion to dismiss because of factual uncertainty regarding whether the
plaintiff reasonably relied on a representation by the defendant); see also Blair, supra note
9, at 469-70 (“[A] plaintiff alleging fraud stands a very good chance of surviving any
pretrial efforts that a defendant might make to cut short the litigation,” and “Sellers faced
with fraud claims . . . are likely to be forced to incur legal fees through a trial . . . .”).
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almost always raise disputed issues of material fact, thus preventing their
disposition on summary judgment. This means that a defendant faced with
such a suit has to incur the significant costs of discovery and perhaps trial.
Moreover, as noted in Abry Partners, claims based on allegedly fraudulent
statements or omissions made in due diligence (especially oral ones) are
subject to a high error rate. These factors combine to endow even quite
unmeritorious suits with considerable settlement value.
All this suggests a simple but powerful economic argument in favor of
making non-reliance clauses effective. For, from economic point of view,
the question has become one of relative costs. If disclaimers and nonreliance clauses are not enforceable, the seller bears the cost of nonmeritorious post-closing suits based on allegedly fraudulent extracontractual statements and omissions. If such clauses are enforceable, the
buyer bears the cost of being duped by fraudulent extra-contractual
statements and omissions. But this second cost can be avoided by the
buyer taking the precaution of ensuring that all representations that are
material to it are included in the definitive agreement. Since the parties are
already going to negotiate such an agreement, and since such an agreement
typically includes a vast array of representations covering all aspects of the
target’s business, the cost to the buyer of making sure that all the
representations material to it are included in the definitive agreement is
normally quite low. Hence, the efficient solution to the problem is for the
cost to the seller of non-meritorious suits to be eliminated by making
disclaimers and non-reliance clauses enforceable, and for the cost to the
buyer of being duped by fraudulent statements and omissions in due
diligence to be avoided by the buyer’s taking appropriate precautions by
negotiating a complete set of representations in the definitive agreement.
By placing the risk on the cheapest cost avoider, this solution maximizes
the joint surplus from the transaction and so makes both parties better off. I
will formulate a much more elaborate version of this argument in Part II
below.
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2. New York Law151
Although New York long declined to enforce non-reliance clauses,152
that changed in 1959 when the state’s highest court, the New York Court of
Appeals, reversed course in Danann Realty Corp. v. Harris.153 In Danann
Reality, the underlying transaction was a sale of a lease for a building.
After the transaction was consummated, the buyer sued, affirming the
contract, but seeking damages for fraud based on alleged
misrepresentations, supposedly made orally by the seller outside the
contract, concerning the operating expenses and profits of the lease.154 As
the court saw it, the key issue was whether the buyer could “establish . . .
reliance upon the representations,”155 given that the contract provided that
the seller “has not made and does not make any representations as to the
physical condition, rents, leases, expenses, operation or any other matter or
thing affected or related to the [building], except as . . . specifically set
forth” in the agreement and the buyer “expressly acknowledges that no
such representations have been made” and was “not relying upon any
statement or representation not embodied in this contract.”156 In the other
words, the contract contained a disclaimer by the seller of extra-contractual
representations and a representational non-reliance clause by the buyer (it
also included a standard integration clause).157 After noting that an
integration clause, by itself, would not operate to bar a fraud claim based
on extra-contractual representations,158 the court held that, in this case, the
151. See generally Masson, supra note 9, at 503 (discussing the evolution of New York
Law on the issue of non-reliance clauses).
152. See e.g., Bridger v. Goldsmith, 143 N.Y. 424, 428 (1894) (stating that “a party that
has perpetrated a fraud upon his neighbor may [not] . . . contract with him in the very
instrument by means of which it was perpetrated, for immunity against its consequences,
close his mouth from complaining of it and bind him never to seek redress.”); CrowellCollier Pub. Co. v. Josefowitz, 5 N.Y.2d 998 (1959) (holding that a disclaimer by the seller
in the agreement did not bar buyer’s suit for fraud based on alleged extra-contractual
misrepresentations); see also Masson, supra note 9 at 504 (citing Danann Realty Corp. v.
Harris, 5 N.Y.2d 317 (1959) as a case in which the court changed the default rule regarding
reliance waivers).
153. 5 N.Y.2d 317 (1959). The majority maintains that the decision in Danann Reality is
consistent with prior New York law, but the vigorous dissent by Judge Fuld demonstrates
that this is clearly not correct. See Masson, supra note 9, at 504 (agreeing that Danann
Reality was an important departure from prior law).
154. Danann Realty Corp., 5 N.Y.2d at 319.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 320 (emphasis deleted).
157. Id. at 319.
158. The court cited Sabo v. Delman, 3 N.Y.2d 155 (1957) and reiterated “the
fundamental principle that a general merger clause is ineffective to exclude parol evidence
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buyer “has in the plainest language announced and stipulated that it is not
relying on any representations as to the very matter as to which it now
claims it was defrauded.”159 That is, the Danann court held that the
particularity of the non-reliance clause mattered: the buyer had represented
it was not relying on extra-contractual representations about expenses and
profits, and now it was suing alleging misrepresentations about specifically
these issues. Noting that the “plaintiff’s officers read and understood the
contract” and “they were aware of the provisions by which they aver that
plaintiff did not rely on . . . extra-contractual representations,”160 the court
held that the buyer would be held to the terms of the agreement and its
claims of fraud based on allegedly fraudulent extra-contractual
representations would be dismissed.
Besides the requirement that the non-reliance clause mention with
particularity the subjects of extra-contractual representations on which the
buyer is not relying, the opinion in Danann is notable for another reason as
well. That is, it anticipates—and arguably even improves upon Chief
Justice Strine’s Double Liar Argument. For, the court says, because the
buyer “made a representation in the contract that it was not relying on
specific representations not embodied in the contract, while, it now asserts,
it was in fact relying on such oral representations,” the buyer thus
“admits . . . that it is guilty of deliberately misrepresenting to the seller its
true intention.”161 This, of course, sounds very much like the Double Liar
Argument. But, the court continues, “To condone this fraud would place
the purchaser in a favored position,”162 and the court cites, without further
explanation, the famous case of Riggs v. Palmer,163 in which the New York
Court of Appeals refused to allow an heir under a will who had murdered
the testator to receive the legacy to which he was otherwise entitled.
Although it is not entirely clear why the Danann court cites Riggs v.
Palmer,164 the court seems to be citing the case for the proposition that “all
to show fraud in inducing the contract.” Danann Realty Corp., 5 N.Y.2d at 320.
159. Id. (emphasis added).
160. Id. at 321.
161. Id. at 323.
162. Id.
163. Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889).
164. Danann Realty Corp., 5 N.Y.2d at 323 (citing Riggs v. Palmer 115 N.Y. at 511-12).
On page 511, the Riggs court is discussing the equitable interpretation of statutes, which is
plainly not relevant to the issues in Danann. At the very bottom of page 511, however, the
Riggs court moves to a new topic, which, as quoted in the text, is that all laws and contracts
may be controlled in their operation by fundamental maxims of the common law, such as
that no one shall be permitted to profit from his own fraud. This discussion continues onto
page 512, where the court gives several examples, such as Mutual Life Ins. Co. of New
York v. Armstrong, 117 U.S. 591 (1886), in which the United State Supreme Court held that
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contracts may be controlled in their operation and effect by general,
fundamental maxims of the common law,” such as that “[n]o one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, or to take advantage of his own
wrong, or to found any claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property
by his own crime.”165 In other words, the Danann court sees the buyer,
who represented that he was not relying on extra-contractual
representations of the seller but did in fact rely on such representations, as a
fraudster, and under the common-law principle that no one shall be
permitted to profit by his own fraud, it would dismiss his suit. But, in
contradistinction to the Double Liar Argument, the Danann court does not
see the seller as a fraudster. Why not, if the seller did, as the buyer alleges,
make lying representations to the buyer outside the contract? I think the
only answer, which goes beyond the Double Liar Argument and
adumbrates much that I will have to say in Part II, is that even if the seller
did lie to the buyer outside the contract the seller did not commit fraud
because the buyer agreed not to rely on such representations, and reliance is
an element of fraud. By contract, the seller presumably did rely on the
buyer’s representations in the contract, and so the buyer, but not the seller,
would be a fraudster. If this is correct, then the Danann court likely
understood the issues surrounding non-reliance clauses more deeply than
any other court to consider them.
However this may be, the requirement in Danann that the non-reliance
clause mention with specificity the matters treated in extra-contractual
representations on which the buyer is not relying did not long survive in
New York. After lower courts chipped away at the requirement,166 the
Court of Appeals reconsidered it in Citibank v. Plapinger.167 That case
centered on a guarantee that the guarantors represented was “absolute and
unconditional” but which, they later claimed, was fraudulently induced by
certain oral, extra-contractual representations by the guaranteed party.168
a beneficiary under a life insurance policy who had murdered the individual whose life was
insured would be not be permitted to collect the insurance proceeds. See Riggs, 115 N.Y. at
512 (holding that the murderer “forfeited all rights under [the insurance policy] when, to
secure its immediate payment, he murdered the assured” because it “would be a reproach to
the jurisprudence of the country if one could recover insurance money payable on the death
of the party whose life he had feloniously taken.”).
165. Riggs, 115 N.Y. at 511.
166. See Barnes v. Gould, 83 A.D.2d 900 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Galvatron Indus.
Corp. v. Greenberg, 96 A.D.2d 281 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); see also Grumman Allied
Indus., Inc. v. Rohr Indus., Inc., 748 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984) (holding that an action for
fraud based on extra-contractual representations cannot be maintained where the plaintiff
contractually disclaimed reliance and had access to all relevant information).
167. Citibank, N.A. v. Plapinger, 66 N.Y.2d 90, 95 (1985).
168. Id. at 93-94.
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Summarizing the holding in Danann as, “the rule that fraud in the
inducement vitiates a contract [is] . . . subject to exception where the
person claiming to have been defrauded has by his own specific disclaimer
of reliance upon oral representations himself been guilty of deliberately
mispresenting [his] true intention,”169 the Court of Appeals noted that
Danann “has been criticized as . . . likely to result in verbose merger
clauses.”170 Suggesting a distinction between specifically negotiated nonreliance clauses and ones not specifically negotiated, the court stated that,
although “it cannot be said, as in Danann, that the defendants have ‘in the
plainest language announced and stipulated that [they were] not relying on
any representations as to the very matter . . . as to which [they] now [claim
they were] defrauded,” nevertheless “following extended negotiations
between sophisticated business people,” the defendants agreed to a
guarantee that they “proclaimed . . . to be ‘absolute and unconditional.’”171
This, the court held, was legally sufficient. “It is unrealistic in such
circumstances to expect an express stipulation that the defendants were not
relying” on the particular representation they claimed to rely upon “when
they themselves have denominated their obligation unconditional . . . .”172
The lesson from Citibank, therefore, seems to be that a non-reliance
clause, even one that is completely general, will be enforced if it is part of a
negotiated agreement between sophisticated parties. Although some
subsequent New York cases continue to consider the specificity of the nonreliance clause,173 others have followed in the path of Citibank and largely
dropped the specificity requirement. Thus, noting that the “specificity
requirement is further relaxed when the contracting parties are
‘sophisticated business people,’ and the disclaimer clause [in the case at
hand] was the result of negotiations between [such parties],”174 the court in
Aniero Concrete Co., Inc. v. New York City Const. Authority held that a
sophisticated party would be bound by a non-reliance clause even though it
did not mention specifically the subject matter of the extra-contractual
representations by which the plaintiff claimed the defendant had
Perhaps not
fraudulently induced it into the contract at issue.175
surprisingly, the Delaware courts have taken Citibank at face value and
169. Id. at 94.
170. Id. at 95 (internal citations omitted).
171. Id. at 95.
172. Id.
173. See e.g., Warner Theatre Assoc. v. Metropolitan Ins. Co., No. 97-9552, 1997 WL
685334 (S.D.N.Y. Nov. 4, 1997) (considering the specificity of language in an agreement).
174. Aniero Concrete Co. v. New York City Const. Auth., No. 94 CIV. 9111, 1997 WL
3268, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 3, 1997).
175. Id. at *8.
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held, when applying New York law, that non-reliance clauses in negotiated
agreements between sophisticated parties are enforceable in accordance
with their terms.176 If this is correct, then, as Justice Holland noted in RAA
v. Savage Sports, the New York rule is the same as the Delaware rule.177
C. The Circuit Split: Enforceability of Non-Reliance Clauses in the
Second Circuit, Un-Enforceability in the Third and First
Circuits.178
We have seen so far that the virtually universal practice in the market
for corporate control is for the seller to require that potential purchasers
enter into a confidentiality agreement prior to receiving due diligence
materials from the seller.179 Furthermore, such confidentiality agreements
routinely include both disclaimers by the seller of any representations about
the accuracy or completeness of the materials made available to the buyer
and promises by the buyer not to rely on any representations of the seller
except for those that are ultimately set forth in the definitive acquisitive
agreement between the parties.180 We have also seen that the leading
commercial law jurisdictions of Delaware and New York have held that
such disclaimers and non-reliance promises are enforceable against
sophisticated parties in accordance with their terms to block suits against
the seller on the basis of extra-contractual representations, even when the
allegation is that the seller made such extra-contractual representation
fraudulently in order to induce the buyer into the agreement.181
Against this background, it might seem inevitable that similar
disclaimers and non-reliance clauses would have the same effect against
fraud claims brought under Rule 10b-5 as they do against common law
fraud claims. Such is indeed the law in the Second Circuit,182 but the rule is
176. See, e.g., In re IBP, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 73 n.178 (citing
Citibank as holding that “specific contractual agreement that representations outside of
contract were not relied upon foreclosed fraud in inducement claim”).
177. See RAA Management, LLC v. Savage Sports Holdings, Inc., discussed above in
Section I.B.1.b, where, when it had to decide whether a non-reliance clause was
enforceable, the Delaware Supreme Court assumed without deciding that New York law
applied but expressly noted that “the outcome would be the same under Delaware law.” 45
A.3d 107, 112 (Del. 2012.)
178. On the specific topic of the circuit split, see generally Altman, supra note 9; Grove,
supra note 9; Lutz, supra note 9; Quaintance, supra note 47; West & Lewis, Jr., supra note
2, at 1003 n.2.
179. See supra notes 35-40 and accompanying text.
180. Id.
181. See Sections I.B.1 & I.B.2.
182. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 342 (2d Cir. 1996).
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otherwise in the First183 and Third Circuits.184 The source of the
disagreement is Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the
Exchange Act). This innocuous-sounding provision reads its entirety as
follows, “Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person to
waive compliance with any provision of this chapter or of any rule or
regulation thereunder, or of any rule of a self-regulatory organization, shall
be void.”185 Generally speaking, this is an entirely unremarkable noncircumvention provision designed to protect investors from sharp practices
in which bad actors would trick them into waiving compliance with the
securities laws, thus defeating the whole purpose of the statutory scheme.
As with so many provisions in the federal securities laws, however,
although this provision may be eminently sensible in the context of
protecting retail investors against securities professionals, nevertheless the
provision becomes problematic in the context of securities transactions
between sophisticated parties advised by expert counsel.186 In the case of
non-reliance clauses in business combination transactions, the problem is
obvious: a non-reliance clause may well seem to be a “condition,
stipulation, or provision binding” the buyer “to waive compliance with”
Rule 10b-5, thus making misrepresentations that are not actionable at
common law (because of the non-reliance clause) actionable under federal
law.187
Taking the question in abstraction from any more detailed context, it
is at least plausible that non-reliance clauses are void under Section 29(a).
In a richer context like that described above, however, this argument
becomes considerably less plausible. In any case, as indicated above, the
United States Circuit Courts of Appeals for the Second Circuit, which
183. Rogen v. Illikon Corp., 361 F.2d 260, 266 (1st Cir. 1966).
184. AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174, 179 (3d Cir. 2003).
185. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 29(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78cc (2018).
186. See Lutz, supra note 9, at 805 (arguing that the split between the circuit courts
“stands for a much more fundamental and widespread problem,” which concerns what
assumptions “should drive legal analysis and rulemaking” and “[w]hat values are served by
regulating the securities industry”).
187. Reasonable reliance is an element of an action under Rule 10b-5 just as it is an
element of an action for common law fraud. See Basic v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 247
(1988) (reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 fraud action); see also Kennedy v. Josephthal
& Co., 814, F.2d 798, 804 (1st Cir. 1987) (listing and discussing factors to be considered in
determining whether a purchaser or seller of securities reasonably relied on the defendant’s
alleged misstatement); Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972)
(noting that in a Rule 10b-5 action based on an allegedly misleading omission, the investor
need not show actual reliance on the omission but, only that a reasonable investor would
find the omitted information to be important in making an investment decision); Lutz, supra
note 9, at 808-809 (discussing reasonable reliance and the Kennedy factors).
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includes New York, and the Third Circuit, which includes Delaware, have
been divided over this issue for at least fifteen years, with the First Circuit
aligned with the Third. Adding to the confusion, other Circuits, including
the Seventh and the District of Columbia Circuit, have considered the
enforceability of non-reliance clauses without reference to the effect of
Section 29(a) and held them to be enforceable. Regrettably, the Supreme
Court has not acted to resolve the circuit split. The next three subsections
consider the relevant cases in detail.188

188. In the famous case of Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429 (7th Cir. 1987),
Jordan resold to his employer, Duff & Phelps, shares acquired in connection with his
employment and later sued under Rule 10b-5 claiming that the corporation should have
disclosed to him the possibility that the corporation could soon be acquired at a price well
above the sales price. The case is thus very similar to Rogen v. Illikon Corp., but unlike
Rogen the court more accurately understood the situation as one involving a duty to
disclose, rather than non-reliance on an allegedly false representation. Judge Easterbrook
writes, “We may assume that duties concerning the timing of disclosure by an otherwisesilent firm also may be the subject of contract. Section 29(a) of the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934 . . . forbids waiver of the provisions of the Act,” including Rule 10b-5. Id. at 436.
But “a provision must be applicable to be ‘waived,’ and the existence of a requirement to
speak is a condition of the application” of Rule 10b-5 “to a person’s silence during a
securities trade. The obligation to break silence is itself based on state law . . . and so may
be redefined to the extent state law permits.” Id. As M. Todd Henderson points out, in their
famous dueling opinions in the case, “one thing upon which [Judge] Easterbrook and
[Judge] Posner agree is that the parties could, through contract, waive any duties to disclose;
they simply disagree about whether Jordan did so in this case.” M. Todd Henderson,
Deconstructing Duff and Phelps, 74 U. CHI. L. REV. 1739, 1754 (2007). “This is a pretty
remarkable leap,” Henderson says, “as it seems to run afoul of the ban on waivers found
in . . . the securities laws.” Id. (citing Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Section 29(a)).
Henderson thinks that “the view that the securities laws are waivable (to some extent) by
contractual definition of rights at the state law level is more readily accepted after O’Hagan,
but when Posner first suggested it in Duff and Phelps, it was a radical notion.” Id. at 1755.
I am not sure this is quite right, at least if Posner is correct (which I think he is) that the duty
to speak arises under state fiduciary law, not Rule 10b-5, and the former may be modified
by agreement. Id. at 445. See Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, Inc., 815 F.2d 429, 445 (7th Cir.
1987), (Posner, J., dissenting) (stating “Rule 10b-5 forbids ‘fraud or deceit’ in the sale or
purchase of corporate securities,” but Jordan “does not argue that Duff and Phelps made any
misleading statements.” Rather, the gist of the complaint is that the company’s “omission to
tell Jordan that he should think twice about quitting since the company might soon be sold at
a price that would increase the value of Jordan’s stock by almost 30-fold.”). In any event,
although Duff and Phelps recognizes the importance of Section 29(a), the fact that the case
is about non-disclosure of material facts rather than non-reliance on matters actually
disclosed, it is not ultimately relevant to the question of the effectiveness of non-reliance
clauses.
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The Second Circuit: Harsco Corp. v. Segui189

In Harsco Corp. v. Segui, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
considered claims for, among other things, Rule 10b-5 securities fraud
arising out of a business combination transaction.190 The buyer, Harsco,
had acquired all of the outstanding equity securities of Multiserv, a
Netherlands corporation, and subsequently Harsco sued various former
officers and shareholders of Multiserv alleging that various extracontractual representations they made were fraudulent in violation of Rule
10b-5.191 The district court below had dismissed the plaintiff’s claims on
the basis of a disclaimer in the acquisition agreement,192 and on appeal the
Second Circuit understood “the central issue” in the case to be “whether
parties who negotiate at arm’s length for the sale and purchase of a
company can define the transaction in a writing so as to preclude a claim of
fraud based on representations not made, and explicitly disclaimed, in that
writing.”193
The Second Circuit began its analysis by noting that reasonable
reliance by the plaintiff is an element of a Rule 10b-5 claim.194 The
agreement between the parties, however, contained not only a standard
merger clause but also a disclaimer in which the seller disclaimed any
representations or warranties except those expressly set forth in the
agreement.195 The defendants argued that these provisions made reasonable
reliance by the buyer on any extra-contractual representations
impossible.196 The buyer disputed the correct interpretation of the
189. 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996).
190. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 341 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Citibank, N.A. v.
Itochu Int’l Inc., No. 01CIV.6007(GBD), 2003 WL 1797847, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 4, 2003)
(applying Harsco Corp. v. Segui to hold that a non-reliance clause in a securities purchase
agreement between sophisticated parties barred fraud claims based on extra-contractual
representations).
191. Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 341.
192. Harsco Corp. v. Bowden, No. 94CIV.6191(LMM), 1995 WL 152523, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 5, 1995), aff’d sub nom. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 1996).
Hence, Harsco, which is universally understood to concern non-reliance clauses, actually
turns on the legal effect of a disclaimer. This is yet another instance of courts and scholars
running together disclaimers, promissory non-reliance clauses, and representational nonreliance clauses.
193. Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 339. The district court dismissed the common law claims
along with the Rule 10b-5 claims. Harsco, 1995 WL 152523, at *6. The Second Circuit
also affirmed this ruling. Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d 337, 339 (2d Cir. 1996).
194. Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 342 (stating, “[t]he general rule is that reasonable reliance
must be proved as an element of a securities fraud claim”).
195. Id.
196. In this respect, the argument is similar to that adopted by the Delaware Supreme
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contractual language, but its chief argument was that, even if the provisions
meant what the seller claimed, then they were void under Section 29(a) of
the Exchange Act. Since the buyer apparently conceded that, if the
disclaimer made reliance on extra-contractual representations unreasonable,
its claims on the basis of such representations had to fail, the issue quickly
narrowed to whether Section 29(a) permitted the parties to agree that the
only representations actionable under Rule 10b-5 would be those made in
the agreement.
The court began its consideration of Section 29(a) by considering the
only Supreme Court case to construe that provision, Shearson/American
Express, Inc. v. McMahon.197 In that case, a securities broker and its client
had entered into an agreement that required the client to arbitrate any
claims against the broker, including claims that the broker had violated
provisions of the Exchange Act or rules or regulations promulgated
thereunder.198 Later, the client argued that the arbitration clause in the
agreement violated Section 29(a) because Section 27 of the Exchange Act
grants the district courts of the United States exclusive jurisdiction to
adjudicate cases involving violations of the securities laws.199 Therefore,
the argument went, enforcing the arbitration clause would amount to the
plaintiff waiving compliance with Section 27 in violation of Section 29(a).
This argument did not prevail, and the Supreme Court held in
Shearson/American Express that Section 29(a) did not invalidate
agreements to arbitrate violations of the securities laws.200
The relevance of Shearson/American Express to the problem in
Harsco is unclear. In holding that agreements to arbitrate claims
concerning violations of the securities laws are not voided by Section
29(a), Shearson/American Express may be read to suggest that extremely
broad readings of Section 29(a) are incorrect. On the whole, however, the
many significant factual differences between disclaimers and non-reliance
clauses in agreements between sophisticated parties involved in a business
combination and arbitration clauses in agreements between brokers and
their (often unsophisticated) clients are so great that it is perilous to infer
Court in RAA, where Justice Holland treated disclaimers not obviously equivalent to a nonreliance clause as their functional equivalent. RAA Management LLC v. Savage Sports
Holdings, Inc., 45 A.3d 107, 119 (Del. 2012).
197. 482 U.S. 220 (1987); see also Lutz, supra note 9, at 810-811 (discussing the
relevance of Shearson/American Express to the issue of the effectiveness of non-reliance
clauses); Grove, supra note 9, at 1131 (discussing the Shearson/American Express opinion
that Section 29(a) only prohibits waiver of substantive obligations of the Exchange Act.).
198. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 222-226.
199. Securities Exchange Act, Section 27(a), 15 U.S.C. 78aa (2018).
200. Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. at 220.
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much at all from Shearson/American Express. Indeed, in considering the
effect of Shearson/American Express on the question before it, the Second
Circuit did little more than note that the Supreme Court had stated that
Section 29(a) “forbids . . . enforcement of agreements to waive
‘compliance’ with the provisions of the statute”.201 It is hard to see how
this gloss to Section 29(a) significantly adds to its content.
But in its analysis of the relevance of Shearson/American Express, the
Second Circuit also stated that “the question here boils down to whether”
the disclaimers in the agreement “weaken Harsco’s ability to recover”
under Rule 10b-5 “in a way that § 29(a) prohibits.”202 That qualification,
of course, contains the whole issue, for the court readily conceded that, by
limiting the universe of representations on which Harsco could bring Rule
10b-5 actions to those set forth in the agreement, there was obviously a
clear sense in which the agreement “weaken[ed] Harsco’s ability to
recover” under the Exchange Act.203 Nevertheless, “in the circumstances of
this case,” the court said, “such a ‘weakening’ does not constitute a
forbidden waiver of compliance.”204 In explaining why this was so,
however, the court merely repeated some of the facts in the case: “there is a
detailed writing developed via negotiations among sophisticated business
entities and their advisors,” and this writing “defines the boundaries of the
transaction.”205 All of this is indisputably correct, but its relevance to
whether Section 29(a) should be interpreted to require that parts of that
writing be void is left entirely unexplained.
Little more emerges from the balance of the Harsco opinion. In
distinguishing Rogen v. Ilikon Corp.,206 a First Circuit case holding that
Section 29(a) voided a non-reliance clause and discussed more fully
below,207 the Second Circuit emphasized that, in Harsco, the parties were
both sophisticated entities and that they negotiated at arm’s length.208 The
result of that negotiation was an agreement containing extensive
representations and warranties that were enforceable (including under Rule
10b-5) and that “protected [] Harsco’s substantive rights.”209 In the court’s
201. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 343 (2d Cir. 1991) (quoting
Shearson/American Express, 482 U.S. 220, 228 (1987)).
202. Id. (emphasis added).
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966); see also Lutz, supra note 2, at 811 (agreeing that
Rogen should be distinguished from Harsco on the facts).
207. See Section I.C.2.
208. Harsco Corp., 91 F.3d at 344.
209. Id.
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view, the “analysis becomes a question of degree and context,” and “in
different circumstances (e.g., if there were but one vague seller’s
representation) a ‘no other representation’ clause might be toothless and
run afoul of § 29(a).”210 In other words, it seems that the court was holding
that if sophisticated parties negotiate a sufficiently large set of
representations, then a disclaimer of any extra-contractual representations
will be enforceable.
Now, such a rule is in keeping with the spirit of the federal securities
laws in at least two important ways. First, it relies on a vague standard the
application of which depends on the court’s appraisal of the totality of the
facts and circumstances.211 Second, it allows sophisticated parties, who can
“fend for themselves”212 and who do not “need the protection of the Act,”213
to arrange their own affairs without governmental inference. It is worth
pointing out, however, that when the securities laws make exceptions to
general rules for sophisticated parties, the exceptions are invariably from
such rules as the registration requirement under Section 5 of the Securities
Act, not the general antifraud provisions such as Rule 10b-5.214 That
potentially important difference goes unnoticed in the Harsco opinion.
The rest of the Harsco opinion is not especially convincing. For
example, if the key factor is the sophistication of the parties, why should
sophisticated parties be permitted to limit the representations on which
Rule 10b-5 claims are brought to those in the agreement only if the
representations in the agreement are very extensive?
Sometimes,
sophisticated parties wish to agree to a sale without representations and
warranties—a sale, in transactional law jargon, “as is, where is.”215 The
Second Circuit expressly says, however, that in such a case disclaimers and
non-reliance clauses may be void under Section 29(a). The idea seems to
be that the federal securities laws protect parties on a sliding scale based on
their level of sophistication.
That is, the securities laws protect
210. Id.
211. Compare SEC v. Ralston Purina Co., 346 U.S. 119 (1953) (holding that availability
of the exemption in Section (4)(a)(2) from the registration requirements of the Securities
Act of 1933 depends on the totality of the facts and circumstances of the challenged
transaction).
212. Id. at 125.
213. Id.
214. For example, Regulation D provides certain safe-harbor exemptions from the
registration requirement of Section 5 of the Securities Act, but Rule 500(a) states that
transactions effected in accordance Regulation D “are not exempt from the antifraud, civil
liability, or other provisions of the federal securities laws.” 17 C.F.R. § 230.500(a) (2016).
215. The facts in the Third Circuit case discussed below essentially fit the bill; the
subject transaction was essentially “as is, where is.” AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325
F.3d 174, 177 (3d Cir. 2003). See supra note 183 and accompanying text.
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unsophisticated parties completely, and so any contractual limitation on
which representations made to such parties may support a Rule 10b-5
action will be void. The securities laws protect sophisticated parties much
less, and so contractual limitations on which representations made to them
may support a Rule 10b-5 action will generally be enforceable.
Nevertheless, since the securities laws protect even sophisticated parties to
some extent, the limitation on representations made to sophisticated parties
cannot be complete. This schema has some surface plausibility, but only
the most naïve view that, no matter what, a buyer is better off with more
representations rather than fewer could possibly justify such a position. In
any event, it is clear that, while the result in Harsco seems right, the
reasoning is inadequate.216
2.

The Third Circuit: AES Corp v. The Dow Chemical Co.

The facts in AES Corp. v. The Dow Chemical Co.217 are very similar to
those in Harsco. As in Harsco, one sophisticated business entity
negotiated with another for the purchase of all the outstanding stock of a
corporation. In particular, when Dow Chemical decided to sell one of its
subsidiaries, it engaged the investment banking firm Morgan Stanley to
manage the sales process.218 Morgan Stanley made available to interested
parties, including the ultimate purchaser, AES, certain information about
the company being sold, but such information was delivered pursuant to a
confidentiality agreement in which such parties (a) acknowledged that the
seller was making no representations or warranties about the accuracy or
completeness of the information being delivered, (b) agreed that the seller
would have no liability arising from any errors or omissions in such
information, and (c) promised that they would rely only on such
representations and warranties as were included in the definitive agreement
216. In Citibank, N.A. v. Itochu International, Inc., No. 01 Civ. 6007(GBD), 2003 WL
1797847 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), a federal district court in the Second Circuit followed Harsco and
further held that, because of the common law doctrine that parties may not contractually
limit their liability for fraud and because Section 29(a) the Exchange Act makes waivers of
rights under the federal securities laws void, a buyer of securities could sue for Rule 10b-5
securities fraud on the basis of the representations a seller made to the buyer in the
agreement without being bound by the exclusive remedies provision contained in the
agreement. Indeed, the court expressly held that a contractual limitation on fraud claims
based on alleged misrepresentations in the agreement would be void under Section 29(a).
Id. The rules in Harsco and Itochu thus exactly parallel those under Delaware law as set
forth in Abry Partners and RAA.
217. AES Corp. v. The Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174 (3d Cir. 2003).
218. Id. at 175.
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related to the sale and purchase of the target company.219 In other words,
the confidentiality agreement contained both disclaimers and a promissory
non-reliance clause.
Eventually, AES and Dow entered into a definitive agreement under
which AES acquired the stock of the target company. That agreement
contained certain minimal representations by Dow, including with respect
to its due organization and authority to enter into the agreement, a lack of
conflicts between the agreement and any court orders by which Dow was
bound or any contracts to which Dow was a party, and the absence of any
fees due to brokers related to the transaction.220 Dow did not make any
representations or warranties about the qualities of the business being
transferred,221 and the agreement also contained a provision under which
Dow disclaimed any representations or warranties except for those set forth
in the agreement.222 After the closing of the transaction, AES sued Dow
alleging that various extra-contractual representations made by Dow’s
representatives during the due diligence process and the negotiation of the
transaction were fraudulent under Rule 10b-5.
Much like the Second Circuit in Harsco, the Third Circuit began its
analysis of the plaintiff’s claim by reciting the elements of a Rule 10b-5
action,223 emphasizing that the reasonable reliance element “requires a
showing of a causal nexus between the misrepresentation and the plaintiff’s
injury, as well as a demonstration that the plaintiff exercised the diligence
that a reasonable person under all the circumstances would have exercised
to protect his own interests.”224 Noting that the defendant argued that the
plaintiff could not prove the reasonable reliance element of its case because
of the disclaimers and non-reliance clauses in the confidentiality agreement
and the disclaimers in the acquisition agreement, the court moved on to
219. Id.
220. Id. at 177.
221. The sale was thus, in effect, a sale “as is, where is.” See infra note 215. A sale of a
business “as is, where is” between such parties is certainly unusual. I asked Herbert L.
Zarov, who represented Dow before the Third Circuit why the representations were so
abbreviated, but he could throw no light on the subject. It seems that it never occurred to
the court in AES that it could have distinguished the case from Harsco on this basis and not
have placed itself in direct conflict with the Second Circuit. See Quaintance, supra note 47,
at 24 (arguing that the Third Circuit could have distinguished Harsco on several grounds,
including the extent and specificity of the representations and warranties the sellers made).
222. AES Corp., 325 F.3d 174 at 174.
223. To wit, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant made a misstatement or an
omission of a material fact, with scienter, in connection with the purchase or sale of a
security, upon which the plaintiff reasonably relied, which such reliance was the proximate
cause of the plaintiff’s injury. Id. at 178.
224. Id.
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consider the effect of Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act on those
contractual provisions.
The court held that enforcing disclaimers and non-reliance clauses to
foreclose Rule 10b-5 actions on the basis of extra-contractual
representations “would be inconsistent with Section 29(a).”225 The court’s
reasoning, however, is very curious. Its primary argument is that, since
reliance is an element of a Rule 10b-5 fraud claim, “if a party commits
itself never to claim that it relied on representations of the other party to its
contract, it purports anticipatorily to waive any future claims based on
fraudulent misrepresentations of that party,” whether the promise covers all
representations the party made or just those made outside the agreement.226
This, of course, is transparently mistaken. The various different clauses in
the confidentiality agreement and the definitive agreement do different
things, but none of these is a promise by the buyer not to claim in the future
that it relied on certain statements by the seller—as if the idea were that the
buyer was indeed relying on those statements but promised not to assert
this later in litigation. Of the various provisions in the agreements, the only
one that is clearly a promise about what the buyer will do is a promise in
the confidentiality agreement that, in entering into the definitive agreement,
it will not rely on any extra-contractual representations of the seller.227
Some of the other provisions may be read as representations by the buyer
about which representations by the seller it is relying upon in entering into
the definitive agreement.228 But nowhere is there a promise not to sue.
It is true that the covenant not to assert certain claims that the Third
Circuit mistakenly believes exists in the agreements and the actual
provisions in those agreements may require the same outcome in certain
kinds of lawsuits, but that does not make them legally equivalent. This is
apparent from a large body of caselaw in which the difference between
similarly worded covenants and representations makes an important legal
difference. For example, a roofer replaces the roof on a homeowner’s
house under a contract that says that the roof will not leak for ten years.229
225. Id. at 180.
226. Id.
227. That is, the relevant provision in the confidentiality agreement should be read in
accordance with the fifth interpretation of non-reliance clauses given above. See Section
I.B.
228. That is, such provisions can be read in accordance with the fourth interpretation of
non-reliance clauses given above. See Section I.B.
229. See Cunningham v. Frontier Lumber Co., 245 S.W. 270, 270 (Tex. Civ. App. 1922)
(guaranteeing that a roof would give satisfaction for ten years); see also Chris Williams, The
Statute of Limitations, Prospective Warranties, and Problems of Interpretation in Article
Two of the UCC, 52 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 67, 68 (1983) (describing the analogous issue
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If this is a covenant, the roofer is promising that, if the roof leaks at any
time in the ten-year period following the date of the contract, the roofer
will repair it (or pay for the homeowner to do so). If the language in the
contract is a representation, it is a statement, definitively true or definitively
false, once and for all, on the date of the contract about the quality of
workmanship and materials used (i.e., whether they are such as to
withstand leaks from ordinary wear and tear for ten years). Suppose the
statute of limitations for a claim sounding in contract is six years, the roof
leaks in the seventh year, and the roofer refuses to provide the homeowner
with any remedy. Whether the homeowner has a claim under the contract
depends critically on whether the language in the contract contains a
covenant or a representation. If it was a covenant, then the homeowner has
a good claim, for the roofer breached the covenant only in year seven when
he failed to repair the roof. If the language in the contract is a
representation, however, the homeowner’s claim is barred by the statute of
limitations, for if the representation was false, it was false when made,
which means that the breach of contract occurred on the date contract was
made, more than six years in the past.
In the context of the federal securities laws, the difference between the
buyer’s promise not to claim a violation of Rule 10b-5 and a representation
that the buyer did not rely on extra-contractual representations is even more
important. The former would, presumably, violate Section 29(a). The nonreliance representation, however, is clearly different. For, in all manner of
securities transactions, sellers demand representations from buyers as part
of their efforts to comply with particular provisions of the securities laws.
For example, under Rule 506(b) of Regulation D, an issuer may sell
securities without registering them under Section 5 of the Securities Act if,
among other things, each of the purchasers of the securities is an
“accredited investor” within the meaning of Rule 501(a).230 Thus, in an
effort to comply with Rule 506(b), sellers routinely require that, in the
agreement under which the securities are sold, the buyer represents to the
seller that it is an accredited investor.231 By reasoning like that in the Third
Circuit’s opinion in AES, this representation should be taken to be
under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code).
230. Rule 506(b) allows the seller to sell to up to 35 non-accredited investors as well, but
in any sizeable private placement of securities, the purchasers are virtually always all
accredited investors. See Rule 506(b)(2)(ii) and Rule 501(e); 17 CFR 230; 506(b)(2)(ii); 17
CFR 230.501(e).
231. See Section 4(a)(2) and Regulation D Private Placements, Practical Law Practice
Note 8-382-6259 (explaining the required representations as to accredited investor status
under Regulation D).
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equivalent to a promise by the investor not to claim later in litigation that it
is not an accredited investor. That promise would then be equivalent to the
buyer’s waiving the protection of Section 5 of the Securities Act, because
by promising not to claim to be anything other than an accreditor investor,
the buyer effectively makes it impossible for itself to argue that the seller
sold securities to it outside the safe-harbor of Rule 506(b) and so in
violation of Section 5. Given the ubiquity of buyers’ representations in
agreements for the sale of securities, and given that some of the SEC’s own
rules require that buyers obtain such representations from sellers,232 it
seems manifestly absurd that a representation from a buyer which, if true,
negates an element of a possible cause of action under the securities laws
should be understood to be a waiver of protection under those laws in
violation of Section 29(a).
Indeed, at this point the difference between a waiver void under
Section 29(a) and a representation that, if true, would negate an element of
a potential claim under some provision of other of the securities laws
should be clear. That is, when sophisticated parties are negotiating a sale
and purchase of securities, they do so in light of the securities laws,
attempting to structure their transaction in order to comply with those laws.
For example, to fit the transaction into a certain safe harbor, it is usually the
case that certain factual preconditions must be met (e.g., in a Rule 144A
transaction, each of the purchasers must be a qualified institutional buyer
within the meaning of the rule).233 Ensuring that these preconditions are
met is often beyond the control of the seller; rather, it requires coordinated
action between the seller and the buyer. The seller, who is at risk of
violating the law if the assumed factual preconditions are not actually
fulfilled, secures the cooperation of the buyer in a legally binding way by
requiring the buyer to make certain legally-binding representations to it in
the relevant agreement. This is not an effort to evade the law or waive
compliance with it; it is an effort to comply with particular provisions of
the securities laws. The same is true with representations from the buyer
regarding which representations and warranties it is relying on. By settling
that matter, the seller knows in which representations it must invest
resources to ensure that they are true in order not to violate Rule 10b-5.
Hence, the representation from the buyer about which representations is it
relying on is not a waiver of compliance with the law. It is a tool to
establish the facts about the transaction in order that the seller can take
232. See, e.g., 17 CFR §230.147 and 17 CFR §230.147A, which relate to intrastate
offerings, require the seller to obtain from each purchaser a representation that the purchaser
is a resident of the state to which the offering is confined.
233. 17 CFR §230.144A.
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precautions to comply with the law.
To return to the Third Circuit’s opinion in AES, after noting that its
holding agreed with that of the First Circuit in Rogen v. Ilikon,234 the court
states that, although the disclaimers and non-reliance clauses in the
agreement between the parties were void in violation of Section 29(a),
nevertheless they would retain evidential value concerning whether the
buyer in fact relied on extra-contractual representations.235 That is, the
buyer’s declaration in the non-reliance clause “alone, or in conjunction
with other evidence, may establish an absence of reliance and, when
unrebutted, may even provide a basis for summary judgment in the
defendant’s favor.”236 The court thus adopted the minimal, evidentiary
interpretation of the non-reliance clause.237 Unlike in Harsco, however, the
Third Circuit held that the non-reliance clause could not establish reliance
as a matter of law entitling the defendant to prevail on a Rule 12(b)(6)
motion to dismiss.238 In other words, the court declined to adopt the
conclusive-evidentiary or estoppel interpretations.
Finally, the Third Circuit acknowledged that its holding in AES was
directly contrary to that of the Second Circuit in Harsco, but the court
stated it found “Harsco’s reasoning unpersuasive.”239 Conceding that
“there may be economic efficiency in allowing private parties the freedom
to fashion their own bargains,”240 the court insisted that “Congress has
made a decision to limit that freedom when it comes to anticipatory
234. 361 F.2d 360 (1st Cir. 1966), which is discussed below in Section I.C.3.
235. AES Corp. v. Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174, 180 (3d Cir. 2003). In other
words, the AES court understand non-reliance clauses in accordance with the first
interpretation thereof given above. See I.B.
236. Id. at 180.
237. See Lutz, supra note 9, at 815 (noting that the rule in AES makes non-reliance
clauses one more factor in an already uncertain many-factor balancing test of whether the
plaintiff’s reliance on the alleged misrepresentation was reasonable). As Lutz correctly
says, one way to understand non-reliance clauses is that they reduce uncertainty and limit
the costs of litigation by settling, ex ante, which representations it is reasonable for the
buyer to reply upon (those in the agreement) and which it is not (any other representations).
Id. at 816-821. Altman, however, argues that this approach is incoherent: he thinks that the
reasonability of a party’s reliance on extra-contractual representations depends on the
enforceability of non-reliance clauses. See Altman, supra note 9, at 756. Altman is surely
right to the extent that, if such clauses are enforceable, then relying on extra-contractual
representations in the presence of such a clause is unreasonable, but if such clauses are not
enforceable, it is not incoherent to treat them as (non-conclusive) evidence of nonreliance—i.e., the evidentiary interpretation of such clauses identified above. See Section
I.B.
238. AES Corp., 325 F.3d 174, at 180-181.
239. Id. at 183.
240. Id.
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waivers of Exchange Act claims.”241 This, of course, merely refers back to
the argument above that equates a representation negating an element of a
potential cause of action under the securities laws with an anticipatory
waiver of that claim. It does little to touch the reasoning in Harsco. The
opinion in AES does not seriously engage with that in Harsco, and, like the
opinion in Harsco, its reasoning is murky. The losing defendant in AES
filed a petition for certiorari, but the Supreme Court declined to hear the
case.242
3. The First Circuit: Rogen v. Ilikon Corporation
The earliest case to consider the effect of Section 29(a) on disclaimers
and non-reliance clauses was Rogen v. Ilikon Corporation,243 which the
Third Circuit cited in AES and which the Second Circuit distinguished in
Harsco. In Rogen, an individual, one of the founders and a former
president and director of the corporation at issue, along with some of his
family,244 resold stock to the corporation pursuant to an agreement that
included a clause in which the sellers represented “they are fully familiar
with the business and prospects of the corporation, are not relying on any
representation or obligation to make full disclosure with respect thereto,
and have made such investigation thereof as they deem necessary.”245 The
second clause here includes a representational non-reliance clause.246
When the sellers later became aware of several matters that led them to
believe that the value of the stock was higher than the contract price, they
sued the corporation, alleging that the corporation had violated Rule 10b-5
by failing to disclose these matters before entering the contract. The
corporation defended on the ground that the plaintiffs could not prove
reasonable reliance.
The First Circuit stated that “the available evidence of non-reliance is
241. Id. Cf. Sachs, supra note 9, at 913 (1994) (arguing that, even when the buyer
voluntarily agrees to a non-reliance clause, it ought not be enforced because “the
voluntariness of the agreement is irrelevant” under Section 29(a)).
242. Dow Chemical Co. v. AES Corp., 540 U.S. 1068, 1070 (2003).
243. Rogen v. Ilikon, 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966).
244. Id. at 262.
245. Id. at 262.
246. As Kevin Douglas has pointed out to me, the other clauses in the quoted language
appeared aimed at other problems, such as contracting around a duty to disclose
information, whether under Rule 10b-5 or pursuant to a fiduciary duty the corporation
would owe to its shareholders when transacting to repurchase their shares. Since the
plaintiff’s suit involves a Rule 10b-5 action, however, these other complex issues may be
ignored for our purposes. In any event, Rogen has come to be understood as a case about
non-reliance clauses, regardless of what other issues were in fact in play in the case.
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impressive,” mentioning, among other things, the fact that the plaintiff
“signed an agreement in which he specifically acknowledged his full
familiarity with the ‘business and prospects’ of [the corporation], his nonreliance on any duty to disclose, and his having made all necessary
This seems to adopt implicitly the evidentiary
investigation.”247
interpretation of the non-reliance clause at issue. Still, the court thought
that the evidence was not sufficient to support judgment as a matter of
law,248 and so it was not adopting the conclusive-evidentiary interpretation.
At this point, the court turned to the effect of Section 29(a) on the
non-reliance clause in the agreement. Stating that it was aware of no other
judicial treatment of Section 29(a),249 the court recognized that a
representation of non-reliance “is not, in its terms, a ‘condition, stipulation,
or provision . . . biding [plaintiff] to waive compliance” with the Exchange
Act.250 Presumably, the First Circuit was here alluding to the point,
explained above, about the difference between a representation that, if true,
would negate an element of a cause of action under the securities laws and
a promise not to bring such an action. The court continued, however, by
saying that “on analysis, we see no fundamental difference between saying,
for example, ‘I waive any rights I might have because of your
representations or obligations to make full disclosure’ and ‘I am not relying
on your representations or obligations to make full disclosure.’”251 On this
basis, the First Circuit declined to allow the defendant to prevail as a matter
of law on the basis of the non-reliance clause, because to do so “would
have gone far toward eviscerating Section 29(a).”252
But, contrary to what the court thought, there is a fundamental
difference between saying “I am not relying on your representations” and
“I waive my rights to bring a claim based on your representations.” They
are alike in that, if given effect, both will defeat a Rule 10b-5 claim, but
that is about the only way the two are alike. As indicated above, the
purpose of the representation is that it helps the parties comply with the
law: one party gives the representation to another as part of structuring a
transaction to comply with the law. The purpose of waiver, if such a
waiver was ever given, would be to proceed with a transaction in violation
of the law in a way designed to evade the consequences of the law. What
247. Rogen, 361 F.2d 260, at 267.
248. Id. at 267-268.
249. Rogen v. Illikon, 361 F.2d 260 (1st Cir. 1966), antedates Shearson/American v.
McMahon 482 U.S. 220 (1987) by over twenty years.
250. Rogen, 361 F.2d 260, at 268.
251. Id.
252. Id.
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the Rogen court, like the AES court, missed was that complying with the
securities laws often requires cooperation and coordination between the
parties, and contractual representations are an important means of such
cooperation and coordination. Make those representations unenforceable,
and you merely make it harder for the parties to comply with the law.253
4.

Some Cases Not Mentioning Section 29(a) in the Seventh, First,
and District of Columbia Circuits

Strangely, there are also several cases in which Circuit Courts of
Appeals have considered factual situations like those in Harsco, AES, and
Rogen but in which Section 29(a) is not discussed. The cases include Oneto-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso in the District of Columbia Circuit, 254
Jackvony v. Riht Financial Corp. in the First Circuit,255 and Rissman v.
Rissman in the Seventh Circuit.256 That is, in each of these cases, the court
had to consider whether a plaintiff may proceed on a Rule 10b-5 claim
253. Regarding the law in the First Circuit, see also the discussion below in Section I.C.4
of Jackvony v. Riht Financial Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989). Yet another way of
understanding the argument of the First and Third Circuits is to see the courts as applying
the principle that, in interpreting the federal securities laws, substance should trump form—
that is, arrangements or actions that have the same effect should be afforded the same
treatment under the law. Since a waiver of compliance with Rule 10b-5 and a non-reliance
clause have the same effect, they should be treated the same way under the law; since the
former would be voided by Section 29(a), so too would the latter. The opposing position
relies on something like the Independent Legal Significance Doctrine in Delaware corporate
law. See Hariton v. Arco Electronics, Inc., 188 A.2d 123 (Del. 1963) (holding that although
a sale of assets accomplished the same result as a merger it is governed exclusively by the
sale-of-assets statute); R. Franklin Balotti and. Jesse A. Finkelstein, Delaware Law of
Corporation and Business Organizations, 3d. ed. (2018) § 10.8. That is, it would attend
closely to the legal forms adopted and give them their proper effect without regard to
whether that effect was one that could be achieved in other ways as well. It is no accident,
of course, that the Independent Legal Significance Doctrine in Delaware law is designed to
serve the interests in clarity and certainty of sophisticated parties to business combination
transactions, whereas the substance-over-form approach common in the federal securities
laws is designed to protect retail investors from the depredations of market professionals.
One way of viewing the entire problem of the treatment of non-reliance clauses under the
federal securities laws is to see the issue as arising from the mismatch between the law’s
solicitude for retail investors on the one hand and efficient bargaining between sophisticated
commercial parties on the other.
254. One-to-One Enterprises, Inc. v. Caruso, 848 F.2d 1283 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
255. Jackvony v. Riht Financial Corp., 873 F.2d 411 (1st Cir. 1989)
256. Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000). Others have noted the oddness
of these cases failing to discuss Section 29(a). See Lutz, supra note 9, at 813-814 (noting
the relevance of Section 29(a) to One-O-One and Rissman); Sachs, supra note 9, at 911
(citing One-O-One and stating that some Rule 10b-5 decisions upholding non-reliance
clauses disregard Section 29(a)).
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based on extra-contractual representations when the agreement between the
parties contained a clause in which the plaintiff represents that it is not
relying on any representations other than those contained in the agreement.
In each case, the court held that the non-reliance clause should be given
effect and dismissed the plaintiff’s Rule 10b-5 claim. Nevertheless, in each
of case, the court never considered the possibility that Section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act renders the non-reliance clause unenforceable, presumably
because the plaintiff’s counsel never raised the issue.
That such an oversight happened in the Seventh Circuit or District of
Columbia cases is surprising but understandable: it amounts to the
plaintiff’s lawyer failing to discover an on-point precedent, albeit it from a
different circuit and so of merely persuasive authority, that could have won
the case for his client. Still, that the same thing happened three times in
three different Circuit Courts of Appeals is remarkable, especially since all
three of the cases involved were decided long after Rogen and one of them
was decided years after Harsco as well. It is even more remarkable,
however, that one of the cases, Jackvony v. Riht Financial, was heard in the
First Circuit, the same circuit that decided Rogen. In other words, the
plaintiff’s counsel in Rogen appears to have failed to find a precedent
decision in the very circuit hearing the case that would have required the
court to rule in his client’s favor. That may well have been legal
malpractice. It is astonishing, however, that, not only did the plaintiffs’
attorneys in all three cases fail to discover the relevant precedents, but so
too did the judges themselves (and their clerks) on three different Circuit
Courts of Appeals, including the judges on the First Circuit who failed to
discover the precedent of their own court. The only thing even more
astonishing than this is who were the judges authoring the relevant
opinions. In Rissman v. Rissman in the Seventh Circuit, the judge writing
the opinion was Judge Frank Easterbrook. In One-o-One Enterprises v.
Caruso in the District of Columbia Circuit, the judge was Judge, now
Supreme Court Justice, Ruth Bader Ginsburg. In Jackvony v. Riht
Financial in the First Circuit, the judge was Judge, now Supreme Court
Justice, Stephen Breyer.
However this may be, the fact remains that although each of these
cases holds that non-reliance clauses will be given effect to defeat a Rule
10b-5 claim, since none of them considers the issue of whether nonreliance clauses are enforceable under Section 29(a), the precedential effect
of these cases for that critical question is low. Since this crucial issue was
never presented to these courts, the most that can reasonably be inferred
from these decisions is that these courts found the policy rationales for
making non-reliance clauses enforceable strong. The Third Circuit,
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however, also allowed that there was a strong efficiency argument for this
view, and it nevertheless held that Congress, in enacting Section 29(a),
decided for other reasons that non-reliance clauses should be
unenforceable. There would be nothing inconsistent if the courts that
decided Rissman v. Rissman, One-o-One Enterprises v. Caruso, and
Jackvony v. Riht Financial were to reach the same conclusion if, at some
point, they were presented with the relevant argument under Section 29(a).
II. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES
The balance of this Article formulates an argument for making nonreliance clauses between sophisticated parties involved in a business
combination enforceable under Section 29(a). That argument proceeds in
two stages. The first, which is contained in Part II, is an argument, already
foreshadowed above, that enforcing non-reliance agreements is efficient.257
257. Most scholars who have considered the problem have reached this conclusion. See
Blair, supra note 9, at 423 (arguing that non-reliance clauses should generally be
enforceable because, for sophisticated parties, they generally serve important contractual
purposes); Davis, supra note 9, at 507 (arguing that enforcing non-reliance clauses “may
permit certain parties to minimize the costs of transacting through agents”); Grove, supra
note 9, at 1144 (arguing that non-reliance clauses should constitute “conclusive proof of a
sophisticated party’s non-reliance on any representation or warranties not contained in the
final negotiated agreement” because non-reliance clauses “efficiently define [] the
boundaries of the transaction and preclude [] fraudulent Rule 10b-5 claims in corporate
acquisitions”); Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 451 (allowing that “the primary basis for justifying
the contractual disclaimer of reliance on the truthfulness of assertions is that this provision,
when used, is efficient, promoting predictability and certainty,” but arguing for limits on the
effects of non-reliance in blocking suits based on misleading representations and
omissions); Lutz, supra note 9, at 803 (arguing for the rule in Harsco over that AES on
efficiency grounds, including that enforcing non-reliance clauses reduces uncertainty,
litigation, and transaction costs); Masson, supra note 9, at 523 n.129 (2009) (stating, “Of
course, between sophisticated parties, one would assume that [a non-reliance] clause only
exists because it is a bargained-for clause in the contract, and so nonenforcement . . .
contradicts common ideas of efficiency.”); SIEDEL, supra note 9, at 19 (stating that the rule
in Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032 (Del. Ch. 2006) that
non-reliance clauses in agreement between sophisticated parties will be enforced meets
Delaware’s goal of having efficient commercial laws). But there are contrary views. See
Altman, supra note 9, at 747 (arguing that non-reliance clauses violate Section 29(a) and
should always be unenforceable); Sachs, supra note 9, at 879 (arguing that, under the
influence of the law and economics literature, courts have wrongly begun enforcing merger
clauses and other contractual provisions that are contrary to the regulatory, pro-security
buyer policy and intent of the federal securities laws). In a very closely-argued article,
Kevin Davis argues that the essential issue concerns the seller’s imperfect ability to monitor
the
statements
of
its
agents,
and
“once we take into account that most disclaimers of liability are actually disclaimers of
vicarious rather than primary liability, it becomes possible to formulate a rule of
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The analysis given here, however, will be far more elaborate than previous
arguments, whether in the case law or in the scholarly literature.258 The
second stage, which appears in Part III below, is an argument that, in part
because of the efficiency of the buyer’s relying on only those
representations by the seller in the definitive agreement between the
parties, no potential buyer in a business combination transaction could
reasonably rely on the accuracy or completeness of any representations by
the seller other than those in the definitive agreement. In other words, even
in the absence of a non-reliance clause, extra-contractual representations in
a business combination transaction should not be actionable under Rule
10b-5. Hence, a non-reliance clause does not in any way reduce the rights
of a buyer in such a transaction or weaken the protections the securities
laws afford the buyer. The function of the clause is to make express what
would otherwise be implicit and so to prevent opportunistic behavior by the
buyer—to wit, lying after the transaction closes about which
representations the buyer relied upon. Since a non-reliance clause neither
waives compliance with Rule 10b-5 (nor any other provision of the federal
securities laws) nor reduces the buyer’s rights under those laws but merely
makes it clearer what those rights are, non-reliance clauses in business
combination transactions do not violate Section 29(a) of the Exchange Act.
A. The Information Problem and its Solutions.
As noted above, the deal process for a business combination
transaction begins with the parties facing a serious problem about
information. That problem has two aspects. On the one hand, the buyer
lacks information about the business to be transferred that both parties
would prefer the buyer to have. On the other, the seller has vastly more
information about the target than the buyer will ever have and so may
potentially use this information opportunistically to exploit the buyer—a
conventional asymmetric information problem.
The first aspect of the information problem is a concern for both
parties, as how much the buyer will pay to acquire the business obviously
depends on the buyer’s assessment of the business, which in turn depends
enforceability which often, though not always, reconciles principles of respect for individual
autonomy, morality, and efficiency.” Davis, supra note 9, at 487.
258. See e.g., Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 435 (arguing that “in focusing on fraudulent
affirmative representations,” the analysis may “fall [] short of (1) recognizing the
fundamental aspect of deceptive promising in a complex deal, namely the half-truth, (2)
articulating an appropriate doctrinal principle to address it, or (3) capturing the social and
linguistic context that makes the deceptive half-truth so insidious”).
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on what information the buyer has about the business and how reliable the
buyer takes that information to be. With respect to positive information, at
least, the buyer’s incentives and the seller’s incentives are clearly aligned.
With respect to negative information about the target, the situation is more
complex and involves the asymmetric aspect of the problem as well.
Clearly, negative information about the target will reduce the amount the
buyer will pay, and the buyer has strong incentives to ferret out this
information lest it overpay for the target. For exactly the same reason, the
seller has strong incentives not to disclose such information. Still, sellers
also have countervailing incentives to bring even negative information
about the target to the buyer’s attention. For one thing, being sophisticated
and experienced parties, buyers are likely to discover such information in
any event, and so straightforward disclosure of negative information allows
the seller to control the timing and manner of its disclosure and to build
credibility by revealing information that it has a motive to conceal. For
another, sophisticated buyers tend to know, in a general way, where the
likely pitfalls concerning a business lie, and if the seller is not
straightforward about problems and difficulties in the target business, the
seller will often assume the worst, which could lead it to offer a price even
lower than accurate negative information would suggest. Thus, while their
relative weight will vary considerably with the circumstances, sellers, as
well as buyers, tend to have incentives favoring disclosure of even negative
information about the target.
The primary tools developed in the market for dealing with this
information problem are two: due diligence, and representations and
warranties. As shown below, these two tools are part of an integrated,
rational system to deal with the information problem inherent in business
combination transactions. Another part of this system is the array of
contractual provisions the parties typically employ: disclaimers and
promissory non-reliance clauses in confidentiality agreements and
representational non-reliance clauses in definitive agreements. In my view,
the inadequacy of prior accounts of the economics of non-reliance clauses
flows from a failure to see such clauses as part of an overall system that
functions to mitigate the information problem and ultimately produce an
efficient definitive agreement.
1.

Due Diligence

Early in the deal process, perhaps even before making contact with the
target, buyers will have studied carefully all publicly available information
about a target. Such information is universally regarded as meager,
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however, compared to the non-public information about the target that the
seller itself possesses.259 Hence, long before the parties enter into a
definitive agreement regarding the transaction, the seller provides the buyer
with tremendous amounts of this non-public information. But disclosing to
the buyer such information makes the seller vulnerable to various types of
opportunistic behavior by the buyer. For instance, an acquirer who is also a
competitor could gain access to the seller’s trade secrets or other
competitively sensitive information, decline to proceed with a transaction,
and then use the seller’s information to compete more effectively against
it.260 To limit the possibility of such behavior, the seller typically makes
any non-public information available to the buyer only after the parties
enter into a confidentiality agreement or non-disclosure agreement.261 The
key provisions in this agreement include promises by the buyer not to
further disclose the non-public information that it receives from the seller
and not to use such information for any purpose other than evaluating the
potential transaction with the seller. As we have seen, these agreements
also typically include two separate provisions relevant to the problem of
extra-contractual representations: (a) a disclaimer, in which the seller
disclaims making any representations or warranties as to the accuracy or
completeness of the information provided in due diligence, and (b) a nonreliance clause, in which the buyer promises not to rely on any information
provided in due diligence but only on the seller’s representations and
warranties, if any, made in the definitive agreement between the parties.
Although courts and commentators have generally assimilated these two
provisions, as we shall see they actually perform independent (and
independently important) functions.
a. The Vast Quantity of Information in Due Diligence
Now, the first thing to understand about the information a seller
provides in due diligence is that the quantity of information involved is
259. Indeed, Martin Lipton, the inventor of the poison pill, once commented that the
greatest impediment to hostile takeovers is not the poison pill but the acquirer’s inability to
access the internal information of the target about its business. See also Guhan
Subramanian, Bargaining in the Shadow of Takeover Defenses, 113 YALE L. J. 621, 659-662
(2003) (discussing the asymmetrical information problem in hostile takeovers).
260. This is a key allegation in Cigna Corp. v. Anthem, Inc., C.A. No. 2017-0109-JTL,
currently pending in the Delaware Court of Chancery. See the redacted, public version of
Cigna’s complaint at https://new.reorg-research.com/data/documents/20170406/58e6665f7b
943.PDF [https://perma.cc/PXQ9-A66Z].
261. NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note
5, at §§ 9.01-9.05.
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utterly enormous.262 A sense of the quantity and variety of information
involved can be gleaned by reviewing the standard due-diligence requests
lists of major law firms representing clients in business combination
transactions. Such lists typically include requests for, with respect to both
the seller and each of its subsidiaries, (a) organizational documents, such as
certificates of incorporation, bylaws, limited liability company agreements,
partnership or limited partnership agreements, shareholder agreements,
voting agreements, voting trust agreements, and shareholder rights plans, as
well as all minutes of meetings of the boards of the directors for the last
three years and a complete organizational chart for the seller; (b) financial
information, including all audited and unaudited financial statements for
the last three years, all correspondence between the seller and its auditors,
information about all material contingent liabilities and off-balance
arrangements of the seller, all budget and financial projections prepared in
the last three years and information about how actual results compared with
such budgets and projections, and all documents related to the seller’s
indebtedness, including loan agreements, credit facilities, indentures, note
or bond purchase agreements, private placement memoranda or other
offering documents for securities of the company, hedging agreements,
swaps, letters of credit, guarantees, and pledges and promissory notes,
along with a schedule of all mortgages, security interests, liens, or
encumbrances on any of the seller’s properties; (c) a list of all real property
owned by the company, along all deeds, mortgages, appraisals, title reports
or policies, surveys, and leases; (d) a list of all real properties leased by the
seller, along with all leases, renewals, amendments, estoppel certificates,
and similar documents; (e) a list of all personal property owned or leased
by the seller, including copies of leases related thereto; (f) a list of all
intellectual property owned by the seller, including trademarks, service
marks, copyrights, and patents, along with all assignments or licenses
related to intellectual property, all applications filed with the Patent and
Trademark Office or the Copyright Office and all correspondence related
thereto, and all cease and desist letters sent or received by the seller, as well
as a description of all non-patented proprietary information or trade secrets
material to the seller’s business; (g) documents related to the seller’s
compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX), especially in
regard to the seller’s internal controls over financial reporting and
disclosure controls and procedures under Section 404 of SOX; (h) all

262. NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note
5, at § 15A.01; Grove, supra note 9, at 1119 (stating, “During acquisition negotiations, the
purchaser wants access to all potentially relevant documents.”).
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contracts material to the seller or its business, including all capital leases,
sale-leaseback documents, joint venture or collaborative agreements,
confidentiality or non-disclosure agreements, contracts with customers or
suppliers, contracts related to acquisitions or dispositions of a material
amount of assets, contracts indemnifying any other party or guaranteeing
any obligation of any other party, all contracts with any government or
governmental authority, and all contracts limiting the seller’s right to
compete in any market or to solicit customers or employees in any market;
(i) an organizational chart for employees of the seller and all its business
units, along with all employment agreements, change of control
agreements, severance agreements, collective bargaining agreements or
union agreements, a list of all pending Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission, Department of Labor, unfair labor practice or similar actions,
copies of all employee benefit plans (along with applicable IRS
determination letters and most recent annual reports on Form 5500 related
thereto), all stock option, bonus or incentive compensation plans, copies of
all deferred compensation, retirement, pension, or profit-sharing plans; (j)
all contracts between the seller and any affiliate, subsidiary, employee,
director, officer, shareholder, or creditor of the seller; (k) documents related
to ongoing or threatened litigations to which the seller is a party, including
all complaints, answers, and related documents, and all audit response
letters of the seller for the last five years, as well as any settlement
agreements or consent decrees binding on the seller; (l) all material
government licenses or permits held by the seller, all governmental or
regulatory approvals received by the seller in the last five years, all
compliance reports or similar filings made by the seller with any
government agency or authority; (m) all environmental permits, notices of
violations, studies or reports received by the seller or related to any real
property in which the seller has an interest, including all notices or other
documents related to the seller’s potential liability under CERCLA; (n) all
federal, state, local and foreign tax reports filed by the seller in the last
three years, all tax-sharing agreements or other agreements related to the
payment of taxes, all correspondence with any taxing authority that has
jurisdiction over the seller, information regarding all net-operating losses or
built-in losses of the seller, all revenue rulings or tax opinions sought or
obtained by the seller in the last three years, and all property, payroll,
excise, sales and use, withholding, Social Security or similar tax returns or
reports filed by the seller in the last three years; (o) copies of all insurance
policies of the seller, including with regard to general liability, products
liability, personal injury liability, workers compensation, directors and
officers liability, and key man, along with an insurance run for the last five
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years; (p) information regarding the seller’s information systems, including
all assignments and licenses related thereto, as well information regarding
cybersecurity measures, including all reports received from experts or
consultants related to cybersecurity; and (q) all information and documents
related to the seller’s compliance with anti-corruption and anti-money
laundering laws, including the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, know-yourclient laws, the USA Patriot Act, and all regulations or rules of the Office
of Foreign Assets Control.263
Note too that this extremely long list is derived from generic due
diligence request lists. Depending on the nature of the seller, there will
certainly be additional requests for information about particularly important
aspects of the seller’s business—e.g., much more extensive requests for
information regarding environmental matters for a seller engaged in an
environmentally sensitive business such as petroleum production, or for
information about real estate matters for a real estate investment trust that
owns and operates shopping malls, or for information about anti-money
laundering and know-your-client matters for a commercial bank.
Nowadays, due diligence information is typically placed in an
electronic data room to which potential buyers are granted access.
Intralinks, the leading provider of data room services for parties involved in
business combination transacts, reports that the average quantity of
information that a seller in a business combination transaction uploads to a
data room is 50,000 pages.264 For transactions involving larger targets,
however, the quantity of information can vastly exceed this figure,
aggregating hundreds of thousands or even millions of pages of data.
Moreover, the information made available in electronic data rooms is
further supplemented by presentations by officers and advisors to the seller,
in-person meetings between representatives of the buyer and the seller
(often meetings down to the line-manager level, as well as meetings
between various kinds of specialists—e.g., human resources, tax,
accounting, information technology, etc.), and even on-site visits by
representatives of the buyer to inspect the seller’s properties and assets.
Indeed, in one recent transaction, when a private equity purchaser was
conducting due diligence on a potential target, more than 460 individuals
associated with the purchaser accessed the target’s electronic data room,
263. See generally NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND
DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at § 8.03 (providing a sample due diligence checklist); Public
Mergers and Acquisitions Due Diligence Checklist, Practical Law Checklist 4-382-9194.
264. Email from Brian Hwang, Director, Strategic Business Development at Intralinks,
Inc. to Robert Miller, Professor, University of Iowa College of Law (on file with the
author).
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and approximately 40 of the purchaser’s employees and agents rented a
hotel ballroom to hold meetings with about 20 employees of the target.265
In cases considering the effect of non-reliance and similar provisions,
courts often marvel at the length of the representations and warranties
included in definitive agreements. The court in Harsco, for instance,
remarks on the twenty-two pages of such representations and warranties.266
The average quantity of information a data room related to a business
combination transaction is more than two-thousand times this amount. The
sheer quantity of the information produced in due diligence, especially in
relation to the length of the representations that parties make in definitive
agreements, should make it perfectly obvious (as, indeed, it is obvious and
unquestioned among participants and their advisors in business
combination transactions) that the seller is most certainly not representing
and warranting the accuracy and completeness of this vast array of
information. Indeed, no one in his right mind could imagine that a seller
was making 50,000 pages of representations and warranties to the buyer,
covering in minute detail every imaginable aspect of the business it is
selling. In fact, in one recent Delaware case, Vice Chancellor Laster
regarded it as practically a reductio ad absurdum of a party’s position in
litigation that this position implied that a representation in a merger
agreement would be qualified by all the information the seller had
produced in due diligence.267
b. An Efficient Rate of Errors and Omissions in Due Diligence
Information
Furthermore, not only the quantity but also the quality of the
information produced in due diligence makes it unthinkable that the seller
is representing and warranting the accuracy and completeness of such
information. For, with extremely limited exceptions, the immense amount
of information that the seller makes available to the buyer is not specially
prepared by the seller for inclusion in the data room and delivery to the
265. Dell, Inc. v. Magnetar Global Event Driven Master Fund, Ltd., 177 A.3d 1, 13 (Del.
2017).
266. Harsco Corp. v. Segui, 91 F.3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1996).
267. Akorn, Inc. v. Fresenius Kabi AG, C.A. No. 2018-0300-JTL, 2018 WL 4719347
(Del. Ch. Oct. 1, 2018), at *80 (“As Akorn’s counsel candidly conceded during post-trial
argument, a regime which holds that a buyer cannot assert a breach of an MAE-qualified
representation if the buyer learned or could have learned about aspects of the risk covered
by the representation during due diligence turns an MAE-qualified representation into the
functional equivalent of a scheduled representation that schedules everything provided in
due diligence.”).
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buyer. On the contrary, the vast majority of the information placed in the
data room consists of business records of the seller generated in the
ordinary course of business.268 For example, employee handbooks and
information about the company’s benefit plans are typically prepared to
explain to employees, who are generally not themselves sophisticated
investors or experts in employment law, the benefits such employees
receive under those plans. They may not include information that an
acquirer, who may have to assume such plans as part of a business
combination transaction, would care about, such as the costs of such plans
to the company. Similarly, financial projections included in the financial
information in the data room may have been prepared as aspirational
documents to motivate employees entitled to various forms of incentive
compensation, not to predict with the greatest possible accuracy the future
performance of the company. Or again, when a buyer asks for all
environmental studies related to the company’s properties, the seller may
respond by placing all such studies in its possession in the data room,
including a Phase I environmental study related to one of its properties that,
the seller knows, became contaminated with hazardous waste only recently
and long after the date of the study. In other words, given the immense
amount of information buyers request and sellers deliver, the seller
necessarily supplies huge amounts of raw data drawn directly from its
business records, the production of the material often being delegated to
relatively junior employees who merely follow directives to deliver certain
kinds of information and who do not exercise any meaningful judgment
about whether the information being delivered provides a true and
complete picture of the relevant aspect of the seller’s business in the
context of a potential transaction between the seller and the buyer.
Now, since accuracy and completeness are costly, no rational business
invests in making its business records perfectly accurate and complete.
Rather, firms invest in accuracy and completeness only to the point that the
marginal benefits of accuracy and completeness exceed the costs, and
where this point is depends on the purpose for which the particular business
268. See Grove, supra note 9, at 1119 (suggesting that, in responding to requests for
information from a potential buyer, “[d]ifferent people, most of whom are lower-level
employees [of the seller] or outsiders [i.e., outside advisors], not authoritative
representatives of the seller, draft the documents,” and “the seller does not want to be bound
for the accuracy of these documents.”). Oftentimes, this is correct, as sellers do sometimes
produce documents specifically drafted to answer due diligence inquiries from buyers, and
especially on relatively minor or technical matters, these documents may be produced by the
kinds of individuals Grove indicates. Because sellers could (and often do) keep tight control
over documents specifically produced for buyers, I think the problem Grove identifies,
though undoubtedly real, is less important than those mentioned in the text.
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records were originally created. An airline, for instance, will invest more
in the accuracy and completeness of the maintenance records of its aircraft
than in those of the records of its price changes and promotional discounts.
Thus, large portions of the information a seller produces in due diligence
will have a positive error rate. Accordingly, no rational seller would ever
represent that the materials it delivers in due diligence are accurate and
complete, for every rational seller already knows that any such
representation would be false. Indeed, since the seller knows that any such
representation would be false making the representation would be
fraudulent. Or, it would be, except for the fact that buyers in business
combination transactions are themselves sophisticated parties who
understand all this perfectly well and treat due diligence materials
accordingly.269 In other words, buyers, as well as sellers, understand the
nature of the materials they are reviewing in due diligence and appreciate
that these certainly contain errors and inaccuracies.
Making matters even worse, the seller does not usually produce due
diligence materials all at once. Rather, since some materials are easier to
assemble than others, and since some materials are more important to
potential buyers than others, sellers tend to produce due diligence materials
in stages, delivering groups of documents into the data room over time. In
addition, the deal-process usually takes weeks or months, and so
information that did not exist at the beginning of the process (for instance,
financial statements covering periods concluded only after the data room is
269. Which answers what one commentator regards as the “core puzzle” of non-reliance
clauses: “why would any rational party in an arms-length contract ever agree to a provision
limiting or eliminating her recovery in cases when the other party intentionally lies to her?”
Blair, supra note 9, at 428-429. As explained in the text, the answer is, in short, that if the
buyer wants due diligence materials, those materials will contain inaccuracies and omissions
that the seller, in a real sense, knows are inaccuracies and omissions, but that correcting
these inaccuracies and omissions in the due diligence materials is extremely costly and more
costly than solving the problem by negotiating representations and warranties in the
definitive agreement for which the seller will assume liability. See id. at 476-479 (arguing
that buyers agree to non-reliance clauses because (a) agreeing to non-reliance clause will
lower the purchase price for the buyer, (b) the buyer may think that the risk of fraud by the
seller is low, and (c) the buyer may believe that extra-legal sanctions are sufficient
protections against fraud); Davis, supra note 9, at 503 (discussing the possibility that
extralegal sanctions may suffice to protect buyers); Masson, supra note 9, at 513 (arguing
that there are several legitimate reasons parties may agree to a non-reliance clause, including
(a) mitigating the potential hold-up problem arising from the expense and difficulty of
dismissing opportunistic, non-meritorious suits based on allegedly fraudulent extracontractual misrepresentations; and (b) mitigating the agency problem, in which sellers find
it difficult to monitor which representations their agents make and for which the seller may
be liable in fraud, while noting that, in exchange for the non-reliance clause, the seller may
reduce the purchase price.).
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opened) may be added to the due diligence materials as they are created
and become available. Often, sellers will deliver, at a later date,
information that updates or supersedes information delivered at an earlier
date. For example, an earlier draft of financial statements for a recent
interim period may be replaced by a later, revised and updated draft.
Similarly, some of the information in a data room relates to moving targets:
for instance, a list of the company’s real and leased properties may well
change during the course of the buyer’s due diligence investigation as the
seller acquires some properties, disposes of others, and enters into new
leases concerning yet others. Since the due diligence materials reflect
virtually all aspects of the seller’s business, and since that business
continues during the perhaps months-long process during which the buyer
conducts due diligence on the seller, naturally some information in the data
room will become stale and will, in some cases (but not necessarily all), be
superseded by information later added to the data room.
c. The Costs of Avoiding Fraud: Diligence Materials
The standard economic argument against fraud is that it is a form of
rent-seeking: the fraudster invests real resources in deceiving the victim in
order to transfer value from the victim to himself.270 Correlatively,
avoiding fraud is said to be costless because, although a person making a
representation would have to invest resources in order to know if the
representation is actually true, a person knows costlessly whether he
believes what he is saying is true, and since avoiding fraud only involves
avoiding making representations a person believes to be false, a person can
avoid committing fraud costlessly.271
270. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139 (8th ed. 2011) (stating
“The lie is different [from merely not disclosing information acquired by investing
resources]. The liar makes a positive investment in manufacturing and disseminating
misinformation. This investment is wasted from a social standpoint, so naturally the law
does not reward him for his lie.”). Lies are also different from negligent misrepresentations,
because the activity that involves making negligent misstatements is itself usually social
valuable, and punishing negligent misrepresentations thus runs the risk of reducing the level
of that activity below the optimum level. By contrast, since it is a form of rent-seeking, “the
optimal amount of fraud is zero,” and judges need not worry about over-deterring it.
Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991).
271. See Davis, supra note 9, at 498 n.55 (“Economists typically assume that the main
cost of avoiding misrepresentations is the cost of verifying one’s statements before making
them. This in turn implies that so long as scienter is an essential element of fraud and is
defined as knowledge of the falsity of a statement, it should be costless for a person to avoid
making a fraudulent misrepresentation.”); Paul G. Mahony, Precaution Costs and the Law
of Fraud in Impersonal Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 647 (1992) (referring to the argument
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This analysis is very plausible if we imagine two principals
negotiating face-to-face, communicating orally, which is often the
paradigm factual situation imagined by the common law. That is, when
one individual speaks face-to-face with another individual, he normally
does costlessly know his own state of mind in the way this analysis
presupposes.272 It should be apparent, however, that this argument
immediately breaks down if applied to the seller’s production of
information to the buyer in due diligence.273 As we saw above, in due
diligence information is transferred wholesale from the seller’s business
records to the buyer, and that information will certainly contain a nontrivial number of misstatements and omissions. Generally speaking, the
information is transferred without any review by anyone associated by the
that “It should be costless for defendants to avoid intentional falsehoods (they need only
decide not to lie)”); see also M. JOHN STERBA, LEGAL OPINION LETTERS: A COMPREHENSIVE
GUIDE TO OPINION LETTER PRACTICE § 12.17 (3rd ed. Supp. 2017) (“it is costless to avoid
intentional falsehoods—all that is needed is that the fraudfeasor avoid reckless misconduct
or decide not to lie”); Amanda M. Rose, The Multienforcer Approach to Securities Fraud
Deterrence: A Critical Analysis, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 2173, 2184 (observing that it is
commonly “assumed that fraud’s traditional scienter requirement ensures that regulated
parties can costlessly avoid liability.”); Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) TORTS, § 552 com. A
(AM. LAW INST. 1977) (contrasting, “honesty,” which “requires only that the maker of a
representation speak in good faith and without consciousness of a lack of any basis for
belief in the truth or accuracy of what he says,” with the care required to avoid negligent
misstatements. “Unlike the duty of honesty, the duty of care to be observed in supplying
information for use in commercial transactions implies an undertaking to observe a relative
standard, which may be defined only in terms of the use to which the information will be
put, weighed against the magnitude and probability of loss that might attend that use if the
information proves to be incorrect.”).
272. But perhaps not always. The analysis assumes that, in epistemic logic, if I know
that P, then I know that I know P (that is, in the standard formalism of epistemic logic,
K(P)→KK(P)), and if I do not know P, then I know that I do not know P (that is,
¬K(P)→K(¬K(P))). These are Axioms (4) and (5) in Lemmon’s well-known nomenclature
in modal logic. See generally E.J. LEMMON, AN INTRODUCTION TO MODAL LOGIC (1978).
Whether they hold in all cases, or even generally, for individual knowing agents is not
obvious. In particular, Axiom (5) is a strong assumption. See generally J.J. Meyer,
Epistemic Logic, in THE BLACKWELL GUIDE TO PHILOSOPHICAL LOGIC (L. Goble, ed. 2001).
273. See Davis, supra note 9, at 487 (emphasizing “the lack of congruence between the
reality of modern contracting behavior, in which transacting through agents is typical, and
legal analyses, both doctrinal and theoretical, which appear to be predicated on the
assumption that face-to-face bargaining in the norm.”). Some scholars do not agree. See
Altman, supra note 9, at 760 (indicating that, “[s]urely if a party is one-hundred percent
honest in its dealing leading up to a sale, and those dealings are well recorded, it has nothing
to fear should the other party challenge it in court.”). The burden of the current and
succeeding subsections is to show that this is not correct—that avoiding liability for fraud
(let alone avoiding situations in which a party could be sued for fraud with enough
plausibility to produce a suit with significant settlement value) is in fact extremely costly in
the context of a typical business combination transaction.
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seller, certainly not by senior personnel or anyone else in a position to
detect and correct apparent (let alone real) misstatements and omissions.
So why then not require the buyer to review the diligence materials
before delivering them to the seller, not to remove all actual misstatements
and omissions but just to remove all the statements and supply all the
omissions that the seller believes should be corrected—that is, to correct
the materials enough to ensure they are not fraudulent? The answer is that
even this kind of review and correction of the materials would be an
immensely costly undertaking. We know this to a certainty because, in
some contexts, parties do undertake to produce information that they expect
will be held to a Rule 10b-5 standard of accuracy, and producing such
information turns out to be extremely costly. The most obvious example is
the representations and warranties in the definitive agreement, but others
include registration statements in securities offerings, filings under the
Exchange Act, and certain other documents used in securities offerings,274
and producing such documents is known to be a long, slow process,
absorbing considerable resources, including extensive labor by
businesspeople and legal counsel. To take a close analogy to the present
case, in Rule 144A securities offerings,275 it is customary for the issuer’s
counsel276 to review the offering memorandum under which the securities
are sold and deliver to the purchaser a so-called negative assurance or Rule
10b-5 letter in which the counsel states that, based on its review of
specified documents and its participation in discussions and meetings
relating to the securities offering, nothing has come to its attention that has
caused it to believe that the offering memorandum either contains any
untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state any material fact
necessary in order to make the statements in the offering memorandum, in
light of the circumstances under which those statements were made, not
misleading.277 Before issuing such a letter, it is standard practice in the
274. As Freund puts it, “It is [the seller’s lawyer’s] job to cross-examine seller’s business
people on their disclosures [in the representations and warranties and related disclosure
schedule], just as he would do if he were preparing a prospectus.” ANATOMY OF A MERGER,
supra note 42, at § 7.2.2.
275. See generally LLOYD S. HARMETZ, MORRISON & FOERSTER, WHAT IS RULE 144A?
(2009), available at http://media.mofo.com/docs/pdf/FAQRule144A.pdf [https://perma.cc/D
79Z-8JAZ] (regarding Rule 144A transactions); Purchase Agreement: Rule
144A/Regulation S Offering of Non-Convertible Debt (US Issuer), Practical Law Standard
Document 1-517-6951.
276. Bond counsel (the law firm selected by the placement agent to represent the
interests of the purchasers, who are usually not definitively determined until almost
immediately before the purchase agreement is executed) undertakes a similar review. See
generally id.
277. Purchase Agreement: Rule 144A/Regulation S Offering of Non-Convertible Debt
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industry for the law firm to prepare, for its internal purposes, a version of
the offering memorandum in which every factual assertion in every
sentence is checked, with footnotes added to support each assertion. Since
the offering memorandum is usually more than one hundred pages long,
this is a significant undertaking, and it is typical for counsel to charge the
client an additional seven-figure fee for a negative assurance letter. In fact,
this fee (along with a similar fee for a similar service from the bondholders’
counsel) are among the more important cost factors affecting Rule 144A
offerings. If the cost of a negative assurance letter for a hundred-page
offering memorandum is, say, $5 million, then the cost for a similar review
of fifty thousand pages of diligence materials could easily reach $2.5
billion.
The lesson here is that, contrary to what may be the case in the
common-law paradigm of two individuals negotiating face-to-face, the
costs to the seller of detecting and remedying statements it believes are
false (not just actually false statements) in the diligence materials in a
significant business combination transaction are very high.278 This is a
(US Issuer), Practical Law Standard Document 1-517-6951.
278. This argument in this and other sections of this Part considers the costs of avoiding
statements that the seller knows are false. In fact, the problem is much more acute because
the scienter requirement under the common law and Rule 10b-5 is generally satisfied not
only if the speaker knows the statement made is false but also if the speaker makes the
statement recklessly, that is, with reckless disregard of its truth or falsity. Although Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976) left open the question of whether recklessness
suffices for a Rule 10b-5 claim, the lower federal courts have generally held that it does.
See e.g., Ackerman v. Schwartz, 947 F.2d 841, 847 (7th Cir. 1991) (holding recklessness is
sufficient to establish liability under Rule 10b-5); Broad v. Rockwell International Corp.,
642 F.2d 929, 961 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding that recklessness satisfies the scienter
requirement for Rule 10b-5); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 554 F.2d 790, 793 (7th Cir.
1977) (holding that reckless behavior constitutes scienter for civil liability for a Rule 10b-5
claim); Hoffman v. Estabrook & Co., 587 F.2d 509, 516 (1st Cir. 1978) (assuming that
recklessness will support an action for a 10b-5 claim). See generally Samuel W. Buell,
What is Securities Fraud? 61 DUKE L. J. 511 (2011); Kevin R. Johnson, Liability for
Reckless Misrepresentations and Omissions Under Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 59 U. CIN. L. REV. 667 (1991). If it is costly for a seller to ensure that its
statements are not knowingly false, it is obviously much more costly to ensure that they are
not recklessly so, especially given that some of the interpretations of recklessness adopted
by lower federal courts involve no subjective component but seem equivalent to objective
gross negligence. For example, in the Seventh Circuit, recklessness requires conduct that is
“highly unreasonable, involving not merely simple, or even inexcusable negligence, but an
extreme departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that the
actor must have been aware of it,” Sundstrand Corp. v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033,
1045 (1977), which makes it sound as if reckless requires a subjective consciousness of
wrongdoing, similar to, for example, an oversight breach under Delaware corporate law.
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crucial fact, and it has very important consequences. In particular, it opens
the question of how the parties can most cheaply deal with the costs of such
misstatements and omissions—whether by action by the seller, action by
the buyer, or some form of joint action.
d. Meetings and Presentations in Due Diligence
Furthermore, as noted above, beyond the written due diligence
materials that the seller provides the buyer, sellers and buyers typically
arrange for an extensive series of meetings between their representatives to
allow the seller to make presentations to the buyer and to allow the buyer to
ask questions of the seller. Some of these meetings will involve senior
officers of the parties accompanied by their financial, legal, or accounting
advisors. At such meetings, the most high-level and important matters will
be discussed. But many of the due diligence meetings will involve more
junior representatives of the party meeting to discuss more particular
matters. For example, relatively junior lawyers from the parties’ respective
general counsels’ offices specializing in intellectual property may meet to
review patents held and patent applications filed by, the seller. Similarly,
information technology professionals from the two companies may meet to
discuss how the two companies’ respective information systems could be
combined if the transaction is concluded. Especially if the companies
operate in the same or similar industries, line managers may meet with their
counterparts to discuss relevant business operations. Representatives of the
buyer may visit some of the seller’s facilities and speak with relatively
junior employees such as plant managers, shop forepersons, employees
who are union officials, and so on. The conversations had in such meetings
will generally not be recorded in any form. At best, the only records of
what was said at many such meetings will be handwritten or similar notes
of one participant in the meeting.
There are several important consequences of this.
First,
representatives of the seller speaking to the buyer will in many cases be
relatively junior employees. This means they may lack a comprehensive
view of the company, and, moreover, they may not be familiar with
See e.g., Stone v. Ritter, 911 A.2d 362 (Del. 2006) (noting that oversight liability requires a
failure to act in good faith). Unfortunately, however, the court in Sundstrand went on to say
that “the risk of misleading buyers must be actually known or sufficiently obvious that the
reasonable man would know of it,” which sounds rather like ordinary negligence even
though the court clearly thought that ordinary negligence would not suffice; see also West &
Lewis, Jr., supra note 2, at 1013-1016 (explaining that “fraud is not limited to deliberate
lying” and discussing claims of negligent misrepresentation).
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business combinations generally or the potential transaction between the
parties in particular. As a result, they may very well, in perfect honesty,
make misstatements of facts or omit to state material facts, in their dealings
with the representatives of the seller. Second, because so many
conversations between representatives of the seller and those of the buyer
take place in particular contexts among specialists, many of the statements
made will be perfectly true in the context in which they are made—that is,
against the background of expert knowledge and implicit qualifications
apparent to experts in the field who had participated in a particular meeting
or conversation. Removed from that context, however, such statements
may well be false or misleading. The upshot of this is that representatives
of the seller will say many things to representatives of the buyer that may
well be true, in the particular context in which they are said, that would not
true if removed from that context—the context being very hard or
impossible to reproduce after the fact. Third, agents of the seller may have
incentives to prevaricate, whether because they perceive doing so to be in
the interests of the seller or even contrary to the interests of the seller but in
their own interests.279 For all these reasons, just as in the written due
diligence materials sellers place in data rooms, misstatements and
omissions in the oral communications between representatives of the buyer
and those of the seller are virtually inevitable, including misstatements and
omissions that the seller, acting through its senior officers or experts, would
recognize as misstatements and omissions.

279. Davis argues that in business transactions between sophisticated parties, the seller
often faces high costs of monitoring its agents, who may have incentives to make fraudulent
representations to the buyer. On this basis, he argues that it is not immoral to allow the
seller to escape vicarious liability for the wrongdoing of its agents, especially if the buyer is
better able to detect their frauds than the seller. Davis, supra note 9, at 497-501. This is a
perceptive and persuasive argument, and it complements many of the arguments in this
article. I find less persuasive, however, Davis’s arguments that buyers are, in a meaningful
percentage of cases, able to detect fraud by the seller’s agents more cheaply than could the
seller itself. Given that buyers are virtually entirely dependent on the seller and its agents
for information, buyers would seem especially poorly placed to detect fraud. In any case, I
would suggest that overzealous or self-seeking agents are not the primary source of
misstatements, even knowing misstatements, by sellers in due diligence in a business
combination transactions (Davis does not suggest otherwise; he is not focused on business
combinations but commercial transactions more broadly where, for instance, salespeople
may have incentives to exaggerate the qualities of the firm’s goods when trying to induce
customers to buy.). Much more important in business combinations is the sheer volume of
information made available to buyers and the fact that such information has been prepared
for use in quite different contexts and for quite difference purposes and so, from the point of
view a buyer of the company, may contain inaccurate or misleading statements. See Section
II.A.1.
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e. The Costs of Avoiding Fraud: Oral Due Diligence
Could the seller monitor the oral communications of its various agents
as they interact with agents of the buyer in due diligence in order to prevent
or correct fraudulent misstatements by such agents? In some sense, yes,
but the costs of doing so would be extremely high.280 In essence, every oral
communication would have to be vetted ahead of time or monitored in real
time by agents of the seller with sufficient knowledge of the business and
sufficient legal expertise to ensure that every statement made met a Rule
10b-5 standard for accuracy and completeness. This could be done, but it
would convert informal meetings and discussions between businesspeople
into the something more like depositions, with the speaker formulating
each answer after consulting with a variety of other people in the company
and legal counsel. Besides the direct costs involved, mostly in the form of
legal fees, the indirect costs in the form of management’s time and delay in
reaching an agreement with the seller (which comes with all manner of
consequential costs, such as damage to the business when it is perceived to
be in play, defections of employees and customers, leaks about the
transaction or its terms to the market, and so on) would be immense. Once
again, as with written diligence materials, we see that the simple paradigm
in which a party can costlessly avoid making fraudulent misstatements or
omissions breaks down, and, in fact, the costs of avoiding such
misstatements and omissions becomes very high.281
There is another reason, applicable to both written materials placed in
280. Davis, supra note 9, at 511-512; see also Grove, supra note 9, at 1119, 1143
(stating that “a seller cannot possibly know all information disclosed by its employees
[orally] or prove the non-existence of an alleged oral statement”). In a related context,
Judge Easterbook has said, “If such a claim of oral inconsistency [i.e., the plaintiff’s claim
that the defendant or its agents made oral representations at variance with the written
disclosure related to a securities transaction] were enough, sellers’ risk would be greatly
enlarged. All buyers would have to pay a risk premium to cover this extra cost of doing
business.”). Acme Propane, Inc. v. Tenexco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1317, 1322 (7th Cir. 1988). See
generally Eric Rasmussen, Agency Law and Contract Formation, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV.
368 (2004).
281. Davis, whose account centers on how enforcing non-reliance clauses can minimize
the costs of transacting for entities that act through agents, argues that agents often have
positive incentives to lie to the counterparty in order to conclude a sale of the business.
Davis, supra note 9, at 503. There are certainly situations in which this is true, as when the
seller is selling only a division, not the whole company, and its agents will receive bonuses
or other forms of incentive compensation if the sale is completed. In other situations,
however, as when the seller is selling the entire company and the seller’s agents expect that
they will soon be employees of the buyer, their loyalties can swing away from the seller to
the buyer, and in such cases their incentives are to be extremely forthcoming, even revealing
matters that the seller has instructed them to keep secret.
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data rooms but especially relevant to oral statements, that avoiding
fraudulent misstatements and omissions is difficult and costly. That reason
is that the matters on which the seller is speaking are in many cases
inherently extremely complex.282 To be true and not misleading, therefore,
many statements about such matters may have to be very carefully phrased
and elaborated qualified. For example, in the merger agreement at issue in
In re IBP Shareholders Litigation, as in virtually all business combination
agreements,283 the seller represented to the buyer that, since a certain date,
the target company had not suffered a material adverse effect.284 This
sounds simple enough, but the representation is clearly denying that certain
changes in the state or condition of the company has occurred, and so the
establishment of the baseline for any subsequent comparison is crucial to
the meaning of the representation, and as Vice Chancellor, now Chief
Justice, Strine explained, the representation created a very complex
baseline against which to measure changes. In fact, the representation
stated that no material adverse effect had occurred relative to the condition
of the company as set forth in a set of financial statements dated as of a
specific date, as adjusted by disclosures in a Form 10-K and three
subsequent Forms 10-Q filed after that date, as further adjusted by
disclosures made in the definitive agreement.285 Without this elaborate
baseline, a statement by the seller that the company had not suffered a
material adverse effect may well be false and indeed knowingly false.
Because of the complexity of the matters being discussed, crafting a
statement that is literally true turns out to be a difficult and costly business.
The sheer complexity of the matters being discussed, therefore, creates an
additional and independent reason why contrary to what many have
thought’, avoiding lying is not, in the context of a business combination
282. See Blair, supra note 9, at 434 (stating, “[p]arties or one of their agents . . . may
make assertions that appear to mean one thing in one context and seem to mean something
quite different in a later context.”).
283. NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note
5, at § 11.04[9].
284. Of course, “Material Adverse Effect” was itself a very carefully defined term, In re
IBP, Inc., Shareholders Litig., 789 A.2d 14, 65 (Del. Ch. 2001) which makes the argument
in the text even stronger. See Robert T. Miller, The Economics of Deal Risk: Allocating Risk
Through MAC Clauses in Business Combination Agreements, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
2007 (2008) (discussing clauses common in definitions of “material adverse change” or
“material adverse effect”).
285. See In re IBP, Inc., 789 A.2d at 66 (where the court states, “Taken together, these
provisions can be read to require the court to examine whether a MAE has occurred against
the December 25, 1999 condition of IBP as adjusted by the specific disclosures of the
Warranted Financials and the Agreement itself.”). The “Warranted Financials” included
“IBP’s 1999 10-K and its 10-Qs for the first three quarters of 2000.” Id. at 43.
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transaction, always costless.286
f. The Impossibility of Reasonable Reliance and the Function of
Disclaimers
To summarize, then, the materials that the seller produces to the buyer
in due diligence include an enormous amount of written materials,
generally tens of thousands or, in larger transactions, even hundreds of
thousands of pages. A large part of this information is drawn directly from
the business records of the seller that were prepared in the ordinary course
of business and so not for the purpose of providing a potential buyer with
an accurate and complete description of the seller’s business. In fact, since
a rational business invests in the accuracy and completeness of its business
records only to the point that the marginal cost of doing so equals the
marginal benefit, and since the marginal benefit of accuracy and
completeness is generally much lower in contexts arising in the ordinary
course of business than in the context of representations to be made by the
seller to the buyer in a business combination transaction, both the seller and
the buyer can be certain that the business records contained in the seller’s
due diligence materials contain some misstatements of material facts as
well as some omissions that make other statements made in the materials
materially misleading. The same is true of the oral communications
between representatives of the seller and those of the buyer. Finally, since
the buyer’s due diligence review will extend over a period of weeks or
months, the materials produced by the seller are necessarily always a work
in progress, with some materials becoming inaccurate or incomplete as the
seller’s business develops and market conditions change. Hence, the due
diligence materials are not a fixed body of statements but an evolving mass
of information, with new materials being added as they become available
and some older materials being superseded.
I suggest that anyone familiar with due diligence reviews in business
combination transactions could not reasonably believe that the seller was
representing and warranting that every statement in this tremendous,
evolving, fluid mass of information was accurate and complete. The
primary reason is that such a state of affairs is a manifest impossibility.
Hence, any such representation would be not only false but obviously false,
286. See Lipshaw, supra note 9, at 435 (arguing that “in focusing on fraudulent
affirmative representations,” the analysis may “fall [] short of (1) recognizing the
fundamental aspect of deceptive promising in a complex deal, namely the half-truth, (2)
articulating an appropriate doctrinal principle to address it, or (3) capturing the social and
linguistic context that makes the deceptive half-truth so insidious”).
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and any seller who gave such a representation would be committing fraud.
Buyers understand this as well as sellers. This, if correct, explains the true
nature of the disclaimers we find in confidentiality agreements: when the
seller says it makes no representation or warranty as to the accuracy or
completeness of the information it delivers to the seller, the contractual
disclaimer is merely making explicit what both parties to the contract
already know. Disclaimers exist not so much to put the buyer on guard (the
buyer already knows there will be errors and omissions in the due diligence
materials) nor to alter the rights and obligations between the parties (on the
facts, because reliance would be so unreasonable the buyer should not have
a good case for misrepresentation, whether contractual or fraudulent, based
on statements in due diligence), but to forestall opportunistic lawsuits by a
buyer when it may be difficult for the seller to prove ex-post, to judges and
jurors unfamiliar with the relevant market practices, facts that the buyer
and seller would both readily admit ex-ante.287
Now, someone may wonder just what the seller is doing in delivering
all this information to the buyer if the seller is not in effect saying that the
information is true and complete. Put another way, if the information that
the seller delivers to the buyer in due diligence is not reliable, what good is
it?
The answer to this question begins from the observation that it is not
only possible but extremely common in human life for one person to call
another person’s attention to a proposition without asserting the proposition
himself.288 It is even more common for a person to deliver information
without thereby assuming legal liability for its accuracy and completeness.
Although creating legal liability for the seller is not one of them, there are
in fact several important purposes achieved in due diligence. First, in due
diligence, the seller can inspect the business and form his own conclusions
about it. When a physical object is being sold, a seller may allow the buyer
to inspect the object in order to form his own opinions about it. With a
business, the analogue is allowing the seller to inspect the books and
records of the company (as well as inspect the physical assets, which, as
noted above, is usually also done in due diligence). Although the seller
allows the buyer to inspect the books and records of the company, it does
not thereby commit itself to saying that every statement made in those
287. There are other reasons that a buyer could not reasonably rely on certain statements
made by a seller in due diligence. See e.g., Blair, supra note 9, 434 (noting that sellers
“often puff their products or services” and “sometimes over-opportunistically predict their
capacity or willingness to perform”). These reasons seem to me relevantly minor compared
to the reasons identified in the text.
288. See FREGE, supra note 139, at § 2.
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books and records is accurate and complete.
Or, to take a particularly important example, buyers are naturally
intensely interested in any financial projections for the company that
management may have prepared.289 When the seller delivers a set of
financial projections, however, no one thinks that the seller is representing
and warranting that the projections will, in fact, be achieved. Precisely
because they are projections sophisticated businesspeople understand not
only that any number of factors could cause them not to be achieved but
also that, for this and other reasons,290 no rational seller would ever
represent and warrant that such projections would actually be achieved.291
Nevertheless, seeing management’s best estimate prepared not for sales
purposes but in the ordinary course of business, of the future cash flows of
the company is extremely valuable information for a buyer trying to value
the company. Something analogous is true for due diligence materials
generally. Even treating them for what they are—basically, the books and
records of the company and the unfiltered and possibly unreliable opinions
of its personnel—the information a buyer gets in due diligence,
appropriately discounted to reflect its degree of reliability, is very valuable
to the buyer.
This reference to discounting is important. The question of the
seller’s liability for misstatements or omissions in the diligence materials is
an all-or-nothing thing: either the seller has liability, or it does not.292 But
the question of the reliability of the seller’s statements in due diligence is
not all-or-nothing. The buyer can, and certainly does, assign to each such
statement whatever subjective probability it thinks is appropriate in light of
the facts and circumstances as the buyer understands them. That
probability would be higher if the seller was liable for misstatements and
omissions, lower if the seller is not, but even in that latter case it will
289. See supra Section II.A.1.a.
290. If the seller promised (since it relates to the future, it is a promise, not a
representation we are considering) that the projections would be achieved, it would in effect
be guaranteeing the future financial success of the business. Since, after the sale, the buyer
and not the seller controls the business, the buyer could adopt a high-risk, high-return
strategy for the business, benefiting greatly if the strategy worked out but being protected
from its failure by the guaranteed return promised in the projections if it did not. The
misalignment of incentives and resulting inefficiencies here are manifest.
291. In rare cases, seller will make representations and warranties about financial
projections in the definitive agreement. When they do so, the customary representation
states that the projections were prepared by the company’s managers in good faith and on a
reasonable basis, but that no representation is made as to whether they will actually be
fulfilled.
292. See generally Saul Levmore, Probabilistic Recoveries, Restitution, and Recurring
Wrongs, 19 J. OF LEGAL STUDIES 691 (1990).
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generally be very much greater than zero, and this means that the
information is valuable to the buyer in evaluating the transaction.
There is an even more important purpose, however, in the seller’s
making available to the buyer information that both parties understand will
contain inaccuracies and omissions. For, as indicated above, due diligence
is part of an efficient process for reaching an efficient transaction. Buyers
will use information acquired in due diligence in order to negotiate
representations and warranties in the definitive agreement. In other words,
buyers do not really need the seller to assume legal liability for the
accuracy and completeness of all of the statements contained in diligence
materials because the buyer and the seller will later negotiate, on the shared
basis of information contained in the diligence materials, which
representations and warranties the seller will actually make and the buyer
will actually rely on. To that topic, I now turn.
2. Discovering Efficient Representations and Warranties
As I noted at the outset, the parties to large business combination
transactions are sophisticated, rational profit-maximizers who will structure
their transactions efficiently, that is, by dividing rights and obligations
minutely and then allocating rights to the party that values them most
highly and obligations to the party that can bear the associated costs most
cheaply.293 They do this to maximizes the joint surplus from the exchange
and so maximize each party’s opportunity to profit from the transaction,
allocating the joint surplus through the price term. This point applies as
much to representations and warranties as to any other provision in the
contract between the parties.
a. Representations that Increase the Joint Surplus
Now, prior to the sale of the target, the seller bears all the risks
associated with owning the target, and after the sale, the buyer bears these
risks. Representations and warranties in the agreement shift some of these
risks back to the seller, for if the statement about the business in the
representation turns out to be false (or knowingly false), then the seller is
liable to the buyer. Hence, each representation that the seller makes creates
a benefit for the buyer and generates a cost for the seller. It may thus seem
that the buyer would want the seller to make as many representations as
possible and the seller would want to make as few representations as
293. See supra Introduction.
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possible—and, indeed, this is the case, if we hold all other terms of the
agreement, including the price term, fixed. In the real world, however,
these other terms are not irrevocably fixed prior to the time the parties enter
into a definitive agreement. The result of this is that the simple picture
suggested above—buyers want more representations, sellers less—is not
correct. Rather, because both parties want to maximize the joint surplus of
the transaction, ex-ante both parties want the seller to make all and only the
efficient representations, that is, those that increase the joint surplus
because the benefit to the buyer of receiving the representation exceeds the
cost to the seller of making it.294
The first thing that follows from this is that neither the buyer nor the
seller wants the seller to represent and warrant all the thousands or millions
of statements included in the due diligence materials. Given that sellers
generally have low information costs related to facts about the target
business, there are many matters for which the cost to the seller of making
a representation is less than the benefit to the buyer of receiving one, but
this is not universally true.295 In fact, the vast body of statements contained
in due diligence materials inevitably includes a huge number of statements
with respect to which the benefit to the buyer of having a representation
would exceed the cost to the seller of making the representation.296
Furthermore, identifying the efficient representations requires comparing
the benefit to the buyer of receiving the representation, which is known the
buyer alone, with the cost to the seller of making the representation, which
is known to the seller alone. Hence, neither party acting alone can identify
the efficient representations; rather, identifying the efficient representations
294. Ex post, of course, when all the other terms of the agreement are fixed, the buyer
wants to the seller to have made as many representations as possible, and the seller wants to
have made as few representations as possible. This point determines the incentives of the
parties in any post-closing litigation and is reflected in the fact that, in the non-reliance
cases, the buyer is arguing that a certain representation was made, and the seller is arguing
that no such representation was made (or, if made, is not actionable).
295. On the length of representations and warranties and the myriad matters about which
seller customarily make representations, see ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 42, at §
7.1.3, (sagely counseling selling clients that “the purchaser is entitled to full disclosure—
even if that means a lot of work for seller in dishing up the facts.”); see also NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at § 11.04
(discussing representations about corporate organization and existence, good standing as a
foreign corporation, subsidiaries, due authorization of the agreement, required approvals,
financial statements, undisclosed liabilities, absence of material adverse changes, litigation,
compliance with law, environmental matters, title to assets, taxes, employee benefit plans
and matters, and accuracy of disclosure).
296. Cf. ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 42, at § 7.1.1 (stating that “representations
constitute a systematic smoke-out of the data about the seller that buyer feels is important”).
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requires cooperation between the buyer and the seller. How is this
cooperation effected? Clearly, it takes the form of bargaining over which
representations the seller will make and the buyer will receive.
Now, for the bargaining process to achieve the intended result of
identifying the efficient representations, both parties need to understand in
great detail the business being transferred. The seller, of course, already
understands the business.297 The buyer, however, does not, but it must
quickly come to do so in order to bargain intelligently with the seller about
which representations to include in the agreement. This brings us back to
due diligence. The purpose (or, at least, one purpose) of the seller’s
delivering so much information to the buyer is not for the seller to represent
and warrant that such information is accurate and complete but to enable
the buyer to bargain effectively against the seller in order that the parties,
working together by bargaining, may identify the efficient representations,
which the seller will then make to the buyer in the definitive agreement.
Due diligence is not the making of representations and warranties; it is a
necessary condition for the parties being able to negotiate efficient
representations and warranties.
b. In the Context of an Agreement
There is another critically important reason why the set of efficient
representations can be determined only in the course of bargaining towards
a definitive agreement. For, the benefit to the buyer of receiving a
representation and the cost to the seller of making that representation both
depend not only on the content of the representation (that is, the factual
statement it embodies) but also on the other provisions included in the
definitive agreement of which it is a part. For example, business
combination agreements involving private company targets typically
provide that the seller will indemnify the buyer for breaches of the seller’s
representations and warranties in the agreement,298 but such agreements
297. What the seller might not understand (or understand fully), however, is what
aspects of the business are important to the buyer. Due diligence is not a one-way street:
although it begins with sellers delivering vast quantities of information to buyers, buyers ask
questions and request additional information about issues that are important to them. As
Freund puts it, the process of negotiating representations “forc[es] the seller to focus on
significant aspects of his business, in a way he has probably never previously attempted, in
order that important information can be formally transmitted to the purchaser.” ANATOMY
OF A MERGER, supra note 42, at § 7.1.1.
298. NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note
5, at § 15.01; see ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 42, at § 7.1.1 (explaining the
relationship between representations and indemnification provisions); West & Lewis, Jr.,
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also typically limit this contractual remedy (which is usually the exclusive
remedy, except in cases of fraud) by making it subject to deductibles (or
baskets)299 and a cap.300 The same set of representations and warranties are
more valuable to the buyer and more costly to the seller if the
indemnification deductibles are low and the cap high; conversely, the
representations are less valuable to the buyer and less costly to the seller if
the indemnification deductibles are high and the cap low.
Or again, in agreements related to public companies (which typically
omit indemnification provisions),301 one of the most important functions of
the representations is to establish a closing condition for the buyer.302 The
typical condition is that the representations made by the seller at the time
the agreement is signed must still be true, to some standard or other, at the
time of closing. For instance, the standard, which is commonly called a
bring-down, could be that the representations remain true in all material
respects, or that the representations remain true except for such failures to
be true as would not have a material adverse effect on the company.303
How valuable a representation is to the buyer, and how costly to the seller,
in terms of its effect on the buyer’s obligation to close the transaction will
thus depend on the nature of the bring-down. The same set of
representations will be more valuable to the buyer and most costly to the
seller if the bring-down standard requires only that the representations be
supra note 2, at 1019 (“Sophisticated corporate agreements also often include
indemnification and exclusive remedy provisions, which work in concert to establish a set of
procedures and damage caps that limit the remedies available to a party for proven breaches
of contractual representations and warranties.”) (emphasis in original).
299. A basket is a clause that provides that the indemnifying party will not be liable to
the indemnified parties until the aggregate value of all claims for indemnity exceed a certain
stated amount, but once the claims exceed that amount the indemnifying parties are liable
for the entire amount of all such claims (not the entire amount of such claims less the stated
amount, which is a conventional deductible as in a consumer insurance policy). See
NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at §
15.03[1].
300. Id. at § 15.03[1].
301. See ANATOMY OF A MERGER, supra note 42, at § 5.3.1 (explaining why acquisitions
of targets that are public companies typically do not include indemnification provisions).
302. Id. at § 7.1.1 (explaining that one function of representations and warranties is to
interact with the closing condition so that negative information about the target discovered
after signing and before closing may result in a breach of representation and failure of the
closing condition that the representations remain true at closing).
NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at §14.02[1]-[3].
303. See NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra
note 5, at §§ 14.02[1]-[3]. The text ignores the so-called double-materiality problem, id. at
§14.02[[3], but including it merely complicates the exposition without advancing the
argument.
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true in all material respects; the representations will be less valuable to the
buyer and less costly to the seller if the bring-down standard requires only
that the representations not be breached in a manner resulting in a material
adverse effect.
Therefore, to determine which representations are efficient, not only
must the parties work together to compare the benefit to the buyer of
receiving the representation to the cost to the seller of making it, but they
must also do this in the context of an overall agreement, for only in such a
context can this comparison sensibly be made.304 In other words, the only
way for the parties to identify the set of efficient representations is to
bargain over which representations will be included in the definitive
agreement. Hence, value-maximizing parties would not want the seller to
make any representations except for those negotiated with the buyer in the
context of the definitive agreement.
c. The Economic Function of Non-Reliance Clauses
But if, for the reasons given above, sophisticated parties, who want to
maximize the value of the joint surplus, would not want the seller to make,
or the buyer to receive, any representations except for those in the
definitive agreement, then the economic function of non-reliance clauses
becomes apparent. Just as with disclaimers of the accuracy and
completeness of the diligence materials, non-reliance clauses merely make
express what sophisticated, value-maximizing parties involved in business
combination transactions have already agreed to. The ultimate purpose of
non-reliance clauses is to identify and include in the agreement all and only
the efficient representations. They are tools for facilitating the creation of
efficient agreements.
Negotiated representations in real business combination agreements
demonstrate this process at work. For example, buyers naturally want
information about contracts between the target business and its customers.
If cost were not an issue, the buyer would want to see all of the contracts
between the seller and buyer. Suppose that, in due diligence, the seller
makes many of these contracts available to the buyer. From this and other
aspects of due diligence, the buyer learns that the number of such contracts
is extremely large (say many thousands), the dollar amounts of such
304. As Kling and Nugent put it, “It is important for lawyers to bear in mind that an
acquisition transaction is an interactive process in which the acquisition agreement serves as
both a template which reflects matters which are of significance to the parties and as a ‘road
map’ of how the parties get from deal concept to consummation.” NEGOTIATED
ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra note 5, at § 1.06.
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contracts tend to be low relative to the value of the deal, and almost all
such contracts are terminable by customers for any reason or no reason on
30 days notice. Nevertheless, there are a relatively small number of
contracts in which the dollar values are higher and the termination
provisions less friendly to the buyer (perhaps, for example, because
delivering the unusually large quantity of goods and services under these
agreements requires special investments by the company). On this basis,
the buyer requests that the seller represent that a schedule attached to the
definitive agreement contain a list of all the agreements the seller has with
its customers that (a) obligate the customer to pay at least $1 million in the
next twelve months, or (b) the customer may not terminate on less than 180
days notice.305 The seller, who still knows its customer contracts better
than the buyer, replies that the number of such agreements will still be very
large, and so assembling the list requested and ensuring that it is complete
and up to date would be very costly. The seller counteroffers to produce a
list of all the agreements it has with costumers (a) under which the
customer is obligated to pay at least $2 million in the next twelve months,
or (b) under which the customer is obligated to pay at least $1 million in
the next twelve months and which the customer may not terminate on less
than 180 days notice. The seller knows that, with these changes, the list
will not be difficult to produce (perhaps querying its software for this list is
easy, while querying it for the list the buyer wanted impossible). The
change makes little difference to the buyer and may in itself convey
valuable information (for example, because it makes clearer to the buyer
which kinds of contracts by the company require special investments in
order for the company to perform on them). The parties thus agree that the
seller will make the representation in the language proposed by the seller.
The parties are here effectively trading off the costs of the seller in making
the representation (including the potential liability for inaccuracy) against
the benefits to the buyer of receiving the representation.306
305. Cf. NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra
note 5, at §§ 1.06 (stating that in the discussion of the relationship between due diligence
and representations and warranties, “a party may well ask for a specific representation and
warranty on a certain topic because its investigation of the business being acquired has
convinced it that such a topic is particularly important to that business or has made it aware
of a specific problem or concern as to which it wants the added comfort of a specific
representation.”).
306. Cf. NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS, supra
note 5, at § 1.06 (stating, “The scope of a buyer’s due diligence may also (unwittingly,
perhaps) form the basis of the ‘definition’ of materiality in the representations,” because, for
example, “if the seller wishes to limit its representations as to contracts by providing that it
is being made as to contracts for sales in excess of a certain dollar volume, the dollar
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3. An Efficient Process to Produce an Efficient Agreement
The relationship between the two tools to solve the information
problem inherent in business combination transactions—due diligence and
the representations and warranties in the definitive agreement—thus finally
comes into focus. Both the seller and buyer understand that the purpose of
the seller’s making so much information available to the buyer in due
diligence is not for the buyer to rely on it. Indeed, even the AES court
understood that “a buyer who relies on seller-provided information without
seeking to verify it has not acted reasonably.”307 Rather, as contemplated
by the confidentiality agreement, the parties go into the due diligences
process with the expectation that, after the buyer has concluded its
investigation of the company, the buyer and the seller will negotiate which
representations the seller will make in the definitive agreement. The
purpose of the buyer’s due diligence investigation (or, at least, one such
purpose) is to make this negotiation possible.
Negotiating the
representations is critically important because, since both parties want to
reach an agreement that maximizes the joint-surplus of the transaction, the
parties in particular want the agreement to contain all and only the
representations that benefit the buyer more to receive than they cost the
seller to make. Identifying these representations, however, requires a
comparison of the benefit the representation confers on the buyer, which is
known only to the buyer, and the cost to the seller of making the
representation, which is known only to the seller. Moreover, these benefits
and costs depend not only on the content of the representation but also on
other provisions in the agreement, such as the indemnification provisions
and the closing conditions that are keyed to the representations. Hence, the
only way to determine which representations are efficient is for the parties
to negotiate about the representations in the context of a definitive
agreement. Since both parties clearly understand this from the beginning
of the transaction process, the confidentiality agreement, which is executed
before the process begins, typically provides that the only representations
and warranties the seller will make will be those contained in the definitive
agreement, and the buyer agrees to this by promising that it will not rely on
any representations by the seller except for representations in the definitive
agreement.
Hence, it becomes apparent why non-reliance clauses are efficient.

amount chosen by the parties may well mirror the dollar amount reflected in the agreements
the buyer has examined in its due diligence process.”).
307. AES Corp. v. Dow Chem. Co., 325 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2003).
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Indeed, they are efficient in two senses. On the one hand, they are efficient
because they facilitate and structure a process of information sharing and
negotiation needed to reach an agreement containing an efficient set of
representations. On the other hand, they are efficient because they exclude
from the transaction only representations that were not efficient,
representations that the parties omitted from their agreement precisely
because the cost of including them would have exceeded the benefit of
doing so.
The representations that non-reliance clauses make
unenforceable are precisely the ones that the parties not only have not
agreed to (this is obvious) but also would not have agreed to.308
III. NON-RELIANCE CLAUSES AND HOW THE CIRCUIT SPLIT ABOUT
THE EFFECT OF SECTION 29(A) SHOULD BE RESOLVED
The argument above shows that, in the context of a business
combination transaction, sophisticated parties know that (a) the information
the seller makes available to the buyer in due diligence will have a positive
error rate and so will contain a non-trivial number of misstatements and
omissions, (b) that if every statement in the information the seller makes
available to the buyer in due diligence were treated as an enforceable
representation, the result would be an agreement containing a vast number
of inefficient representations, thus reducing the joint surplus of the
transaction and making both the seller and the buyer worse off, and (c) both
parties expect and find it in their interest to determine the efficient set of
representations in negotiating the final definitive agreement. Sophisticated
parties know all these things not only because they are sophisticated and
can be counted upon to know what is in their own best interests but also
because these matters are so well understood in the market for corporate
control that they have become embodied in customary market practices.
308. The argument in the text is really an unusual application of the Coase theorem.
Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1960). In the more usual
situation, the argument goes that, because transactions costs were high, a gap exists in a
contract between the parties; had transaction costs been zero (or low), the parties would
have agreed to a particular provision, because, in the context of their agreement, that
provision would have been efficient. See e.g., Katz v. Oak Industries, Inc., 508 A.2d 873,
880 (Del. Ch. 1986). The argument in the text is that, because transaction costs are low and
because a certain provision does not appear in the contract between the parties, that
provision would not have been efficient in the context of the agreement between the parties.
These two arguments are applications of the two conditionals that, together, are logically
equivalent to the biconditional in the Coasean claim that, if transaction costs between the
parties negotiating an agreement are zero, then a provision will be included in the agreement
if, but only if, it is efficient in the context of the agreement.
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One convincing proof of this is that the contractual clauses giving effect to
these market practices—disclaimers by the seller of any representations as
to the accuracy and completeness of the information in the due diligence
materials and non-reliance clauses by buyers representing or promising that
they are relying on no representations of the seller except those included in
the definitive agreement—are boilerplate provisions in model
confidentiality agreements published by such organizations as the
American Bar Association309 and the New York City Bar Association.310
309. See ABA, Confidentiality Agreement, in MODEL STOCK PURCHASE AGREEMENT 83
(2d ed. 2010) (providing “Neither party to this letter agreement . . . has made or will make
any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the
Evaluation Material,” “neither [party] shall have any liability to the other party hereto . . .
from the use of the Evaluation Material or any errors therein or omissions therefrom,” and
“[e]ach party hereto also agrees that it is not entitled to rely on the accuracy or completeness
of any Evaluation Material and that it shall be entitled to rely solely on such representations
or warranties regarding the Evaluation Material or the subject matter thereof as may be
made in any definitive agreement” related to the transaction.). Compare, Sachs, supra note
9, at 909 (worrying “whether it is reasonable to expect investors to ferret out a merger
clause from a voluminous offering document of considerable complexity.”). Such concerns
are understandable in the contexts that Sachs appears to have in mind—namely, situations
involving a sophisticated party dealing with a retail investor, not two sophisticated parties
dealing with each other, which is the focus of this article. As I emphasized at the outset, the
argument here concerns business combination transactions (and by analogy some similar
complex corporate transactions) in which both parties are highly sophisticated and in which
all competent transactional lawyers would expect to see disclaimers and promissory nonreliance clauses in confidentiality agreements and representational non-reliance clauses in
definitive agreements. In quite different contexts, like those Sachs has in mind, the
appropriate outcomes of cases could be quite different. Others who have considered the
problem of enforcing non-reliance clauses have usually had sophisticated parties in mind,
though not necessarily only in the context of business combination transactions. See also
Blair, supra note 9, at 428 n.17 (distinguish situations involving sophisticated parties from
those involving “consumer contracts or contracts involving radically disparate bargaining
power.”); Masson, supra note 9, at 528 (discussing how New York law distinguishes
between agreements between sophisticated commercial parties and consumer contracts
when determining whether to enforce non-reliance clauses); West & Lewis, Jr., supra note
2, at 1033 (“Contracts made between sophisticated parties, represented by counsel, who
freely decided after extensive negotiations to allocate risk in a carefully crafted written
agreement are fundamentally different from the adherence contracts made by consumers
who buy cars, rent jet skis, or sign consents allowing their children to participate in rafting
excursions.”). Kevin Davis’s account, which is focused on how enforcing non-reliance
clauses can minimize the costs of transacting through agents, would seem to apply to any
parties, whether sophisticated or not, who transact through agents. Davis, supra note 9, at
507.
310. See Model Form of Non-Disclosure Agreement § 4, Corporation Law Committee of
the New York City Bar Association (2015), available at https://www.nycbar.org/pdf/report/
New_York_City_Bar_Association_Model_Form_of_Non-Disclosure_Agreement_2015.pdf
[https://perma.cc/29Z3-K392] (“Buyer acknowledges and agrees that: (a) no representation
or warranty, express or implied, is made by the Company or any of its Representatives as to
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Under these circumstances, no reasonable seller understands itself to
be making representations to the buyer when it makes available to the
buyer due diligence materials. For exactly the same reasons, no person in
the position of the buyer could reasonably understand that, in making
available to it information in due diligence, the seller was making
representations to it. No reasonable buyer would expect the seller to make
representations that both parties know are not true and complete.
Furthermore, both parties understand perfectly well that there is a
process—namely, the negotiation of the definitive agreement—whereby
they will work out the set of efficient representations and that the buyer
will make such representations to the seller if, but only if, they actually
enter into an agreement to effect a business combination. Therefore, even
in the absence of an agreement embodying a non-reliance clause,
sophisticated parties involved in a business combination transaction cannot
reasonably understand the seller to be making representations to the buyer
in the information provided the buyer in due diligence, and so, even in the
absence of a non-reliance clause, a seller cannot reasonable rely on any
putative extra-contractual representations.311 This brings us to the true
function of non-reliance clauses: by making express in a legally binding
way an efficient arrangement for the discovery and negotiation of efficient
representations in the definitive agreement, non-reliance clauses prevent
one party (the buyer) from taking opportunistic advantage of the other party
(the seller).312 That is, in due diligence the seller makes available to the
buyer certain information about the target, some of which the parties know
will almost inevitably include misstatements and omissions. The parties
understand and agree from the beginning, however, that this information

the accuracy or completeness of any of the Evaluation Material; and (b) Buyer shall be
entitled to rely only on those representations and warranties that are expressly set forth in
any definitive written agreement that is hereafter executed and delivered by both Buyer or
its Affiliate and the Company in connection with the Transaction . . . . Except as may be
expressly set forth in a Definitive Transaction Agreement, none of the Company or any of
its Representatives shall have any liability to Buyer or any of its Representatives on account
of the use of any Evaluation Material by Buyer or any of its Representatives or any
inaccuracy therein or omission therefrom”). In the interest of full disclosure, the author
notes that he is the current chairman of the New York City Bar Association’s Corporation
Law Committee, which was responsible for drafting the model agreement, and was a
member of that committee in 2015 when the model agreement was published.
311. Recall that even the AES court understands that “a buyer who relies on sellerprovided information without seeking to verify it has not acted reasonably.” AES Corp. v.
The Dow Chemical Co., 325 F.3d 174, 181 (3d Cir. 2003).
312. See Rissman v. Rissman, 213 F.3d 381 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating written non-reliance
clauses protect parties from “the vagaries of memory and the risks of fabrication”).
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will not be treated as representations by the seller;313 rather, sharing the
information facilitates the negotiating of such representations in the
definitive agreement. By engaging in this sharing, however, the seller
makes itself vulnerable to a later lying claim by the buyer that the seller
induced the buyer into the transaction by making fraudulent representations
to it in due diligence. The way to prevent such opportunistic behavior is a
non-reliance clause, a promise (in a preliminary agreement) and a
representation (in a definitive agreement) by the buyer that it is not relying
on information disclosed in due diligence. A more complete representation
would state that the buyer understood that the information it received from
the seller in due diligence contained errors and omissions, probably a great
many of them, and that both the seller and the buyer, knew this, and knew
that each other knew this, but that the buyer and seller both believed the
seller’s making such information available to the buyer on these terms was
in their common interest.314
From all this, it should be clear that any interpretation of Rule 10b-5
that imposes liability on sellers in business combination transactions for
misstatements and omissions in due diligence materials would result in
great inefficiencies in the market for corporate control. In my view, the
argument for this conclusion is overwhelming.315 But, as explained above
313. Cf. Grove, supra note 9, at 1121 (holding that a “[non-reliance clause] is not a
waiver but a statement of fact”).
314. Compare the language in big boy letters, which typically includes provisions that
one party is or may be in possession of material, nonpublic information about the securities
that are the subject of the sale and purchase and that the counterparty is aware of this fact
but does not desire that the party with such information disclose it. See, e.g., WACHTELL,
LIPTON, ROSEN & KATZ, supra note 81, at 1 (discussing typical provisions in big boy letters);
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 81, at 2 (discussing the differences between non-reliance clauses
and big boy letters); Eshmoli, supra note 81, at 153 (noting preclusion of reasonable
reliance in big boy letters).
315. Readers insufficiently impressed with efficiency rationales may still worry about
the moral aspects of a system that, on rare occasions, allows one sophisticated party to
intentionally lie and escape liability therefor. The answer to this, I think, is twofold. First,
given the nature of the system, any lies the seller may tell pre-contractually are almost
certainly immaterial (which means that, though lies and perhaps fraud, they would not
support any meaningful damages), for if they concern significant matters, they would be
incorporated in the seller’s representations in the definitive agreement, and as such they
would be actionable (indeed, actionable in contract and not merely in fraud). Getting the
efficient representations (and only the efficient representations) into the definitive
agreement is, after all, the point of the system. But no system is perfect, and there will
occasionally be lies that go unpunished at law. This is hardly surprising since any
enforcement mechanism is expensive to operate, which means that the marginal benefit of
reducing the incidence of the kind of conduct to be suppressed down to zero (usually)
eventually exceeds the marginal cost. The only thing surprising in this case is that the
optimal enforcement system has been almost completely privatized by the market
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in Part I, the issue faced by courts in determining whether disclaimers and
non-reliance clauses will be given effect in accordance with their terms is
not one of merely interpreting Rule 10b-5. Practically every court that has
viewed the question merely in these terms316 has concluded that disclaimers
and non-reliance clauses should be given effect, but the more difficult
question of statutory interpretation concerns whether Section 29(a) of the
Exchange Act makes such contract terms unenforceable as a matter of
federal law. To that final question, I now turn.
A. Section 29(a) As Non-Circumvention Provision and Disclaimers and
Non-Reliance Clauses as Not Circumventing
By its terms, Section 29(a) is a non-circumvention provision. That is,
its purpose is to prevent the parties engaged in securities transactions
governed by the Exchange Act from agreeing by contract that certain rights
allocated by the federal securities law to one party will be retransferred to
the other party. Those rights undoubtedly include rights under Rule 10b-5,
which are essentially rights not to be defrauded by material misstatements
or misleading omissions. Hence, under Section 29(a), an agreement that a
representation otherwise actionable under Rule 10b-5 will not be
actionable—a transfer of a certain right from the buyer to the seller—is
unenforceable. So far, so good.
But which rights the buyer has under Rule 10b-5 to transfer depends
on which representations the seller previously made to the buyer. That is,
before a contractual provision can violate Section 29(a) by transferring
rights from one party to another, the party transferring those rights must
participants, but even that is not surprising when we remember we are dealing with very
sophisticated parties involved in very high-stakes transactions. An answer to the argument
that lying is immoral and should be punished that does not work, I think, is that, while some
lies are immoral, not all are (e.g., the famous case of lying to the Nazis to protect the Jews
hiding in the attic). Blair, supra note 9; see generally SISSELA BOK, LYING (1999). One
may well think that lies to save lives, divert evildoers or madmen from their pernicious
ends, or safeguard privacy are morally permissible, but that does nothing to show that lies
about the subject matter of a contract being negotiated between potential contracting parties
are permissible. Chief Justice Strine is certainly correct when he says that lies in such a
context are among the most inexcusable kinds of lies. Abry Partners V, L.P. v. F&W
Acquisition, LLC, 891 A.2d 1032, 1058 (Del. Ch. 2006). When Blair argues that “fraud is
not categorically unreasonable” because “there are other social goods that can, in proper
circumstances, offset the need to impose liability for fraud,” Blair, supra note 9, at 464, I
think he is confusing fraud, the optimal level of which is zero, and reducing the incidence of
fraud to zero by enforcement action, which is very likely not optimal.
316. See supra Section I.C.3 on the cases in the First, Seventh, and District of Columbia
Circuits.
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actually have those rights. In this case, the rights in question would be
rights the party has because the other party has made certain false or
misleading representations to it. Hence, before a party has any rights that
could be transferred in violation of Section 29(a), the other party must have
made to the party a false or misleading representation.317
Now, as the argument above has shown, as typically used in the
market for corporate control, disclaimers and non-reliance clause do not
reallocate rights from the seller back to the buyer. That is, we do not have
a situation in which the seller has made false or misleading representations
to the buyer in due diligence on which the buyer could have reasonably
relied, thus acquiring a certain kind of right—a cause of action under Rule
10b-5—which such right is then transferred to the seller by contract. That
is nothing like what occurs. As we saw, even in the absence of disclaimers
and promissory non-reliance clauses in the preliminary agreements and
representational non-reliance clauses in the definitive agreement, the
market realities of business combination transactions ensure that rational,
profit-maximizing parties involved in such transactions would not want,
and to not understand, sellers to be making representations and buyers to be
receiving them in the due diligence process. Rather, in pursuing an
efficient and value-maximizing transaction, both sellers and buyers want
only the representations that they negotiate in the definitive agreement to
have any legal effect. The disclaimers and non-reliance clauses they
employ do not change their understanding of how rights and obligations are
being allocated. They merely memorialize this understanding to prevent ex
post opportunistic defalcations.
Another way to grasp this point is to consider the temporal
relationships between the creation of the relevant contractual provisions
and the alleged misrepresentations in due diligence. That is, if we had a
process in which a seller makes representations to the buyer on which the
buyer, in the circumstances, could reasonably rely, and then, when the
parties are negotiating the definitive agreement, the seller slips into the
agreement a clause in which the buyer represents that it is relying on no
representations of the seller except for those contained in the definitive
agreement, we would indeed have a very problematic situation. For one
thing, the seller would have made representations on which the buyer likely
did reasonably rely, and so the contractual provision in the agreement
would be transferring by contract rights that the buyer had acquired under
317. Lutz, supra note 9, at 846 (arguing that because it would be unreasonable for a
buyer to rely on extra-contractual representations in a business combination transaction,
non-reliance clauses do not waive existing rights but merely make explicit the fact that
reliance on extra-contractual representations was unreasonable).
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federal law (or, at least, rights the buyer would acquire once the parties
entered into a binding agreement and that was a sale and purchase of
securities). For another, the representation that the buyer would give
stating that it is not relying on extra-contractual representations would
likely be false when given. Similarly, if the provision in the definitive
agreement were a disclaimer, in which the seller disclaims making any
representations or warranties except in the definitive agreement, the
disclaimer is likely a false representation when made: it is simply not true,
as a matter of fact, that the seller had made no representations except those
in the contract. Given the implausibility of these contractual provisions,
such provisions would likely best be understood as waivers of rights
already accrued, and in that case the correct result is no doubt that such
provisions are void under Section 29(a).
But, as explained above, this scenario bears no resemblance to what
actually occurs in the market for corporate control. There, as we saw, what
typically happens—and what the parties from the beginning of the process
understand will happen—is that at the very outset, before due diligence
begins, the parties enter into a preliminary agreement in which the seller
disclaims any representations as to the accuracy or completeness of the due
diligence materials and the buyer promises not to rely on any of those
materials in entering into the definitive agreement. At this point, before the
seller has made any representations to the buyer, the buyer of course has
no rights under Rule 10b-5, for there are no representations with respect to
which such rights could accrue. Thus, disclaimers and promissory nonreliance clauses in preliminary agreements cannot possibly be transferring
rights in violation of Section 29(a). At most, they are controlling the
creation of such rights that, absent these contractual provisions, the
subsequent behavior of the parties might cause to accrue. But even that is
not the case, because, as we saw, the disclaimers and promissory nonreliance clauses are really only memorializing the only reasonable
understanding of the market realities at issue. Hence, it is clear that such
provisions in the preliminary agreement do not violate Section 29(a).
Subsequently, in the definitive agreement, the parties typically include
a representation by the buyer stating that it has not relied on any extracontractual representations of the seller. Clearly, this representation does
not run afoul of Section 29(a) either. For, in giving the representation, the
buyer is merely representing that it has performed on its promise in the
preliminary agreement, and it would be nonsense if the earlier contractual
promise and its fulfillment did not violate Section 29(a) but a mere
subsequent representation by the party that it fulfilled these obligations
somehow did. The representational non-reliance clause in the definitive
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agreement is a statement that certain rights never accrued; unless false
when given, it does not attempt to transfer rights but rather confirms that
certain rights were never created in the first place.318
Therefore, disclaimers and promissory non-reliance provisions in
preliminary agreements and representational non-reliance provisions in
definitive agreements are not devices that, individually or in the aggregate,
transfer rights created by Rule 10b-5 or other provisions of the federal
securities laws. Such contractual provisions are thus not void under
Section 29(a). Indeed, so far from being devices for transferring rights
created under federal law, these contractual provisions are integral parts of
a process of determining which representations the seller will make and the
buyer will receive—that is, they help the parties identify the efficient set of
representations. Such contractual provisions thus in no way “weaken [the
buyer’s] ability to recover under the Exchange Act.”319
Someone might object that this argument, which places great weight
on the difference between a representation never having been made and a
representation having been made and then negated by contract, is
excessively formalistic. I think that objection misses a crucial point. As I
emphasized several times, it is not so much the contractual provisions that
allocate and reallocate rights here; it is the underlying market realities
themselves. Given the quantity and nature of due diligence materials and
the economic interests of the parties in negotiating efficient representations
only as part of a definitive agreement, no reasonable seller understands
itself as making representations in due diligence, and no reasonable buyer
understands itself as receiving such representations. Giving effect to
disclaimers and non-reliance provisions is thus emphatically not
formalistic; it is just the opposite: it is to give effect to realities in the
marketplace. If there is any unrealistic formalism here, it is to apply Rule
10b-5 in literal accordance with its terms but in ways that would seem
patently absurd and unreal to businesspeople involved in the transaction.

318. Cf. Grove, supra note 9, at 1143 (concluding that non-reliance clauses do “not
waive compliance with 1934 Act” but “merely affect [] the question of whether there is a
Rule 10b-5 violation in the first place. One cannot waive a right one does not have.”).
319. Shearson/American Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 231 (1987); see also
Grove, supra note 9, at 1131 (discussing the relevance of Shearson/American Express to the
issue of the effectiveness of non-reliance clauses).
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B. Section 29(a) as Not Prohibiting Agreements About Which
Representations Are Being Made
Above I suggested that Section 29(a) should be understood as
prohibiting any transfer of rights that parties obtain under the Exchange
Act, including Rule 10b-5, and I argued that disclaimers and promissory
non-reliance clauses and representational non-reliance clauses in definitive
agreements do not work any such transfer. But it seems clear that Section
29(a) does not even prohibit all transfers of accrued rights under Rule 10b5.
Consider the following example. Suppose that the parties enter into a
binding agreement for the sale and purchase of securities that includes
several representations by the seller about the securities being transferred
and the underlying business. After the agreement is signed but before the
transaction is closed, the parties renegotiate the deal in important respects,
amending the agreement to change the price of the securities and the
quantity sold; they also make extensive changes to the seller’s
representations in the agreement, deleting some, adding others, and
modifying yet others. The amended agreement includes a full integration
clause that expressly states that the amended agreement supersedes the
original amendment, and it also contains a representational non-reliance
clause in which the buyer represents that, in entering into the amended
agreement, it is relying on no representations or warranties of the seller
except for those set forth in the amended agreement. After the transaction
as specified in the amended agreement closes, the buyer sues the seller
under Rule 10b-5 alleging that certain representations made by the buyer
were false or misleading, including (a) some alleged extra-contractual
representations that appeared in neither the original nor the amended
agreement, and (b) some representations that appeared in the original
agreement but were deleted from the amended agreement.
Courts such as the First and Third Circuit would say that Section 29(a)
voids the representational non-reliance clause as to the extra-contractual
representations, which allows the plaintiff’s suit to proceed with respect to
these claims (of course, whether the plaintiff will succeed in proving
reasonable reliance is another matter). But what of the claim based on the
representations that had been included in the original agreement but were
removed when the parties agreed to the amendment? It is patently absurd
to say that the buyer can sue on those representations. Why? Obviously,
because in entering into the amended agreement, the buyer expressly
agreed that such representations would no longer be part of the agreement.
No reasonable interpretation of Section 29(a) would make it impossible for
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parties to amend an agreement in a way that deletes a representation that
had previously been part of the deal. But if, without offending Section
29(a), a seller can make a representation in a legally binding agreement,
something that obviously causes rights to accrue to the other party under
Rule 10b-5, and then by agreement with the buyer remove that
representation from the agreement so that the buyer may no longer rely
upon it and so no longer sue on the basis of it under Rule 10b-5, why
cannot the parties agree to do exactly the same thing with respect to a
representation that was never part of the agreement in the first place?
Even more, why can they not do so with respect to a statement that, even
before it was made, the seller disclaimed, and the buyer promised not to
rely upon? There are no good answers to these questions. If Section 29(a)
allows representations made in legally binding agreements to be voided by
the agreement of the parties, it must also allow the parties to agree in the
first instance which representations will be included in their agreement. Its
reasoning may have been inadequate, but the Second Circuit was
essentially correct when it held in Harsco that nothing in Section 29(a)
prevents sophisticated parties from agreeing as to which representations the
buyer makes. Section 29(a) does prevent the parties from agreeing that
Rule 10b-5 will not apply to representations one party makes to another,
but it does not prevent the parties from agreeing which representations they
want to make and receive.320
When the Supreme Court finally resolves the split between the Second
Circuit and the First and Third Circuits regarding the enforceability of
disclaimers and non-reliance clauses under Section 29(a) of the Exchange
Act, it should hold that, at least as between sophisticated parties engaged in
business combination transactions in the market for corporate control, such
provisions should be enforceable in accordance with their terms.321

320. See Davis, supra note 9, at 496 (discussing whether non-reliance clauses amount to
retractions of prior fraudulent representations and concluding that “the most satisfying
approach seems to be to say that if a misrepresentation has been retracted in the clearest
possible language it should not be considered to have induced entry into a subsequent
contract.”).
321. See Grove, supra note 9, at 1145 (pointing out that, even apart from the merits of
such a result, making non-reliance clauses in agreements between sophisticated parties
enforceable would further the Supreme Court’s announced policy of keeping the scope of
the private right of action under Rule 10b-5 narrow); see. e.g., Stoneridge Investment
Partners v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 U.S. 148, 167 (2008) (referring to “the narrow
dimensions we must give to a right of action Congress did not authorize when it first
enacted the statute and did not expand when it revisited the law.”).
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CONCLUSION
Anyone familiar with the due diligence process has to be impressed
with the vast quantities of information involved and recognize the
inevitability that such information will, in some respects, be inaccurate and
incomplete. There is usually, moreover, a mad rush on the part of the seller
to produce such information, and an equally mad rush on the part of the
buyer to review it. On the other hand, the representations included in a
definitive agreement are often negotiated word by word by senior counsel
with the involvement of various senior officers from the company and other
expert advisors, and at some point counsel will typically insist that the
relevant business people review the representations (and many schedules
qualifying them) word by word and sentence by sentence to check their
accuracy and completeness. The contrast between the level of care
involved in the diligence materials and the representations could not be
starker. Anyone who has witnessed this firsthand cannot help but see why
both parties want the buyer to rely on the representations in the agreement
and nothing else. In other words, if non-reliance clauses did not exist, they
would have to be invented.
In this regard, I remind the reader of the commonly-heard argument
that anyone can avoid making a fraudulent statement at zero cost because
he knows, immediately and costlessly, before he opens his mouth, whether
he believes that the statement he is about to make is true. As I indicated
above, this is likely correct in the vast majority of cases when one
individual human being is speaking to another, which is the paradigm
situation presupposed by the common law. It is emphatically not true,
however, when one large organization delivers tens of thousands, hundreds
of thousands, or even millions of pages of information to another, or when
their various agents meet and discuss such material. In that context, it turns
out that avoiding fraud—and not just lying or mistaken claims of fraud
brought after the fact by disappointed or opportunistic buyers—is actually
very costly.
What emerges from the contrast is that common law judges developed
a set of rules that were very likely efficient at a time when face-to-face
negotiations between individual human beings were the norm. Perhaps
such situations still are the norm, but, however this may be, the rules of the
common law undoubtedly assume that the transactions costs faced by the
parties are the kinds of costs typically faced by individual human beings
dealing with other individual human beings. We have today—and have
had for a long time—to consider as well quite different kinds of parties
interacting in quite different kinds of contexts, contexts where the relevant
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transaction costs may be materially different from those of individual
human beings interacting with other individual human beings. In such
cases, the market usually supplies a fix in the form of agreements that vary
the common law rule, replacing it with a rule that responds to the different
cost structures the parties actually face. Thus, forms of deal technology
arise to create efficient rules for parties for whom the common law rules
would be inefficient. Common law judges, like the judges on the Delaware
Court of Chancery and the Delaware Supreme Court, usually see such
things for what they are and allow the parties to make rules appropriate for
their situation. In other words, they enforce the relevant agreements.
Difficulties arise, however, when legislatures make rules of wide
applicability that do not allow for adaption to the vastly different situations
and cost structures that parties who come within the rule actually face.
This is the underlying problem with Section 29(a). Congress enacted this
provision with one class of case in mind, presumably a kind that it thought
common at the time, back in 1934. Fortunately, the text of Section 29(a) is
sufficiently open-textured to allow federal courts to find that disclaimers
and non-reliance clauses of the kinds typically used in business
combination transactions are enforceable. But this is more a matter of good
luck than anything else. If Congress had said something slightly different,
reaching the socially-desirable result may have been impossible. The
lesson is one of the omnipresent danger of writing an inflexible rule for a
complex and evolving world.

